



Words of Appreciation

The original syllabus of UPSC Mains General Studies Paper-II contained only two topics of International Relations (IR) viz. (1) India and the World and (2) India's Economic Interaction with the World. In 2013, the syllabus was expanded to introduce many new topics. Consequently, the nature, depth and difficulty of the IR questions have greatly changed.

For example, before the change of syllabus, the UPSC asked: *Do you agree with the view that Israel is a natural ally of India?* (Asked in 2010). After the syllabus changed in 2013, the nature of the question changed to: *Too little cash, too much politics, leaves UNESCO fighting for life. Discuss the statement in the light of the US withdrawal and its accusation of the cultural body as being 'anti-Israel bias.'* (Asked in 2019)

Sadly, nowadays, the newspaper editorials are too much centred on selective coverage of Pakistan/China/USA/Sri Lanka etc. to cater particular masses of audience on nationalism, visa and immigration only. So, *why did the USA exit from UNESCO?* You may not even have heard about this news in the newspaper. Gone are the days when newspaper editorials alone were sufficient to prepare IR.

In this situation, Pavneet Singh saves your time and trouble. Because if you are going through his book, then you will **not** have to manually wade through:

1. 2500+ pages of BA and MA Political Science material to learn about the evolution of India's bilateral relations, Indian foreign policy and contribution of Indian diaspora.
2. 1000+ pages worth MEA brief given for India's relations with individual countries.
3. Three dozen+ websites of the international organisations and their notable agreements.
4. Websites like IDSA, EPW, ORF, TIME Magazine and other supplementary readings required to learn about the economic and strategic interests of India.

Pavneet Singh's experience as a teacher of International Relations has helped a lot in the right articulation of this book. He has kept the content inside crisp, compact and highly UPSC exam-oriented. Further, he updates this book on an annual basis with new development in the foreign policy and diplomacy.

In his magnificent 4th edition, Pavneet Singh has added completely new material, innovative mind maps, analysis of issues like Ukraine crisis, Takeover by Taliban, Ladakh standoff with China, Developments with all neighbours; to a new chapter like 'Ethical Dilemmas in Indian Foreign Policy'; re-written chapters of the US, Russia, Africa, Indo-Pacific, QUAD and its impact on India's global diplomacy to Indo-EU Summit etc.; and topic-wise analysis of questions from 1979 onwards, as well as practice questions with suggested answer writing approach for future examinations.

The content is also helpful for other areas of the syllabus like topics of GS Mains Paper-I (Globalisation and Its Impact on Indian Society), GS Mains Paper-III (International Economy, Internal Security and Challenges in Border Management), IR-related Essay and Political Science as an optional subject. Even college students and researchers pursuing BA/MA/UGC-NET/JRF in Political Science and International Relations will also find this book very useful.

I wish the best of luck to Pavneet Singh and the esteemed readers of this comprehensive and succinct textbook for International Relations.

Mrunal Patel

How to Study International Relations for Civil Services Examination

In any competitive examination, the key to success is to understand the syllabus thoroughly. This write up, as an introductory one, precisely does the same for International Relations (IR) for the UPSC Civil Services Examination.

RELEVANCE OF IR IN CIVIL SERVICES EXAMINATION

First, let us try to understand the sections of IR in the vast syllabus prescribed by the UPSC. IR is crucial for all the three stages of the examination. It is directly mentioned in the syllabus of the Prelims (the first stage) and the Mains (the second stage). Third stage is the interview of civil services examination.

In the Prelims examination, IR comes under the heading of the syllabus mentioned as “Current Affairs of National and International Importance”. A simple analysis of the previous year Prelims papers will help understand any aspirant that the above-mentioned section is one of the most important sections of the syllabus, contributing nearly 35 to 40 questions per year. A further breakdown of the above section of the syllabus gives us a better picture. As per that, one can infer that on an annual basis, there are 10 to 12 questions in the Prelims examination that can be directly related to IR.

Number of questions from IR in Mains examination: 4 to 5

Number of questions from IR in Prelims examination: 10 to 12

EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS IN THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

The nature of the questions in the Prelims is simple and straightforward. The questions normally range from International organisations in which India participates or is affected by its dynamics; bilateral and multilateral diplomatic agreements and accords signed by India or affecting interests and diplomatic values of India; geopolitical changes in India's neighbourhood or extended neighbourhood affecting India.

Preliminary Examination Question in 2018

In 2018, India was diplomatically striving to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The joining of NSG has tremendous implications on India's nuclear programme (covered in chapter on Indian Nuclear Diplomacy). The UPSC asked question related to NSG in the Prelims asking the consequences of India joining NSG.

Preliminary Examination Question in 2019

Israel–Palestine issue was in news throughout 2019 due to conflict between Palestinians in Gaza Strip and Israel. The UPSC asked the question related to the “two-state solution” in 2019 Prelims.

Seeing the instances of the two questions, one thing can be safely inferred. The Prelims examination revolves around the current happenings.

HOW TO APPROACH IR FOR THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION?

3-Point Strategy for Prelims Examination

Strategy Point 1: An aspirant should read the newspaper carefully.

Strategy Point 2: One should analyse what are the major events happening on the international front in the newspaper. This means you need to look out for all the news related to IR on editorial, op-editorial and international pages of the newspaper.

Strategy Point 3: The aspirants should try to study different dimensions related to the items in the news from the book here. For instance, if India joined the NSG—this as a news item will be found in every newspaper. What is expected from the aspirant is that after seeing this news item, one should go to the chapter on India's nuclear programme and try to study about NSG and associated multilateral export control regimes and India's diplomatic stance. Similarly, if Israel and Palestinian people are having a conflict, then the aspirants need to read Israel–Palestine dispute from the book here. One must note that reading the entire Israel–Palestine issue is important as it is a broad issue. If in 2019, the UPSC has asked about the two-state solution; and if the issue continues in news in 2019 (which it is), then, the UPSC can ask any other dimension from the issue ranging from HAMAS to Palestinian Authority to the policy of Khaled Mashal and Mohammad Abbas etc.

Thus, read the newspaper. Identify the IR-specific issue in the news. Read its background from the relevant chapters in the book. Add from the news whatever tit-bits you get. The dimension is ready for the Prelims examination.

HOW TO APPROACH FOR THE MAIN EXAMINATION?

The IR is a part of General Studies Mains Paper-II. There are four topics mentioned by the UPSC in the syllabus.

Topic 1: The first topic in the syllabus is called *India and neighbourhood relations*. By far, this is the most important topic. It encompasses all are land and maritime neighbours. The neighbours of India stretch from Afghanistan to Myanmar to China to Maldives. This book has covered the bilateral relations with all the neighbours from ancient times till 2020–21. Any developments between India and its neighbours have to be carefully analysed. For instance, if India and Pakistan decided to open Kartarpur Corridor in 2019, the aspirants should know all the consequences related to it.

Topic 2: *Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests* is the second topic. This broad topic literally includes India's relation with all the countries from regional to the international level.

Topic 3: The third topic is *Effect of Policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests, Indian diaspora*. For instance, If Sri Lanka comes out with a policy that affects Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, then it comes under this heading.

Topic 4: The last topic of the syllabus is *Important International institutions, agencies and fora, their structure, mandate*. The examiner tests the aspirants' command over India's international diplomatic negotiation style at international institutions and agencies. Therefore, the aspirants need to study carefully the various meetings where India participates and its style of negotiation.



Answer Writing Technique for the Mains Examination for International Relations

For Mains examination, three things are to be followed that constitute the basic structure of any answer.

Step 1: Introduction of the answer and Five Golden Points

Writing an effective and a powerful introduction will act as a force multiplier to overall score. Please note that as you are writing answers for the UPSC Civil Services Main examination, your answers should reflect the same maturity. Also, keep in mind the Five Golden Points while writing an introduction.

Point 1: Introduction is a snapshot of the answer. The idea is to give a glimpse to the examiner of what to expect in the answer ahead.

Point 2: Please refrain from using definitions and quotations in the introduction, as introduction is a summary of the answer in short.

Point 3: It has to be short and crisp.

Point 4: The standard practice is that in a 150 words question, introduction should be in not more than 2 lines and in a 250 words question, the introduction should not be more than 3 lines.

Point 5: By default, introduction should always be in a paragraph and never ever in bullets points.

Step 2: Key Points to Design a Powerful Body of the Answer

Body of an answer helps to communicate the core ideas to the examiner. Key Points are:

Point 1: An aspirant can be innovative here. One can use diagrams to give information. Throughout the book you will come across many diagrams. They will help you understand how to create diagrams in IR to fetch surplus marks.

Point 2: One can use bullets points but bullets are used only for writing factual points in the answer. If there is nothing factual in your answer, then the body of the answer should better be in a paragraph.

Step 3: Three Power Points for a Powerful Conclusion of the Answer

Most of the aspirants neglect this and end up in losing marks. Please note the following points.

Power Point 1: Answer needs to be concluded always and it cannot be abruptly ended. Conclusion of an answer should always be on a positive note. This is universal fact.

Power Point 2: It is always a futuristic suggestion. This means that the examiner should know the future ahead and how to achieve the future.

Power Point 3: It should be non-repetitive. One should be careful to note that conclusion should never consist of any point that one has already mentioned in the body above.

Final Summary to Remember

Structure	Design
Introduction	Summary of the answer/150 words = 2 lines/250 words = 3 lines/always in a paragraph/no definitions ever.
Body	Always in a paragraph/Diagram and bullet points if needed
Conclusion	Positive point/Futuristic suggestion/Non-repetitive point

APPROACH FOR THE ESSAY PAPER

Basic Idea

Essay in Civil Services is a full-fledged paper of 250 Marks. The UPSC normally asks two essays which an aspirant needs to attempt. A lot of essays have been asked by the UPSC from topics of international relations and this book can be very beneficial to develop content that one needs for the essay paper. To attempt any essay, one needs to remember that there is a defined approach. First, an essay is nothing but a very long answer of general studies (GS). So, if you master the art of writing GS answers then you are not likely to have any difficulty in attempting an essay. In essay, you need to organise and articulate your thoughts in the form of an introduction, body and conclusion. The contents of these three remain the same as for GS answers, with three exceptions. Firstly, the introduction should have a glimpse of your entire essay/your position you intend to take/your core points of the body and conclusion. So, it is not wrong to say that an introduction to the essay is a miniature snapshot of the essay itself. Secondly, the body should have well-defined and well-articulated arguments, logically designed in a coherent flow. Thirdly, the conclusion should present 'your views and opinion' with respect to the stand you have taken.

Topic 1: The emerging global order, political and economic (1993)

Topic 2: Restructuring of UNO to reflect present realities (1996)

Topic 3: The world of the 21st century (1998)

Topic 4: India's contribution to the world wisdom (1998)

Topic 5: My vision of an ideal world order (2000)

Topic 6: India's role in promoting ASEAN cooperation (2004)

Topic 7: Terrorism and world peace (2005)

Topic 8: Importance of India-US Nuclear deal (2006)

Topic 9: Are we a soft state? (2009)

Topic 10: Good fences make good neighbours (2009)

Topic 11: In the Indian context, both human intelligence and technical intelligence are crucial in combating terrorism (2011)

Topic 12: Has the non-alignment lost its relevance in a multi-polar world? (2017)

Topic 13: Technology as a silent factor in International Relations (2021)

HOW WILL THIS BOOK HELP IN ANSWERING THESE TOPICS?

These topics are easy to attempt if an aspirant has conceptual clarity. This is where the relevance of this book enters. It equips you with potential fodder base to write these essays. If you look at the topic number 8, this topic is dealt in depth in the chapter of India and the USA relations. It is explained there why did the US sign the deal with India? What was the need of the deal? How did it help India? What were its implications on Indian strategy of great power politics? What were the implications of the deal on China/Pakistan/regional Asian security/and global nuclear proliferation order?

SECTION 1

BUILDING BLOCKS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

- 1. The Fundamentals of International Relations
- 2. Basics of World History and International Relations
- 3. Multipolarity, Crisis of Multilateralism and India in the Post-Pandemic World

AN OVERVIEW

The World History for International Relations is regarded as building blocks section. This topic is not directly mentioned in the UPSC syllabus, but a few questions were asked in the past. In 2000, question came on the difference between collective security and cooperative security. In 2002, a question was asked, "What is meant by unipolar world"? In 2003, a question on the concept of veto in the United Nations was asked. Similarly, in 2007, a question was based on the meaning of global governance. In 2011, a very conceptual question was asked, "Is there still a role of concept of balance of power in contemporary international politics"?

Potential foresight On the basis of the above-mentioned questions asked by the UPSC, we should note that the commission can ask questions pertaining to the World History section in future. For instance, with the presence of Covid-19 pandemic, a question on the crisis of multilateralism may be asked. A thought related to this could be that why India has faith in multilateralism or has India lost faith? Because a question on unipolarity had already been asked previously, now a question on multipolarity might be asked. The commission can also ask a question on why India advocates for multipolarity and what role can India play strengthening multilateralism. This chapter is constructed succinctly with a foresight in mind that will equip one with the knowledge for answering such questions.



1

CHAPTER

The Fundamentals of International Relations

THE NEED FOR BUILDING BLOCKS

Whenever an aspirant studies International Relations (IR), they often struggle with some fundamental terms and concepts. These terms come repeatedly in the newspapers and the aspirants struggle to find their succinct meanings. In this chapter, our endeavor is to enable the aspirants develop a basic understanding of some of the most commonly used terms and concepts in IR. The aspirants are expected to master these terms and develop a conceptual grasp over them so that these terms can enable better understanding of the subject and the textbook.

CONCEPT OF STATE, SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

'State' is a creation of man and not a creation of mother earth or nature. Further to it, State is a political association that has a defined territory with a permanent population to be governed by a government, which is sovereign. Sovereignty entails hierarchy within the state. It means, state has the freedom to take independent decisions in domestic and international affairs without being answerable to any authority above it. Security ensures the absence of any threat. Security at a micro level, is called human security, at state level is called national security and at a global level is known as international security.

UNDERSTANDING DIPLOMACY, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In simple language, diplomacy is communication between strangers. The strangers here are states, so, diplomacy is communication between states and other actors. At times, diplomacy was called honorable spying. It is not just formal communication, it also includes negotiations, information gathering and image management. In this sense, we can say that diplomacy is an instrument of statecraft for implementation of interests of state through communication. International Relations is a study of state's relationship with other countries, and it is an interdisciplinary field that includes the study of history, international law and security. Foreign policy is what a country does, and International Relations is how a country does what it does. International Relations is a political marketplace where a state can sell its foreign policy. The interests of a state are known as 'national interests'. National interest is used as an analytical tool to identify the objectives of foreign policy of a state. National interest is always those basic determinants used by a state to guide state policy in relation to other states in an international system. According to Charles Beard, the term 'national interest' gained momentum in political lexicon during sixteenth century in Europe, when it replaced *raison d'état* during the gradual development of the idea of nationalism. The idea expressed was of development of interest of the whole of the society. Later, it was used in International Relations as an exercise of state power.

WOLF WARRIOR DIPLOMACY

In recent times, wolf warrior diplomacy has been attributed to China. It is a term that has its origin to the Chinese movie 'Cut the Clutter', released in 2015, where the plot depicts Chinese soldiers fighting and teaching a hard lesson to the enemies of the state. The diplomats of China are quite prosaic and conventional, but since 2019, we have seen changes in their language. Chinese diplomats and Foreign Ministers have used phrases like '*pushing back countries that deliberately insult China*', '*refute groundless slander with facts*' (when an opinion is given to China which they do not prefer to hear) and in response to Chinese handling of COVID-19, Xi Jinping sent a message to his internal constituency stating, "*The whole world is against us, I am fighting back*". This recent change in the behavior of Chinese diplomats has led the world leaders and the global diplomatic community to draw parallels with the Chinese film 'Cut the Clutter'. Put simply, the global diplomatic circles have given this new term to imply the **harsh diplomacy** being practiced by China, called wolf warrior diplomacy.

PERIODIZATION OF WORLD AFFAIRS

For the simplicity of understanding chronology, it is expected that the aspirants remember the following periodization of world affairs. The period from 1914 to 1918 is the period of World War I and the period from 1939 to 1945 is the period of World War II. The period between 1918 and 1945 is known as Inter-War period. The time between 1947 and 1989 is broadly called as the period of Cold War and the period since 1989 till now is the period of post-Cold War.

BASICS OF COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR

For the time being, till we undertake a deeper elaboration in the subsequent chapters, we must note that Cold War is a period that began after the World War II ended. This period saw the world being ideologically divided between communist and capitalist ideologies. The world also witnessed geopolitical tensions between US (for promoting capitalism in the world) and USSR (for promoting socialism in the world), thereby making the world bipolar (meaning two poles, US and USSR, spreading their own ideologies globally). In 1989, the USSR disintegrated and the world witnessed a rapid transformation. The world became unipolar (means only one pole, namely the US) and the world slipped into post-Cold War period. However, today, it is stated that the world is multipolar, which means there is an international system with multiple power centers. This gives an assertion that multiple countries in the world exist in the international system that can exercise power.

CONCEPT OF ALLIANCE

Alliance is a written formal agreement between two states with common values where one state intends to offer security protection to the other; while the other state receiving the security protection offers its market access to security provider. It is an agreement where both parties gain mutual benefits. For instance, in 1949, the US created an alliance called North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Similarly, in 1955, the Soviet Union created a Warsaw Pact as an alliance.

The above-mentioned view is one way of looking an alliance, which is seen through a security lens. The alliance can also be seen in a more generic sense, which can imply a grouping of like-minded nations to achieve a common goal. For instance, the International Solar Alliance is a generic alliance, not a security one, having a group of like-minded states brought together by India and France to develop solar potential and clean energy.

Age of Uncertainty

Certain scholars often refer the period of post-cold war as an age of uncertainty. They do so because this period of the history of the world has seen uncertain and unpredictable behaviors by states. Indian Ambassador Rakesh Sood is also one of the vocal champions of this term in his writings.

Polarity Thesis

The word 'pole' comes from polarity, which implies the way power is distributed in the international system. The period of Cold War saw the power distributed between US and USSR, thus, making the world bipolar.

Challenges for NATO

NATO was formed for tackling Cold War but since the post-Cold War period, new challenges confront NATO and they include the challenges of climate change, cyber war attacks, threats to energy supplies and global commerce.

CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

The strategic partnership agreement is a written formal agreement between two states with common values where the states decide to cooperate with each other on multiple dimensions and deepen their relationships. These dimensions are limitless and it is the individual prerogative of states to define the end lines of cooperation. They could range from economic cooperation, trade and cultural cooperation to energy diplomacy and technological cooperation etc. It is important to note that in a strategic partnership agreement, the parties concluding the agreement have the necessary security capabilities to protect themselves and would not undertake offering or receiving of any security protection. The states shall utilise their existing security capacities to defend themselves from adversaries. However, due to possession of common values that bind the two states, the states will cooperate and deepen their ties further where strategic partnership agreement offers them a framework for better cooperation. But we must note that a strategic partnership agreement may include the security dimension as one of the dimensions in the multidimensional cooperation. This security dimension, however, shall not be security protection but commercial defence sales. For instance, India and Japan are strategic partners since 2006 and the strategic partnership agreement includes cooperation in multiple dimensions including defence, where Japan has been undertaking commercial defence sales of defence products to India as a privileged partner.

Global Partners, Special Global Partners, or Strategic Partners ... all are similar terms. The difference in nomenclature asserts the symbolic significance the states intend to attach to their special partners.

DIFFERENTIATING CONFLICT AND WAR

Why was 1962 a conflict between India and China?

India and China had difference of opinion over the boundary, which was a colonial inheritance. The two sides, since 1949, tried to find a mutually acceptable solution for the border, but failed. This led to an un-intentional violent clash in 1962.

In IR, conflict and war are two important terms that have special significance. Just like two people can have differences, so can two countries. The countries can have differences because of any issues, be it different interpretation of boundaries or different interpretation of trade policies (often called by economists as a 'trade war', but in reality, it is a conflict over difference of opinion on trade policy) or different interpretation in conduct of states. The best way to resolve differences is dialogue. However, at times, there could be a possibility that the dialogue between the two states may not give the intended results. In case the dialogue fails to deliver, the two states can become insecure and this insecurity may manifest as a violent clash. This clash, however, will be accidental, unintentional and non-deliberate. The conflicting parties will again take the recourse of dialogue to resolve the differences. However, in war, there is a deliberate attempt by one nation to violate the sovereignty of another nation. As war involves a deliberate attack, the country under attack reserves the right to retaliate in self-defence. The war is always intentional and deliberate. There is

another situation, called civil war, which is a fight between two political groups within the borders of a country, primarily with the objective of capturing state power. The core differences between conflict and war can be summed up in the table given below.

Conflict	Unintentional	Non-deliberate
War	Intentional	Deliberate

In India, we have had our own instances of conflicts and wars. India and China had a conflict in 1962; however, India and Pakistan had a war in 1971.

CONCEPT OF IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM

Imperialism is a phenomenon where one country tries to control and subordinate another country. This phenomenon involves a capitalist country, which uses its economic and military power, to subordinate a pre-capitalist country. When the capitalist country subordinates the pre-capitalist country, they use their resources for their own welfare. One way of doing imperialism is known as colonialism. In colonialism, one country militarily and politically annexes the other and the country annexed loses its sovereignty and eventually gets exploited. Once a country is colonised, its resources are taken by the coloniser, its people are subjugated and the political and economic systems are also controlled by the coloniser. The country that gets colonised resorts to resistance against the coloniser. The resistance can be peaceful or violent, but is aimed at de-colonisation.

Neo-Colonialism

In neo-colonialism, the country that gets decolonised comes under indirect pressure by erstwhile coloniser or other powerful countries. The attempt is now to use indirect pressures like economic levers and conditionalities to subjugate the weak countries.

CONCEPT OF GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitics, in a simple language, means the role of geographical factors in foreign policy. In other words, geopolitics is concerned about how a country leverages its geographical location or resources, its core geographical factors, in doing relationship with others. A country can have a favourable location and may leverage its location in engagement with others. For instance, the location of Iran, when seen from Indian point of view, is favourable because the location of Iran allows India an access to Central Asia and Afghanistan. This makes Iran a geopolitically significant country for India. Similarly, Saudi Arabia possess a natural resource called oil and they use it in their relationship with other countries. India is their customer and uses oil for its domestic economic development. This makes Saudi Arabia geopolitically important for India. We also observe an interesting phenomenon that both Saudi Arabia and Iran are geopolitically important for India, for different reasons, as given in the table below.

Geopolitical significance of Saudi Arabia for India	Oil (resource)
Geopolitical significance of Iran for India	Access to different countries (location)

HYPHENATION AND DE-HYPHENATION


Let us understand this concept through an example. During the Cold War, the US would always do diplomacy with Pakistan by looking at its implications on India. This was because during the Cold War, the US was concerned that their diplomacy with Pakistan should not 'provoke' India to balance Pakistan by engaging with someone else. This is known as hyphenation. In this way, one country does diplomacy with another country by looking at implications of its diplomacy on the other country, thus hyphenating the two. So, we can say that during the Cold War, the US hyphenated India and Pakistan. This implies that US's diplomacy, during Cold War, with Pakistan was done with keeping in mind how India would react to such diplomacy. The reaction, US aimed, should not provoke India to counter Pakistan by engaging with an adversary of the US. The concept of de-hyphenation is exactly opposite to hyphenation. Here, the focus is to engage with two states independently and not get concerned about the implications. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has de-hyphenated India and Pakistan. The US is not concerned about the diplomatic implications of their engagement with Pakistan on India and vice versa.

CONCEPT OF GREAT POWERS

The concept of great powers is used in the theory of realism by realist scholars and it signifies the ranking of the global states in terms of their economic and military capabilities they possess.


The term 'great powers' found its first written mention in the Treaty of Chaumont in 1817, as, by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia were granted the great power status for the first time. In 1944, a


foreign policy and IR scholar named William Thornton Rickert Fox replaced the term 'great powers' with 'superpowers' and since then, the US, Britain, France, Russia and China have been given the status of superpowers. The hierarchy that is established on the basis of capabilities is as follows:



CONCEPT OF TREATY, CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS

A treaty is a written agreement which is signed by countries or international organisations, making it obligatory for the signatory parties to accept certain rules that have been consensually agreed upon in the contract. On signature of the treaty, the signatory parties agree to follow the written obligations while agreeing to accept liabilities on failure to follow said obligations. The treaties are governed through the Vienna Convention (1969), which is also known as the laws of treaties or the treaty of treaties. We must note that when a state signs a treaty, it remains a party to the treaty even if domestically, after signing a treaty, the state government changes. On the other hand, a convention is a special treaty that concludes the discussion of an issue of global significance leading to the creation of an agreement to be ratified by the member states discussing the global issue. For instance, climate change and its consequences are discussed in conventions attended by several global member states. A protocol is also a kind of a treaty but a specialised one as it allows amendments and alterations in the main text of the treaty. If a state undertakes a signature to a treaty, it means that the state has an interest in following the points mentioned in the treaty. Signature is a legal process and is of two types—simple signature and definitive signature. In a simple signature, a state is not bound to follow the points of the treaty until it ratifies the treaty. Thus, a simple signature involves no obligation on the state as the state reserves the option of putting the treaty before the domestic national parliament allowing its people to have a say in the external matters of the state. On the other hand, in a definitive signature of a treaty, the state expresses its willingness to be bound by all the points of the treaty without the need for ratification of the treaty. When a state ratifies a treaty, it gives its consent to be bound by the treaty. In the ratification of a treaty, the state agrees to get the treaty approved by its national parliament and also indicates its willingness to be bound to other contracting parties in the treaty. In ratification, it gives the national parliament of state a much bigger role to direct state's external affairs.





KEY TERMS

1.	State	Defined territory with a permanent population to be governed by a government, which is sovereign
2.	Diplomacy	An instrument of statecraft for implementation of interests of state through communication
3.	Wolf Warrior Diplomacy	Harsh diplomacy practiced by China while communicating with countries in the international system
4.	Cold War	A situation of no war, yet no peace
5.	Alliance	Written formal agreement offering security protection in return for market access
6.	Strategic Partnerships	Written formal agreements to deepen cooperation in multiple dimensions other than security protection owing to existing capabilities to protect
7.	Imperialism and Colonialism	Subordinating a pre-capitalist country is imperialism and colonialism is exploiting the resources for augmenting own power



2

CHAPTER

Basics of World History and International Relations

THE RISE OF MODERN AGE

The study of the modern world history can be traced back to 1453. The Church controlled the medieval European society and was the most important institution in the medieval era. It controlled the behaviour of men (including what and how will men think) and also politics (that is, who will be the king and who will not) in the society.

The medieval Europeans did commercial trade with Asian states. This trade was managed by the Ottomans, who acted as intermediaries. They purchased commodities from Asia and sold them to Europe, thereby making a huge commission in the process.

The economic wealth accumulated by the Ottomans sparked political expansionist ambitions. They began to expand westwards, towards Europe. On 29th May 1453, they captured the city of Constantinople (the capital of the European Byzantine Empire) and established control over the key trade gateway to Europe and Asia.

This led the Europeans to search for alternative trade routes, compelling them to explore alternatives in the sea. As the Europeans went to the sea, they discovered distant lands and new people. As they intermingled with distant cultures and people, their perception of the outside world changed.

They began to think differently and rationally. They refused to accept the notions popularised by the Church and preferred to accept things that could be rationally and empirically verified. This new scientific, rational and empirical thought process which people developed emerged as a new movement known as Renaissance.

The invention of Press popularised renaissance. Instead of being dependent upon the sermons from the priests, people began to read the religious scriptures on their own. Bible was translated into languages people could understand.

As people read Bible and other scriptures, they found the discrepancies in the written texts and the existing narrative. People began to question the authority of Church and sought reforms in the functioning of it. Thus, the renaissance paved way for the rise of reformation. As it affected the authority of Church, it led to massive crisis in the society.

A natural consequence was civil war, which lasted for many decades, and eventually ended in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. This not only separated the religion from politics but also paved way for stability, and thus, the rise of nation states.

The nation states that eventually began to rise were strong monarchies. The Monarchs continued to support scientific thoughts, rationalism and modernism. This led to the rise of a new intellectual movement known as Enlightenment in Europe, which became the foundation for Industrial Revolution. The Monarchs also continued the commercial trade with Asia.

As Europe entered the dawn of industrial age, it needed resources, which were not enough in Europe to fulfil the growing appetites. The need for resources compelled the Europeans to colonise distant lands of Asia, Africa and Far East, thus began the era of colonisation.

POWER POLITICS, ALLIANCE FORMATION AND EVENTS LEADING TO WORLD WAR I

As the European states colonised distant lands for access to resources to fuel their industrial revolution, their insecurities with each other grew. To mitigate these insecurities, they formed alliances.

Till 1870, Germany was a broken and fragmented territory. Otto Von Bismarck unified it in 1870 and began to colonise territories in Asia, Africa and Far East (like Micronesia islands). The German unification sent shivers down the spine of Britain and France, who were to then confront a territorially and economically strong Germany.

In 1870, Germany resorted to power politics and Franco-German war happened, where Germany defeated France and snatched away Alsace Loraine from the latter. Knowing that French would retaliate, in 1879, Germany entered into an alliance with Austria–Hungary.

The Austria–Hungary Empire was on the fringes of Europe, bordering the Balkan lands. The Balkan land was under the imperial control of Russia and the Balkans fiercely resisted Russian imperialism.

The Balkan lands were not economically important but strategically significant as they were located as a bridge between Asia and Europe. The Balkan lands were an ethnic port of different races and cultures. The Russians always wanted to develop an imperial control over Austria–Hungary. Thus, Austria–Hungary, in order to mitigate the threat of imperial Russia, joined an alliance with Germany in 1879, thereby giving birth to the Dual Alliance.

In 1882, Italy joined the Dual Alliance making it the Triple Alliance or Central Powers. The Italians had ambitions to acquire Libya, which was neighbour of French-controlled Algeria and Morocco. Italy knew that France would act as an irritant to Italians. Thus, it joined the Dual Alliance to mitigate the threat of France for their African foray.

Even though the Triple Alliance was formed to maintain status quo, it generated sense of insecurity amongst the British, French and the Russians, leading to formation of counter alliances.

In 1893, France initiated the alliance formation and joined an alliance with Russia. France did not enter into alliance with Britain because it had colonial disputes with the latter and by signing an alliance with Russia, it tried to isolate the British. It had the desired effect.

The British resolved their colonial disputes and in 1904, the British and French signed an alliance, isolating Russia. The reason was that the British were not happy to join an alliance with autocratic Russia. The Russians realised their isolation, compelling the Russian Czar to provide for freedom of speech to the Russian people and also carry out partial democratic reforms. This was appreciated by the British, and in 1907 the British, Russians and the French established an alliance of Allies. By 1907, Europe was divided between Allies and Central Powers.

What are the Balkans?

The lands between Adriatic Sea, Aegean Sea, Baltic Sea and Mediterranean Sea comprising of states such as Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Serbia.

Who are Czars?

Russia was led by rulers known as Czars, who were autocratic and the British found engagement with Russia repugnant to democratic Britain.

THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR I

The Balkan states were developing intense nationalism, driven against imperial tendencies, by developing secret organisations. In Serbia, a secret organisation called Black Hand gave responsibility to Gavrillo Principe to assassinate Archduke Francis Ferdinand (who was about to become the ruler of Hapsburg Empire, which was under larger control of Austria–Hungary).

In 1914, when Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated, Austria–Hungary told Serbia to clamp down upon these secret organisations, investigate the assassination and allow it to participate in the investigation. Serbia refused to allow it to join investigation, as doing so would have threatened the secret societies that existed in the Balkans. Thus, Austria–Hungary declared a war on Serbia. Because Serbia was under imperial control of Russia, the Russian came to the rescue of Serbia. Seeing this, Germany joined Austria–Hungary and declared a war on Russia and France. As Germany attacked France and Austria–Hungary attacked Russia, the British declared a war on the Germans and Austria–Hungarians.

In 1914, Central Powers were at war with Allies. Italy was a part of Central Powers and was debating whether it should participate in the war or not. France made a proposal to Italy and stated that if the Italians support the Allies, the Allies on victory would allow Italy to have access to Libya, South Tyrol, Fiume and Dalmatian Islands. This was much more than Italians had aspired for. Thus, Italy deflected from the Central Powers and joined the Allies.

On the other hand, Japan in the East had colonial ambitions over China. But it could not materialise its ambitions, as it was not interested to upset British in India and French in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. It decided to support the Allies in the war, thinking that after the war, Japan could get concessions to acquire lands in China. Initially, the Central Powers were able to defeat Allies in the ongoing battles.

In 1915, the Allies sought the help of the US. As the negotiations materialised, the US began to provide monetary assistance and arms to the Allies. The American ships with armament sailed via Atlantic to reach the shores of Britain and France, which increased the power of the Allies.

Why did the US Enter World War I?

The US entered the World War I in 1917–1918 when Germans attacked American ships, which was perceived by the US as an attack on its sovereignty.

What are Administered Territories?

This concept was advocated by Jan Smuts and George Louis Beer under Article XXII of the covenant of the League of Nations to control and administer the colonial possessions of Germany in Africa, Pacific and Turkey in the Middle East. It was a system that did not involve direct annexation and traditional imperialism. The 'responsible' states in 'sacred trust' of the League of Nations would provide guidance and support to the powers incapable of self-governing themselves.

1916 onwards, with the American support, the Allies were able to hit Central Powers and finally defeated them in 1918, thereby ending the World War I. After their victory, the Allies began the post-war settlements at the Paris Peace Conference through various treaties with defeated powers (such as Treaty of Versailles for Germany, Treaty of St. Germaine for Austria–Hungary and it created Poland, Treaty of Neuilly for Bulgaria, Treaty of Trianon for Hungary and Treaty of Sevres in 1920 for Turkey).

The US President Woodrow Wilson announced the creation of League of Nations as a body, which would strive to alter the behaviour of the states by modifying the environment in which the states exist, so that it could display positive and 'good' behaviour, thereby preventing another world war. The concept of right to self-determination (RTSD) was applied, though selectively in Balkans and territories of the defeated powers, but not in the colonies.

A concept of administered territories was proposed by the League for the lands of defeated powers and especially for the Ottoman lands and it led to the birth of Mandate System (under which the British and France became mandatory powers, who were to provide guidance and support to the defeated Ottoman lands).

The Mandate System was unique because without officially colonising the Ottoman lands, the British got the control of Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Palestine; whereas France got the control of Syria and Lebanon, for guidance and support (an indirect attempt by the British and French to hijack the oil reserves in Middle East and establish monopoly).

At the end of the World War I, the US did emerge as a rising power (through display of its capabilities), but still allowed the British and French to assert dominance in the international system. Japan got the control of lands in the Far East and some concessions in China, only at the apprehension of British and French, which was perceived negatively by Japan (Japan perceived that British and French would do everything possible to prevent the rise of Japan).

But the defeated Central Powers were not invited in the Paris Peace Conference held in 1919. Also, due to selective application of RTSD, the image of Europeans in colonies declined and it intensified nationalist struggles in the colonies, thereby, shifting the nationalism to Asia.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

The Treaty of Versailles (which was imposed upon the Germans by the British and French) restricted the German economic growth and domestic production, military expansion and attempts towards colonisation. Not only Germany consequently became economically and militarily weak but also, the treaty hurt the psyche of the German people.

The 1929 Great Depression pushed the German economy on the verge of collapse. This created an ideal condition for the rise of Hitler, who launched his Fascist campaign based on Nordic superiority (that Germans are the purest Aryans and all other who are impure need to be killed) and Lebensraum theory (that superior Nordic Aryan Germans need more living space, thus Germany will acquire more lands).

Italy, which deflected to the Allies on the promises of territory, saw the rise of Fascist Mussolini as the Allies refused to give the promised lands to Italy. Russia, as stated earlier, was a feudalistic and agrarian society under the Czars. In 1853, when British and French were busy colonising, the Russians colonised the Danube region (which was under Ottoman rule), near Crimea.

This sent alarm bells to the British, who perceived that southward expansion of Russia would be a threat to the British in the Jewel in the Crown, India. In 1854, British, Ottoman and French collectively attacked Russia near Crimea, leading to the outbreak of the Crimean war. The Russians, after their defeat in the Crimean war, decided to match British and French. So, they began to industrialise and adopted the policy to capitalise and colonise.

The Czars remained suppressive while the newly emerging Russian capitalists became exploitative, crushing the Russian people anyway. This, in 1898, paved way for the rise of socialists in Russia, who established the Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP).

They wanted to remove Czars, but were divided on how to, as Bolsheviks in the RSDLP wanted to use peasants and labour to fight Czars while the Mensheviks favoured the support of capitalists to remove Czars. In 1917, during World War I, the Bolsheviks succeeded (led by Vladimir Lenin) in a revolution against the Czars through guerilla warfare.

Due to Russian revolution (which gave birth to modern day USSR and created the Communist Party of Soviet Union—CPSU), Lenin through the Treaty of Brest–Litovsk, in 1917, withdrew Russia from World War I and later announced a new form of international relations based on equality, non-exploitation and suppression and RTSD, which sent deep shivers down the capitalist world (Britain, France and the US, who perceived Communism as a threat to Capitalism).

The Russian revolution at one place inspired Nehru in India (who was motivated by state-led industrialisation model) and Dr. Sun Yat Sen in China (to fight Japanese suppression).

The League of Nations failed to check the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. It also failed to contain Italian annexation of Abyssinia and Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1935. The rising insecurities in the world again paved way for alliance formation.

British and French again became allies; Italy and Germany came together. Japan realised that its rise as a power in the East bothered Britain and France. Thus, Japan joined Germany and Italy and a Fascist Axis was born again. Russians wanted Britain and France to sign a military pact against Germany. But the British and the French knew that Communist Russia was a bigger threat than the Germans. So, they did not favour the Russian proposed military pact. This compelled Russia to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, which came as a shock to the British and the French.

Why did Great Depression occur in 1929?

It occurred because the US stopped providing monetary support to the Europeans for post-war reconstruction, pushing the British and French economies into depression, as they were taking American support since 1920 to rebuild their economies that were devastated by war.

What is Revolution?

A revolution means a sudden change in the system of governance of a state through violence. A revolution also signifies a change in the value system of the state.

THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

Poland was a territory sandwiched between Russia and Germany. The Polish people knew that due to their location, they witnessed a threat from Russia and Germany. Thus, Poland sought a security guarantee from British and French. In 1936, Hitler signed a non-aggression pact with Poland, which Polish people appreciated thinking that they had mitigated one serious threat.

In 1939, when Russia and Germany signed the non-aggression pact, Hitler secretly proposed to Russia that both of them would attack Poland and take away territories bilaterally (based on Lebensraum of Hitler). The Russians accepted the proposal of Hitler as they got the control of territory of Poland. The Russia–Germany non-aggression pact in reality became a pact for aggression in Poland.

In 1939, Russia attacked Poland from the East and Germany from the West, compelling Britain and France (security guarantors of Poland) to wage a war on Germany. While Germany came under attack, Russians used this as a shield to annex Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The Germans began to counter attack Britain and France, compelling the two to seek assistance from the US.

The US (through Cash and Carry Act 1939 and Lend and Lease Act 1941) aided the Allies in Europe to use American support and lease land bases and attack the Axis. In 1941, to the surprise of Russia, Germans attacked them. Germany asserted that the need to attack Russia (despite a non-aggression pact in 1939) was because the Russians were acquiring bases to attack the Germans in Baltics and Finland. However, the claim was vehemently refuted by Russia.

The Russians immediately joined the Allies and sought help of Britain and France, both of whom were devastated due to German attacks. The Allies (Britain, France and Russia) now sought the help of the US to target the Axis, but it was Japan that brought the US in the World War II. Japan, since the end of the World War I, had imperial ambitions over China (it also got German colony of Micronesia Island, located close to Hawaii, the US).


For its domestic industrialisation, Japan was seeking oil from South East Asian states (Indonesia, Brunei and South China Sea) and was simultaneously developing dominance over the region, leading to serious concerns for British, French and America. In 1935, when Japan attacked China; the US imposed sanctions on Japan and prevented Japan to seek oil. This drastically affected Japan, compelling Japan in 1941 to attack the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.

The US declared a war on Japan and entered the World War II on behalf of the Allies, eventually crushing them in 1945. The war quickly ended in Europe with Russia, France and British emerging victorious. As per the Potsdam Conference in 1945 (the conference related to post-war settlement in Europe), Germany was divided into four zones (one zone each for Britain, France, Russia and the US).

The British, French and the US zones in Germany were merged as West Germany (capitalist) and Russia renamed its zone as East Germany (communist), both divided by the Berlin wall (which eventually fell in 1989, marking the end of the Cold War). But the war was still going on in 1945 in the East, as Japan had not surrendered.

The Allies built bases in China to attack Japan (the US used this opportunity to condemn the rising red star in China), but the US surprised all by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to instant surrender of Japan.

The use of atomic bombs by the US (coupled with the secrecy of the Americans in developing the bombs) sent shivers down the spine of Russia, which feared that the Americans could use them against Russia if they did not acquire the similar capability.



RISE OF STRATEGIC BIPOLARITY, IDEOLOGICAL BIPOLARITY AND COLD WAR

What is Veto?

Veto means an ability or power to stop an undesirable outcome unilaterally. A state needs to possess capabilities to exercise veto.

At the end of World War II, the US, due to use of atomic bombs, emerged as a global superpower. Even though the British and French were victorious, but both were economically and militarily devastated. However, they were accommodated by the Americans in the new international global order through permanent membership seats in a new institution known as United Nations. The UN Security Council was conceptualised with veto power that accepted their status as Middle Powers (countries that accept an existence of a superpower above them, the US here).

The three post-war settlement conferences, such as Potsdam Conference 1945, London Conference 1945 and Paris Conference 1946, gave a huge territory to Russia in Europe. This made Russia not only

territorially the largest power in Europe but also ideologically opposite to the US in the world, thereby emerging as a superpower.

However, Russia was determined to seek parity with the Americans and speeded up the development of their nuclear bomb. By 1949 (though the US by now developed hydrogen bomb), after giving the US four years of unbridled atomic power supremacy, the USSR emerged as a challenger (by developing atomic bomb in 1949 and hydrogen bomb by 1953) to the US.

The USSR was now territorially and economically strong along with absolute strategic parity with the US. The ideological bipolarity was cemented by the Greek crisis and Turkish crisis. During the World War II, Greece was under the control of Germany. The Greeks had monarchy, but due to the Russian revolution, by 1940s there was a growing Communist movement in Greece. At the end of the World War II, the Greek monarchy wanted to get rid of the Germans, and hence, they sought the support of the Communists, who in turn sought support of the USSR. The USSR saw this as an opportunity to make Greece communist and plunged to help.

The Germans were ousted by 1946 and now the USSR compelled the monarchy to accept communism, which the monarchy and the Greek people vehemently opposed. They favoured monarchy to be in power. This is where the US saw an opportunity (where it perceived that the USSR was trying to 'impose communism') and stepped in to support the Greek people and monarchy, and eventually helped them to oust the Communists by 1949.

The Greek crisis compelled the US to think about a strategy to protect the 'freedom' of the people from totalitarian communism. The US Congress, under the 'Freedom Agenda' empowered the American President to militarily intervene to protect the 'freedom' of the people anywhere endangered in the world, which manifested as the Truman Doctrine (named after the US President Harry S. Truman, the then American President who sought such powers from the Congress).

This military doctrine gradually developed an economic component known as Marshall Plan (proposed by the US Secretary of State George S. Marshall, also known as the European Recovery Plan), where the core idea was to provide economic assistance for post-war recovery in the European continent (though, in reality was designed to prevent post-war European states to fall into the orbit of communism).

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, born out of the Greek crisis, became the ideological tools of the American strategy in the Cold War. The Russians responded by creating Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

Turkey was a part of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of World War I, through the Treaty of Sevres 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, the modern day Turkey was born, and it continued to have good ties with Britain. In 1947, the USSR asked Turkey to provide them with access of Turkish straits (the area near Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea) for commercial trade with the world.

The Turks refused (as they feared that after access, the Russians would demand a base and eventually spread communism in Turkey) to comply with the Russian demand and sought British help to check Russia. This angered the Russians, who responded through gunboat diplomacy. The Americans, seeing this, came to the rescue of Turkey, and responded with counter gunboat diplomacy, leading to escalation.

To de-escalate, the two immediately came on the table for talks to find a diplomatic solution. The Americans bargained that if the USSR guarantees that they would not spread communism, they could be allowed access to the Turkish straits. The Russians agreed and the crisis was de-escalated, with Russians getting the strategic access demanded, but the US deployed Jupiter and Thor missiles (directed at the USSR) in Turkey.

However, after the Turkish crisis, the Americans were concerned, thinking that they would be able to intervene, but in future, the USSR can again resort to these hard tactics against states. The US decided a need to work out a security architecture, which would be an alliance, where the US could provide a security umbrella to states, and thereby protecting them from Soviet assertion.

What is Cold War?

The term was coined by H. B. Scope, who was an American journalist. Walter Lipmann, a scholar, popularised the term and stated that Cold War describes a situation where there is no war, yet no peace. It is a term that signified the global ideological tensions in the world created in the aftermath of the World War II by the US and the Soviet Union.

NATO and Collective Security

Collective security is equivalent to the doctrine of 'one for all and all for one'. The idea is to create mechanisms legally to prevent an aggression by any state in the system against other states. In a system of collective security, the states remain sovereign but relinquish the quest of using force to settle disputes among themselves to maintain peace among the members of the system. NATO is a collective defence system. In the post-Cold War times, the idea of cooperative security has become more popular than the idea of collective security.

because of this, the Cold War did turn into a hot war as well. In 1954, the US created South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Its members were USA, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines and Pakistan. In

What is a Base?

In the context of international relations, it is a term that signifies a point of military supply and troop concentration. Bases are strategically located and during the Cold War, both the US and the USSR established points of troop concentration in the territory of their allies.

In 1949, the US established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a tool of strategic bipolarity and a transatlantic alliance. The USSR responded to NATO by establishing Warsaw Treaty Organization or Warsaw Pact (Warsaw, the capital of Poland, where the agreement was signed) in 1954.

The American tools of ideological bipolarity were Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan whereas the Russian one was Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The American tool of strategic bipolarity was NATO and the Russian one was Warsaw Pact. These tools finally paved way for the official onset of the Cold War and creation of bases.

THE COLD AND HOT WARS FROM 1945 TO 1988

With the rise of ideological and strategic bipolarity between the USSR and the US, the world slipped into a Cold War. It was a situation where there was no war, yet there was no peace. There was no war as the two superpowers had a moral obligation to maintain world peace and prevent another world war.

There was no peace because the two superpowers continued to have the urge to fight, if not militarily, then ideologically (where both superpowers decided to market their respective ideologies and tried to convince states to accept their ideologies as an attempt to seek ideological dominance in the world). This ideological battle, between communism and capitalism, manifested in different theatres of the world and at times. In 1957, the US also created ANZUS or Australia, New Zealand and US alliance. It is important to analyse the two specific hot wars in the region. In 1955, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and United Kingdom created CENTO or Central Treaty Organization, also known as Baghdad Pact as a military alliance (dissolved in 1979). In 1958, Iraq left the Baghdad pact due to Baathist Revolution (a pro-socialist revolution), and thus, the Baghdad Pact was renamed as Central Treaty Organization or CENTO. After the failure of the US in Vietnam, they along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan played out the Cold War in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988.

Base

Base signifies a point of military supply and troop concentration. Bases are strategically located. During the Cold War, both the US and the USSR established points of troop concentration in the territory of their allies.

THE RISE OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Who are Han Chinese?

The name Han comes from the Han dynasty which ruled China in 202 AD and followed Han synthesis—Confucianism and Legalism.

Till 1644, China was ruled by the Ming dynasty. In 1644, tribals from North China, known as Manchus, crossed the Great Wall of China, invaded the Ming dynasty and removed it from power and established the rule of Manchus or Qing Dynasty. The rulers of Qing Dynasty followed Buddhism and discriminated the local Han Chinese. By 1800s, when the British established rule in India, they began to seek trade ties with China and Tibet.

The rulers of the Qing Dynasty perceived that the British had no trade motive and were here to spread Christianity. The rulers of Qing dynasty adopted a closed foreign policy and decided to shun engagement with the British.

The British decided to carry out illegal trade with Tibet and also adopted the policy of corrupting the Chinese youth through drug trade. This led the Chinese and the British to fight Opium wars. After the Opium War II (1860), where the British defeated the Chinese, they got trade concessions and access to strategic Chinese ports like Hong Kong.

In Hong Kong, the British tried to outmaneuver the Qing Dynasty by legalising Christianity and also supported the Han Chinese (who were discriminated by the rulers in China). This led to constant interference by the British into the affairs of China and eventually led to the collapse of Qing Dynasty in 1911. The collapse was rejoiced by the Chinese people, who now, inspired by nationalistic urges, established a nationalist party known Kuomintang Party (KMT) under the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 inspired Dr. Sun Yet San, who in 1920 established the Communist Party of China (CPC), under the leadership of Mao Zedong. After the end of World War I, as noted previously, Japan became aggressive in China and began to occupy areas in China.

The KMT and CPC, despite divergent ideologies, often united together against Japan. However, the KMT and CPC had serious differences regarding China, as CPC wanted to focus on rural areas first and then capture urban areas; whereas the KMT only focused on urban areas, neglecting the rural areas completely. Due to these growing differences, in 1927, China descended into a civil war. Japan took opportunity of the civil war and attacked Manchuria in 1935 and again attacked China in 1937.

The CPC and KMT did unite against Japan, but both were crushed by Japan. From 1937 onwards, they again began their civil war, which however remained suspended from 1939 to 1945, owing to the World War II. After the surrender of Japan in 1945, the US tried to negotiate peace between CPC (supported by the USSR by now) and KMT (supported by the US this time) but failed.

The CPC was able to mobilise Chinese people by branding the KMT as anti-nationalists for they are seeking support of the US. The public sympathy increased with the CPC and by 1949, the CPC was able to oust KMT and established the People's Republic of China (PRC), thereby China emerged as a Communist state. The KMT fled away to Taiwan and established the Republic of China (ROC), with ideological differences with PRC. To keep a check upon communist China, in 1951, the US and Japan entered into an alliance through the Treaty of San Francisco.

THE CRISIS IN VIETNAM

In 1800s, when the British colonised India and Burma, this compelled France to colonise Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (which eventually came to be known as Indochina region). The French not only got access to South China Sea (via Vietnam) but also tea, rubber, oil and rice from the region.

After the World War II, a movement of decolonisation, with the help of USSR, began in North Vietnam, led by Ho Chi Minh, against France. The US supported the French, but by 1953–54, the French were ousted from North Vietnam. The French decided to decolonise Vietnam, but decided to divide Vietnam into two parts, where North Vietnam came under the communists (Ho Chi Minh, who ousted the French) but not the South Vietnam.

In fact, the people in South Vietnam were anti-communists, which was the only saving grace for France. After the French left, Ho Chi Minh stated that the French had divided the territory but could not divide the people of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh began to construct a system of rail and road networks (called Ho Chi Minh trails) to provide connectivity to the people. These trails were used by Ho Chi Minh to spread communist ideas to the South.

To keep a check upon Vietnam, after the resolution of Korean crisis (explained separately later), the US and South Korea entered into a mutual defence treaty. The US was concerned and it started sending advisors (who in reality were Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] spies) to assist South Vietnam.

As Ho Chi Minh continued to spread communist ideas overtly and covertly, the insecurity of the US grew and it began to think that South Vietnam too would fall to communism (since 1949, birth of PRC, the US was always concerned about the 'domino effect' of communism in Asia, that is, spread of communism from China to other states). In 1964, the US began to deploy naval ships in Gulf of Tonkin (a gulf near North Vietnam which witnessed extreme rainfall and lightening in the sea).

In 1964, the lightening at the sea damaged some American naval ships, but the US began to assert that its ships were targeted by torpedo fired by North Vietnam. The US used this instance, known as Gulf of Tonkin crisis, where the US Congress passed a Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which empowered the US President to send massive military force to South Vietnam against the North Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh began to attack the massive US military on ground with guerilla warfare tactics, something that puzzled the Americans, as they never knew about guerilla warfare. The US resorted to use of chemical weapon known as 'Agent Orange', leading to thousands of deaths. This led to massive negative sentiment against the US and the American people too demanded that the US need to withdraw from Vietnam.

Under public pressure, in 1972, Ho Chi Minh and the US concluded the Paris Accord, leading to the US withdrawal. In 1973, Ho Chi Minh declared a war on South Vietnam and unified Vietnam in 1975. The British and French enjoyed a historical presence in the Middle East. This made it easy for the US to enter the region.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND WORLD ON THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WAR

America and Spain fought a war in 1898. Since the war, Cuba had been under American control. At the onset of the Cold War, America had a proxy in Cuba known as Fulgencio Batista, who was gradually growing unpopular. A lot of American businesses flourished in Cuba.

Taking advantage of the weakened rule of Batista, Fidel Castro, on 26th July 1953, led an attack on the Moncada army barracks. He was imprisoned for this assault. By the time he was released, Batista's rule diminished as it faced financial bankruptcy. Thus, there was a vacuum to be filled and Castro undertook this successfully.

One thing to be noted was that Cuba, at the time of the power transition, did not witness a civil war. As Castro strengthened his rule, he initiated the programme of nationalisation of property owned by the US business houses. Castro gave the logic of sovereignty and nationalism to justify his move.

The US retaliated by closing down its markets for import of sugarcane from Cuba. A lot of Cubans were affected due to this. Some even left Cuba for the US to settle in Florida. As the economy of Cuba got badly hit, Castro domestically fuelled nationalism and internationally requested help from Russia. Perceiving this, the then US President Kennedy gave the task of solving Cuban menace to CIA.

The CIA drew up a plan of using Cuban exiles in Florida to be airdropped on Cuban beaches (Bay of Pigs). The idea was that exiles would be dropped on the beaches, and as per the plan they would intermingle with the Cuban population to create unrest for Castro.

The CIA assumed that Castro did not enjoy popular support of the Cuban people and the plan was executed. The exiled Cubans were dropped in Bay of Pigs. Within a span of three days the local Cubans overpowered them. The exiled Cubans requested help from the CIA.

The US did not help them, as they were not prepared for this. Observing the matter thus unfolding, Nikita Khrushchev of the USSR decided to defend the small range missiles in Cuba, since this would not only defend Cuba, but also ensure his presence in Cuba, which would be at a proximate destination to launch attacks on the US on the East Coast.

The CIA got the photographic evidence of sites of Russians creating missile-launching sites in Cuba, after which the US ordered quarantine and a blockade for incoming Russian ships and began to scan for nuclear weapons. Russia, in the meanwhile, backed out. Diplomatically, a huge nuclear crisis was averted. The Russian seemed to teach the US how it feels to have missiles nearby (The US had stationed Jupiter and Thor in Turkey).

The issue concluded by the acceptance of the US not to militarily invade Cuba and the subsequent removal of its missiles from Turkey. Both the USSR and the US realised that how quickly a small issue like Cuba could have escalated conflicts. They took a step towards disarmament namely, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). The PTBT became a step towards subsequent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.

DISINTEGRATION OF SOVIET UNION AND RISE OF UNIPOLARITY

The disintegration of the USSR occurred because of many factors. Firstly, the regimes in the USSR consisted of Russia and fifteen other satellite states. These regimes were tightly controlled by Moscow and states had no breathing space.

The frustration of the people increased. Winston Churchill pointed out to the descendants of the 'iron curtain' in Europe. This iron curtain was between the West Europe (capitalist) and the East Europe (communist). This created a huge difference in the developmental strategies adopted by the ideologically different regimes. As people of East Europe travelled to West Europe, they saw the differences, which also contributed to the rising resentment.

In 1988, Gorbachev introduced changes in the USSR through Glasnost and Perestroika and democratisation and eventually reversed the Brezhnev doctrine. Czechoslovakia was one of the Russian satellite states headed by Alexander Dubcek. In 1968, he introduced freedom of speech and travel and other changes.

This event came to be known as Prague Spring. The USSR, which was ruled by Leonid Brezhnev, militarily intervened to halt the Prague Spring. In 1968, Brezhnev announced 'The Sovereignty and International Obligations of Soviet People and the Soviet Union', where he stated that the Soviet people in the satellite states had a right for RTSD provided they did not alter or damage the principles of socialism and Soviet Union, else, the USSR had the right to military intervention.

Gorbachev in 1988 reversed this and enabled Soviet people to manifest their destiny. This created a spark in the satellite states, which began to seek RTSD from the USSR, contributing to the disintegration of the USSR, leading to the rise of unipolar US. The US again enjoyed a decade of unipolar power, from 1991 to around 2001. It remained the sole military superpower in the world. The US proved their unipolar power in the Gulf War I, when Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait and the US along with a coalition defeated Iraq.

What are Glasnost and Perestroika?

Glasnost means openness in state affairs and Perestroika means rebuilding of political and economic system of Russia.

CHRONOLOGICAL FLOW OF THE EVENTS

Fall of Constantinople → Geographical discoveries → Renaissance → Reformation → Civil wars → Peace of Westphalia → Modern states → Trade → Enlightenment → Inventions → Fusion created Industrial Revolution → Created need for resources → Led to rise of imperial ambitions → Manifested as colonialism → Colonialism generated insecurities → To mitigate insecurity, alliances formed → Formation of alliances generated more insecurity → Conditions created for World War I → World War I is won → League of Nations → Ottoman Empire is disintegrated → Italians, Germans and Japanese are given step brotherly treatment → Clouds build up for World War II → World War II occurs → League of Nations is replaced with United Nations → World enters into Cold War → Bipolar world and Cold War becomes Hot war in certain instances → Soviet Union disintegrates → World enters post-Cold War Period



3

CHAPTER

Multipolarity, Crisis of Multilateralism and India in the Post-Pandemic World

FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY

Since 2001, the world has witnessed multiple challenges. Firstly, there is a rise in Islamic radicalisation, which ranged from Al Qaeda to ISIS, and is a manifestation of what Samuel Huntington called as the 'clash of civilisations'. Secondly, the economic supremacy of the US has been challenged since 2008 economic crisis and also by the meteoric economic rise of China. Thirdly, the hegemony of the US is challenged by a resurgent Russia and a rising India. Fourthly, the globe is witnessing new challenges that range from poverty and unemployment to climate change and hunger. All these require innovative diplomacy and global cooperation. How the world will resolve them is uncertain. A global consensus is elusive on all these challenges, from terrorism to climate change. All these challenges have pointed out that there is no country in the world which is in a position to offer solutions to such problems.

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY PARADIGM OF MULTIPOLARITY

Today, with rising ambitions of various countries such as India, China, Brazil, Turkey and UAE; there is growing discomfort amongst the countries to accept the US as the sole unipolar power. Many countries, especially India, favour a multipolar world. India favours a multipolar world on the premise that such a world will have multiple power centres (as opposed to just one, the US) and all countries in the world will be able to have a say in the shaping of the new world order. In this backdrop, it is easier for us to understand that because the global challenges are such that they require cooperation, a world which is multipolar, than unipolar, is more suitable. This is why when India advances the idea of a multipolar world, it advocates that global institutions must reform. The global institutions, like the United Nations today, constitute the multilateralism architecture.

CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM

Multilateralism is a diplomatic practice which is based on cooperation between several states on issues that confront the world, like climate change for instance. The concept of multilateralism, in modern times, can be traced to League of Nations. The League was the first international institution that brought countries on a common platform to maintain peace and foster cooperation. Subsequently, the League was replaced by the United Nations (UN) in 1945, as the fulcrum of multilateralism architecture. The UN was able to perform its duties as per its charter in the international history but the system was based on giving power only to the permanent five members of the Security Council, who acted as the torchbearers of the world. The UN played an important role in facilitating a liberal international order, which facilitated the spread of globalisation and enabled the creation of an integrated world based on global governance.

Far from being flawless, the multilateralism began to witness endemic structural impairments since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Today, multilateralism is more akin to a faltering hot air balloon, as it has entered a serious situation of crisis. The crisis is driven by rising economies like India which seek their rightful place in the comity of nations.

The UN as an institution is at the heart of criticism for its lack of efficiency, institutional sclerosis, ideological infighting and denying rising economies.

The crisis such as climate change, promotion of free trade and management of the coronavirus pandemic have exposed that multilateral institutions have faced global governance crisis. All these crisis have only strengthened the notion, which is also advocated by India, that such problems require global cooperation and that is possible only when countries like India are given a say to shape international events. India continues to have belief in multilateralism but asserts that the global governance architecture requires a massive re-haul. Increased participation and inclusiveness are the heart of India's argument to strengthen multilateralism.

It is also noted that India has reposed faith in multilateralism because international history has proven that multilateralism has ensured global peace. In this sense, India is not against multilateralism but favours reforms in multilateralism so that the multilateralism can be strengthened.

What is Global Governance?

Global governance means a set of international institutions that coordinate behaviour of states, resolve their conflicts/disputes, alleviate collective action programmes and enforce international rules.

PANDEMIC AND CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM

The Coronavirus pandemic has recently exposed the phenomena of weaponised interdependence. Since the end of the Cold War, the globalisation has brought the world closer. Many countries have used the theory of comparative advantage and engaged in global trade. Some countries have emerged as a pioneer in producing global goods. China, owing to its labour sector, government policy and vision, has emerged as a global producer of goods. To ensure the free flow of goods for mutual global growth, the countries in the last three decades had established interdependent supply chains.

However, with this interconnected growth of the last three decades, many countries achieved significant progress and improved their economic prowess. This led to some countries developing insecurities seeing the prosperity of others. The insecurity was driven more by competition and power rivalry. For instance, India in the last three decades has made tremendous economic progress and same is the case with Chinese. However, the Chinese are not very comfortable to see a rising and a powerful India in its neighbourhood, as it perceives India as a rival in world power.

The pandemic has exposed the phenomena of weaponised interdependence. Because of the pandemic, the world witnessed a global lockdown to curtail the spread of the Coronavirus. The global lockdown broke the global supply chains also. As the lockdowns were lifted and vaccination drive paced up, the supply chains were brought back on track. But it is at this juncture that countries like China tried to weaponise the interdependence by exploiting the control they had over the hubs of production networks in an era of globally integrated supply chains.

This weaponisation of interdependence also exposed how the multilateralism architecture failed to offer any solutions. The failure of World Health Organization (WHO) to ensure global cooperation in pandemic prevention and failure of World Trade Organization (WTO) to ensure equitable distribution and manufacturing of vaccines for ensuring human welfare of all have exposed the vulnerabilities of multilateralism.

In this backdrop, India's assertion of making multilateralism work through an inclusive order by reforms of multilateral institutions makes sense. The weaponisation of supply chains by a few handful countries have reasserted the need to create new minilaterals that would foster cooperation and resilient supply chains.

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-PANDEMIC GLOBAL ORDER

On the basis of the above analysis, it is clear that India, which for decades, had been advancing the idea of reforms in global institutions has now an important responsibility to shape the post-pandemic global order. India must adopt a four-point foreign policy framework.

Firstly, it must be realised that any reform in multilateralism cannot be driven by efforts of India alone. This explains why since the pandemic, India has displayed a new thrust in establishing a coalition with like-minded countries to form minilateral groupings. These groupings will give India the power to collectively amplify India's voice for reforms.

Secondly, while keeping a global eye, India should not neglect its immediate neighbourhood. As Chinese have weaponised the supply chains and affected the global recovery, this is where India needs to join hands with European Union, Japan and South Korea to ensure that a niche is created where India and the like-minded countries emerge as key suppliers of global goods and foster regional growth and well-being.

Thirdly, it must be noted from the above analysis that India's stance on reforms in multilateralism are pragmatic and driven by pragmatism, but India needs to go one step ahead. It needs to realise that it must enhance its global and regional presence by emphasising on values. While pragmatism is always the key driver of foreign policy, the values are the glue. While seeking the reforms of the multilateralism architecture, India must advocate the values such as democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech and pluralism; which it stands for. The attention to values and its fusion with pragmatism will give India an edge over China.

Fourthly, none of the above-mentioned strategies will work unless India rectifies its domestic front. This implies that the most crucial determinant to achieve the above strategies will be a strong domestic economy. The importance of this helps us to understand that India has launched the Atmanirbhar Bharat campaign to achieve self-reliance in cooperation with like-minded countries. A sustainable economic growth, fused with democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech and pluralism will give India more persuasive power and an economic clout to shape the multilateral architecture.

CHRONOLOGICAL FLOW OF EVENTS

Post-Cold War world order begins from 1991 → US asserts unipolar power → World witnesses globalisation → Rise of interconnected world → Global governance takes shape → Multilateral institutions shape globalisation and one world → Centre of gravity shifts to Asia → Globalisation spreads to Asia and propels its growth → Asian countries become part of global supply chains → World begins to witness new crisis → Climate change, poverty, unemployment, drug trafficking, migration and inequality emerge new challenges → Existing multilateral institutions fail to offer credible solutions → Multilateral institutions unable to foster global cooperation to solve these problems → Multilateralism and global governance comes under stress → Multilateralism centric stress aggravated when countries taking advantage of globalisation seek multipolarity in international relations → Unipolar status of the US, multilateralism and global governance are stressed and call for reforms grow → World witnesses COVID-19 pandemic → WHO fails to ensure prevention of pandemic and WTO fails to ensure vaccine equity → Crisis of multilateralism amplifies when countries weaponise supply chains → India takes the lead in calling out need for reforming multilateralism → India articulates its policy to seek reform of multilateralism through minilaterals → The world is still evolving and age of uncertainty continues.

QUESTIONS FOR PRACTICE

1.	"Nuclearisation of the world after 1945 helped in maintaining a stable Europe." Analyse.
2.	"In the wake of changing world order due to COVID-19, India should neither permit capsizing of the world order nor allow it to be captured by any superpower". Analyse how can India resuscitate drowning multilateralism in the global order today?
3.	The US exit from Afghanistan in 2021 proves that Afghanistan ended up in being the next Vietnam for USA. Explain.
4.	"China and the US are locked in a Thucydides Trap". Explain.
5.	Examine the role Indian foreign policy that can play rescuing multilateralism from the crisis.

SECTION 2

HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND MAKING OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

- 1. Historical Genesis and Values of Indian Foreign Policy
- 2. Institutions Involved in Making Indian Foreign Policy

AN OVERVIEW

This section is also not directly mentioned in the syllabus but again, as is the case of previous section. UPSC has taken an implied meaning of the defined syllabus and asked questions from this chapter. In 1981, the UPSC asked a question on how does tradition influence Indian foreign policy. In 1996, a question was asked on Kautilya's Mandala Theory. In 2013, a question on the identification of the elements of change in India's foreign policy was asked. In 2014, a question was asked on the role of MEA and PMO in Indian foreign policy making. In 2015, a question was asked on how does the Parliament determine and influence the making of India's foreign policy.

Potential foresight On the basis of the above-mentioned questions asked by the UPSC, we can draw a few learnings. The UPSC can potentially ask questions on Mandala Theory with an example. Recently Afghanistan is in news again and India has often used Mandala Theory in engagement with Afghanistan. This theory can also be applied to Indian engagement with Philippines and Vietnam. Similarly, the UPSC can probably ask questions pertaining to values of Indian foreign policy. In the crisis like Ukraine, South China Sea and China-US-Russia Cold War, the response of India to all these emerging situations would be determined by the values that India stands for. Thus, keeping the potential foresight in mind, the section is designed to give the content to enable one to have adequate thoughts and knowledge to answer any such questions ahead.



1

CHAPTER

Historical Genesis and Values of Indian Foreign Policy

RELEVANCE OF HISTORY IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Lessons from Ramayana – What do diplomats do today?

In modern times, diplomats are known as information agents. They carry information from one state and convey it to their own parent state. As the diplomats carry sensitive information, when they deliver it, the diplomats must provide a truthful account. They must not distort or manipulate the fact. This is precisely what Hanuman did. He carried the information to Ram and delivered the message without distortion.

How is Power Projection done Today?

Today, when Indian PM visits a foreign state, he highlights the economic prowess of India and positions of India as a lucrative destination for investments and trade.

India is a civilisational country, which had a glorious past. India's values trace their origin from the history. The behaviour in the foreign policy India displays, is also influenced by the past. It is not wrong to argue that India's foreign policy is deeply influenced by tradition, history and geography. Let us try to understand the genesis of Indian foreign policy through one example of tradition and history and one of geography.

RAMAYANA AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

If we study the Ramayana, we get to know that there are many principles of modern diplomacy owe their origin to the text.

Sita, wife of Ram, was kidnapped by Ravana, the king of Lanka. Ram entrusted on Hanuman the responsibility to locate Sita. Hanuman, who was able to locate Sita in Lanka, first tried to convince her that he was a messenger of Ram and not that of Ravana. Once he convinced Sita that he had been sent by Ram, she too conveyed a message to Hanuman to deliver it to Ram. From this situation, we may infer that Hanuman, who delivers Sita's message to Ram, was seen to be doing what a diplomat does in modern times.

The next scene that is important for us is the court scene where Hanuman argued with Ravana to liberate Sita. He initiated his dialogue by telling Ravana about the power of Ram. He intimidated Ravana of how popular Ram was back in Ayodhya, Ravana about his leadership and his followership. He was thereby indulging in something known as 'power projection'. He was projecting the power of Ram in front of Ravana. During the ancient and medieval times in the world history, power projection was always individual in nature. The diplomats, during this time, undertook power projection of an individual personality, who was invariably their own king. For instance, if a South Indian king sent a diplomat in a mission to another state, say in West Asia or East Africa, the diplomat used to project the might of his king in the court of the other king. The diplomat would glorify his own king's power, and his military prowess and his territorial extent. During the early modern times of colonial rule, the coercive elements of power projection diplomacy emerged.

In a situation, in Ramayana, Hanuman told Ravana that it was against ethics to keep Sita in captivity over a long period of time and if Ravana did not liberate Sita, Ram might burn Lanka into ashes. To this, Ravana reacted angrily and ordered that Hanuman should be put to death. But Ravana's brother Vibheeshana said that Hanuman who had come to Lanka as an emissary from a foreign state could not be put to death.

CHANAKYA'S MANDALA THEORY AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Geography is the most important determinant of our foreign policy. In the Hindu cosmology, the location of India is on the southern petal floating on the cosmic ocean. The lotus petal resembles the shape of the subcontinent as it is narrow at the tip and broad when it emerges or blossoms from the central axis. The Indian foreign policy and its worldview are based on the concept of Mandala, where the entire cosmos has a vast circle. This circle has seven concentric oceans. The oceans separate six regions, also known as Vanshas. Certain geographical features separate the Vanshas. At the centre of all these is a lotus, which has four petals, and it features Bharata, which is also known as Jambudvipa. As mandala radiates out, each radiating circle outside is superior to preceding circle and India is just one of the Dvipas with peculiar and different values. This is different from Chinese worldview. They saw Hans at core being the most advanced and the larger circles as barbaric and uncivilised. This is why Chinese suffered from the middle kingdom complex.

What is the Middle Kingdom Complex?

The ancient Chinese perceived themselves at the centre of the universe. They were at the centre of the civilised world and all other countries outside were perceived as barbarians and uncivilised. This perception of Chinese, continues to dominate their foreign policy thinking, thus making others around China believe that this is a complex world view as it hinders cooperation, thus, middle kingdom complex.

NITISARA OF KAMANDAKI AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Nitisara, the famous ancient Indian treatise on politics and statecraft, influences India's foreign worldview. It mentions in detail a great theory of diplomacy. Kamandaki, the writer of Nitisara was a disciple of Chanakya. In this book, he talks about three types of ambassadors—diplomats, envoys and plenipotentiaries. It further says that any diplomat needs to have the following qualities:

- Should have ability to be an expert debater
- Should have possess a good memory
- Should be eloquent
- Should have knowledge of military science
- Should have the ability to bear adversary's abusive language, anger and impulses
- Should always keep his own plan of actions secret
- Should have knowledge of psychology to ascertain other people's feelings

KAUTILYA'S ARTHASHASTRA AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

It is important to understand Kautilya's Arthashastra as it is an Indian treatise on statecraft and diplomacy and also gives valuable insights into international relations and foreign policy. Kautilya is India's own realist as his ideas resonate with realism.

For Kautilya, the state is the most important and legitimate instrument that enjoys sovereignty. The responsibility of the king is to guard his subjects and ensure their protection and survival. This should be the primary national interest of any state. The core objective of a state is to acquire wealth, deliver justice and undertake expenditure. A state has to be strong and for this, it needs good administration, stability and justice. This results in a situation conducive for wealth creation and leads to military expeditions for conquests. The wealth in the state is generated by elaborate taxation machinery.

What is Realism?

Realism is a view in international politics, which argues that states in the international system must focus on ensuring their own security and pursue their own national interests.

The primary duty of a king is the welfare of the people. If the king is unable to make the people prosper, it is inevitable that people will become restless and finally rebel. The rebellion can take any form, including that of violence.

The Kautilyan idea of national interest is based on welfare of people. If people prosper, so will the state. Kautilya's concept of power begins from society. His grand strategy is based on the idea that the king needs to be a conqueror. He needs to aim to increase his power over neighbours. The king is envisaged as a 'Chakravartin'.

'Chakravartin' is an ancient Indian term used to refer to an ideal universal ruler, who rules ethically and benevolently over the entire world. Such a ruler's reign is known as *sarvabhauma*. The goal of such a king is to promote national economy and ensure national security and social order. The state is primarily agrarian in nature. Cattle rearing and agriculture are primary activities. This leads to production of surplus, which leads to trade. As trade is undertaken, economy is strengthened.

A strong economy sustains the state and the army. To develop this kind of a state, which is based on powerful agrarian economy, the state needs to conquer new lands. The king undertakes expeditions to conquer new lands. The new lands conquered would allow citizens to expand opportunities to earn livelihood. The goal of the ruler is a stable state, which needs to be achieved for the welfare of citizens and to achieve such a state; the ruler is responsible for good governance.

Governance is a means to achieve the aforementioned goals, as well as to achieve social harmony. At the foreign policy level, Kautilya had a different thought. If the ruler has to be a conqueror, then war is a natural outcome of his foreign policy. Kautilya said that the ruler had to be careful because his immediate neighbours were enemy states, jealous of the social harmony and progress of the king and the kingdom.

Thus, conflicts with neighbours are likely to be natural and to resolve the conflict, the king has to decide if he would resort to conciliation and give gifts to another state to make it an ally, or sow dissension and use force, if needed. This depends upon the power of the king and options for war available to discussion and use of force when the need arises. Kautilya propounded that the power exuded by the state were of three types.

The first is individual power. This is the power and courage of the king. This is psychological in nature. The second is hard power. This is the military and economic capacity of the ruler and the state. The third is soft power. This is the diplomatic power of the ruler.

Kautilya said that before a ruler declares war on an enemy state, he should measure his power. He should ensure that he possesses superiority over all three levels, i.e., terrain of warfare (place), season and his own counsellors. Hence, if a ruler is morally intelligent and has good counsel, he will win diplomatically.

If a ruler has adequate economic and military strength, he will win on the basis of physical power and achieve physical success (application of hard power). The ruler, Kautilya said, should strive for soft power rather than hard power. Depending upon the situation, he has three types of war to wage—

First one is *Dharma-yudha*, which is outright, righteous war, fought while following certain predetermined rules. The second option is alternative to *Dharma-yudha*, which is war by deception. There is no lawful framework governing this war. The third one is silent warfare, where a state undertakes war without public attention. Kautilya also said that aim of the state should be to expand national power. This can be done by conquests or alliances. The components of national power are called *Prakritis*. There are seven components—political leadership, administration, resources, infrastructure, economy, security forces and alliances. So, *shakti* and *prakriti*, if used prudently, leads to rise of comprehensive national power.

SOME VALUES OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Value	Preference for the middle way
Philosophy	This is based on the Sanskrit saying <i>Ati Sarvatra Varjaye</i> , which means "let us eschew excess at all times". This is based on the Indian philosophical idea that we should not look things as extremes and should not have a tendency to look at stuff as black and white.
Advocacy	It advocates a focus on the middle path, which is reflected in the synthesis of Dharma, Artha, Karma and Moksha. Even Bhagwat Geeta favours a middle path be followed and also advocates for divine sanctions for desires which are against moral order.

Opinion	Michael Brecher, the renowned political scientist, says that Indian philosophy of golden middle path of compromise and tolerance of opposites is reflected in Indian foreign policy.
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Value	Blend of idealism and realism
Philosophy	Since ancient times, war has always been an option of last resort. The Upanishads clearly mentioned non-violence as they assert that the spirit is undivided and universe is an expression of the spirit and universe is where all humans are a part. The Buddhist/Jain texts clearly assert non-violence. Asoka, post-Kalinga battle, preached non-violence, so did Gandhi. The ancient royal policy from Arthashastra, Bharadwaj in manusmriti to the teachings of Panchtantra, all have advocated for realist thinking but the royal policy has always been of the idea that there should be peace in the beginning and war at the end.
Advocacy	The entire thought has been that war is just, not immoral, but be used as a last resort because war is expensive, troublesome and victory is not certain.

Value	Value of tolerance
Philosophy	The value of tolerance is based on the ancient idea of <i>Vade, Vade, Jayte Tattava Siddhih</i> , which means enlightenment is achieved through debate. All throughout ancient times, there has been focus on paramountcy of reason. The Mahabharata notes Dharma to be judged on the basis of expression and reason. The value of tolerance is based on the idea of human mind that has limited range and power. This is clearly visible even in Upanishads that assert that all different parts lead to same goals, that is, cows of different colours yield the same milk. Tolerance, in India, is not just seen in philosophy, but is a social reality.
Advocacy	In 47 AD, Christians came to Kerala and in 70 AD Jews came. Both were allowed to preach, practice and propagate their religions. The Akbar's policy of universal harmony, i.e., <i>Sulh i Kul</i> and Dara Sikon or Shajahan's translation of Upanishad in Persian, is a testimony to historical tolerance.

Value	Absence of imperialistic traditions
Philosophy	India has not been imperialist. Historically, there has been an assertion of the value of not being imperialist. Mahabharata notes that Indian Empire should not extend beyond its geographical limits. Even Kautilya, Bodhayan and Manusmriti assorted against the extension of Empire of India beyond the geographical boundary of Bharat—that is from Himalayas to south sea and West sea to East. The Buddhists (who have a world view of rule by love) and Hindus who went to South East Asia, went as traders for business and not as warriors to conquer. The Mughals also unified India—Akbar had a policy of tolerance, conciliation and diplomacy. No attempt towards imperialism was ever visible.
Advocacy	When the British came to India as imperialists, India's developing anti-imperialism was a natural manifestation. The entire national movement of India was anti-imperialistic in tone and tenor and this became a feature of foreign policy subsequently.

Value	Expression of positive ideas through negative terms
Philosophy	India will not use the word 'peace' but uses 'non-violence'.
Advocacy	India will not use the word 'defeat' but uses 'non-victory'; 'non-idleness' against exertion and 'non-grudge' against tolerance.
Opinion	K. P. Mishra, the renowned author, says that the Indian language at the foreign policy level is to use negative terms to express positive ideas of profound importance.

KEY POINTS

- History influences foreign policy. In India, history, tradition and geography have influenced foreign policy.
- Ramayana has contributed to influence Indian foreign policy and influenced global diplomatic history.
- The practice of diplomats as information agents, power projection by states and diplomatic immunity are Indian contribution to global diplomatic history.
- India is different in global perception from Chinese and perceives every country equal, a thought since ancient times.
- Chinese have called themselves a middle kingdom and perceived others as barbarians, creating complex relations.
- Nitisara of Kamandaki was a treatise defining qualities, a diplomat must possess for effective diplomacy.
- The Nitisara of Kamandaki is one of the core training modules used for grooming Indian Foreign Service officials.
- Kautilya is India's realist who favoured economic development as a strategy to assert regional and global power.
- Kautilya emphasised that when countries grow in power, they will generate insecurity around.
- The rise of China, insecurity of the US that China could replace them as a superpower today is explained by Kautilya.
- Kautilya gave the first explanation of Thucydides trap, that a rising power will generate insecurity in established power.
- Indian foreign policy stands for certain values such as expression of positive ideas through negative terms, absence of imperialistic traditions, preference for the middle way, blend of idealism and realism and value of tolerance.



2

CHAPTER

Institutions Involved in Making Indian Foreign Policy

CORE INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA INVOLVED IN MAKING FOREIGN POLICY

The making of foreign policy (FP) is a complex process. Initially in European countries, the FP was formed by the foreign office but the entire process was shrouded in secrecy. The public was not a participant in the process of formulation of FP or debate. In a democratic society like India, the decision-making in the FP involves multiple agencies but the overall policy always bears the stamp of ideological underpinnings of the Prime Minister (PM).

Thus, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the political party in power at the centre always have a deep sense of influence on the Indian Foreign Policy (IFP). Thus, it is not wrong to say that FP formulation in India involves a blend of actors, personality politics, neurological impulses and institutional support. K. Subramanyam asserted that IFP was always leadership driven which often lacked consensus. However, today as globalisation has led to creation of a global village, the internal and external boundaries between states have been erased. The foreign policy matters are no longer just under the MEA but also involve other actors. Now, we will have a look at various institutions or actors involved briefly.

ROLE OF MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN MAKING INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

It is the primary institution on matters related to external affairs. It is responsible to gather, process and analyse information, which is done by the diplomatic corps through embassies abroad for decision-making. Siuli Sarkar, the eminent educationist, mentioned that origin of MEA can be traced back to 1783 when the British established the first ever foreign office to manage India's relations abroad along with internal affairs. J. Bandopadhyay, the famous diplomat and scholar of IR, said that the Charter Act of 1833 finally separated internal and external functions of East India Company and established a foreign department. Initially, the MEA remained under the control of the PM and the PM, as the Minister of External Affairs, directly exercised influence.

Over a period of time, we have had independent ministers in MEA. As per J. Bandopadhyay, until 1962, MEA had no policy formulation wing or section but after 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, a new policy planning and research division was created. The division was concerned with strategic and foreign policy formulation. In 1965, N. R. Pillai Committee was appointed by Lal Bahadur Shastri to suggest remedies to the problems faced by IFS. The committee found that the strength of IFS has been quite less in contrast to the requirements of the diplomatic corps. It also pointed out the lack of coordination between foreign bureaucracy and other foreign policy formulation departments.

In 2009, a scholar named Daniel Markey in an essay titled '*Developing India's Foreign Policy Software*' asserted that the IFS cadre is very small in contrast to the required numbers. He also said that the Foreign Service bureaucracy has inadequate mid-career training programmes and is quite reluctant to explore outside expertise in policy formulation. He suggested that there is an urgent need to expand the IFS cadre and also provide a mixture of better pay and incentives to retain the efficiency.

Markey, the eminent lawyer and politician, advocated that on the limited term engagement policy, the MEA should bring non-career foreign policy experts and enhance its intellectual bank. The present day crisis in MEA of IFS is such that even Shashi Tharoor asserted that as India undertakes a global stretch, its frugal staffing pattern of IFS reveals a country punching well below its weight on the global stage. As per R. B. Jain, the political writer, the MEA has not undergone any massive structural change since 1947 till today.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS BY MODI GOVERNMENT

In 2020, the MEA, under the leadership of a diplomat-turned foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, decided to undergo massive structural changes. The new foreign secretary of India, Harsh Vardhan Shringla explained the rationale behind the changes. As per him, the objective of MEA and Indian Foreign Service (IFS) is to advance the national interests of India and serve the people of India all over the world. To achieve this objective, the MEA has decided to undertake the needed changes.

The prime focus of the change is to make the ministry more nimble and responsive to strategic issues. To make routine foreign policy matters separate from strategic projects, the MEA has decided to create multiple verticals. An IFS officer of the rank of Additional Secretary (equivalent to a political director) will head each of these verticals. This will allow the Additional Secretaries to focus on the vertical policy and the Secretaries to focus more on strategising foreign policy. The MEA has identified the need to create a corporate-like vertical for the following:

- Economic diplomacy vertical
- Trade diplomacy vertical
- Development partnership vertical
- Emerging technology vertical
- External publicity vertical
- Cultural diplomacy vertical
- Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific vertical

ROLE OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE IN MAKING OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The PMO initially was known as the PM Secretariat (PMS). When Nehru was the PM, the PM Secretariat became the nerve centre in foreign policy decision making. J. Bandopadhyay says that PMS was so influential during Nehruvian era that it eclipsed the role of cabinet in foreign policy. Bandopadhyay justifies his view by giving an example of Kashmir where he asserted that Nehru had taken many decisions on Kashmir without consulting even senior cabinet colleagues like Patel.

Roxane Sismanidis, an IR expert, asserts that as the time progressed, the successors of Nehru ensured that PMO became a de facto coordinator and a supra ministry of the government. Till today, PMO remains the centre of gravity in foreign policy establishment. In fact, Harish Kapoor in his book '*Foreign Policies of Indian PMs*' clearly asserts that India has never seen an independent and a powerful foreign minister, who has left an imprint on Indian foreign policy despite its exclusive jurisdiction and existence. It remains a body that follows dictates from PMO.

With the creation of National Security Advisor (NSA) post, the NSA continues to play an important role in advising PM on foreign and security policy by virtue of being an important stakeholder of PMO. Many times we have seen a customised PM and PMO centric foreign policy in India. The PM also deserves an exclusive privilege of appointing special envoys for matters close to the heart of PM. K. Subramanyam, the famous international strategic affairs analyst, had rightly said that IFP is leadership-specific - certain PMs have left an imprint on the foreign policy like Indira Gandhi's USSR policy, Nehru's Disarmament policy, Gujral Doctrine on the neighbourhood policy, Rajiv Gandhi's China policy, Vajpayee's Nuclear policy, Manmohan Singh's India-US relations policy and Modi's greater power politics.

ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT IN MAKING INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Constitution of India has accorded the Parliament of India the status of supreme legislative body to make policies on union list matters that include foreign policy. As the government is accountable to the Parliament, the Parliament can use the two houses as a platform to influence the foreign policy of the government.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs offers the Parliament to keep a track of policies at foreign level. The item number 10 of the Union List and items from number 9 to 21 empower the Parliament to make laws on subjects ranging from foreign affairs, war, peace, UN matters and international treaties. Over a period of time, in response to the legislative authority guaranteed by the Constitution to the Parliament, it has formed various laws that include—the Emigration Act 1983, Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act 2010, the Extradition Act, UN (Security Council) Act etc. It has created institutions such as NSC (National Security Council), RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) etc. to guide foreign policy.

Naheed Murtaza asserts that till the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, the foreign policy of Nehru was not subjected to parliamentary scrutiny in a big way. It was Shastri who revolutionised the concept and introduced the increased role of Parliament in scrutinising foreign policy through debates and discussions and motions. This led to discussion on issues such as India and NPT, India and CTBT, Tibetan policy, major power relations etc. Paul Martin, an eminent politician, has studied that in India, parliamentary debates on foreign policy matters are interlinked to international situation and world behaviour. Some instances are as follows:

S. No.	Instances of debates on foreign policy in Parliament
1.	A. Appadorni's talks of Parliament influence India's China policy. After 1962 conflict, India decided to go for high-powered voice of American transmitter to match Chinese propaganda. The leftist rhetoric in Parliament of anti-Americanism forced government to cancel it.
2.	When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, Vajpayee did not favour offending the US invasion by condemning it in the Parliament despite the growing rhetoric of opposition to show solidarity with Iraq. The PM used the 'middle path' and chose to use the Hindi word 'Ninda' over 'condemn'.
3.	During Gulf War-1, the Chandra Shekhar government allowed the US planes to refuel in Mumbai. The Congress party, through intense parliamentary debate, compelled a change in policy.

KEY POINTS

- Foreign policy making is a complex task and multiple institutions play important roles in the process.
- In India, MEA plays an important role because it is staffed by career diplomats.
- The MEA, as many studies have pointed out, witness serious shortage of staff and trained experts.
- In recent times, Government of India has created new verticals in MEA to sync the foreign policy with challenges.
- Creation of a new vertical on the Indo-Pacific is an example of how Indian foreign policy is dynamic towards institutional changes.
- The Prime Ministers and National Security Advisors always leave a deep imprint on the foreign policy.
- The Parliament plays an important role in ensuring that legislations are passed to ensure smooth functioning of foreign policy.

SECTION 3

HOW PRIME MINISTERS SHAPED INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

- 1. The Foreign Policy of Jawaharlal Nehru
- 2. The Foreign Policy from Indira Gandhi to Manmohan Singh
- 3. The Foreign Policy of Narendra Modi and the Modi Doctrine
- 4. The Ethical Dilemmas of Indian Foreign Policy

AN OVERVIEW

This is a foundational section that helps us understand the subsequent chapters by placing the things in a context. The UPSC has asked many questions from this chapter in the past. In 1980, question was asked on how fruitful has been the policy of non-alignment. In 2000, there was a question that required the aspirants to explain non-alignment is a need and not a creed. In 2002, the commission asked questions on the Gujral Doctrine and on India's contribution to the growth of non-alignment. In 2007, there was a question on relevance of non-alignment. In 2013, a question was asked on relevance of Gujral doctrine. In 2015, a question was asked on how non-alignment is the basic principle of Indian foreign policy. In 2017, there was a question about the era of rise of multiple organisations, and the relevance of non-alignment. In 2018, a question was asked on how India's current foreign policy marks a qualitative shift from that of previous regimes.

Potential foresight A clear analysis of the above-mentioned questions suggests that the UPSC has been asking repeated questions on Gujral doctrine and non-alignment. An interesting observation is that in 2018, the UPSC asked a subtle question on the comparative analysis of the foreign policy of Modi and others. We can now build a foresight that in future, the UPSC will diversify this and ask questions on how Gujral doctrine is different from Neighbourhood First policy; how is non-alignment relevant in the post-pandemic world order; what role can India play in using non-alignment as a tool in the post-pandemic world order and how are retail diplomacy, faith diplomacy and summit style diplomacy new trends in India's foreign policy. One would not be surprised if the UPSC may ask a question on comparison between non-alignment and strategic autonomy. Keeping the above threads in mind, this chapter has been constructed to give an analytical edge over all the elements of potential foresight.



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
CHAPTER

The Foreign Policy of Jawaharlal Nehru

GRAND STRATEGY, STRATEGIC THOUGHT AND INDIA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

A grand strategy is an aggregation of national resources and national capacity of a country. It includes a combination of military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural and moral capabilities that a nation deploys in the service of national security. A grand strategy is all about protection of domestic values. Every state has certain values and to uphold those values are the primary goals of every state. But as a state cannot protect all values, it resorts to satisfactorily protecting the few it holds most sacred. In case the values of a state are threatened, either by a non-state actor or by an act of nature such as an earthquake or tsunamis, how the state manages to restore the value threatened, is the main concern. To protect its internal and external security, a state may deploy its capabilities combined, known as grand strategy.

This takes us to strategic thought. Strategic thought signifies the resources a government has (such as diplomacy, military, economic strength, cultural values, etc.) and the way it uses these resources to achieve security for the society. For India, strategic thought means certain values and preferences, which leads to the state evolving some ideas and using these ideas in its policies and approaches in foreign policy.



INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AS A TOOL OF INTERNATIONAL POWER

After India became independent in 1947, it initiated the process of developing its foreign policy. The Indian Foreign Policy (IFP) that came to be developed was under the leadership of Nehru. He did not invent the IFP but had nurtured it and gave it a shape. The IFP has its roots in India's past and its traditions.

When India became independent, the world witnessed Cold War and Asia and Africa witnessed reawakening. The national reawakening, which manifested as aggressive nationalist struggles in Asia and Africa, were driven by the urge of the colonised people of Africa and Asia to manifest their own destiny in an independent manner. This led to the development of an idea where the people of Asia and Africa decided to develop an independent world view based on their historical legacies, national interests and social milieu.

Nehru was confronted with the challenge of articulating how India would conduct its international relations. But, India also confronted the challenge of how to manage its domestic development. At this juncture, Nehru fused domestic development with Indian foreign policy and articulated that India would develop industrially at the domestic level and that would help in advancing India's international image.

India had to make a choice of either developing the state militarily or economically. Nehru realised that states such as Pakistan and Thailand focused on developing their military establishments at the cost of developing their nations economically; these states thereby had unstable politics. In this context, Nehru understood that the foundation of social coherence lies in economic strength. The Nehruvian perspective was that economic strength is the guarantee of security of a state and a strong economic base could also enable India to develop a robust military. Nehru, therefore, shifted India's focus on industrial development.

DESIGNING THE STRATEGY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

Though the origin of IFP is traced back to ancient texts and leaders, its immediate roots lay in the Indian struggle for independence against the British. It was during the Indian National Movement (INM) that India developed certain principal elements to its foreign policy that were used by India throughout the Cold War. It was during the INM that India declared its commitment to fight imperialism and colonialism and support the unity of all nations struggling to fight imperialism and colonialism. The period after the World War II saw the decline of imperialism but also led to the economic and military dominance of the USA.

This led to an arms race between the USA and the USSR, which ultimately became nuclear in nature during the Cold War. It was against such a backdrop, with an arms race and an ideological war waging across the world, that India had to evolve its foreign policy. India, being a non-communist country, was not welcomed in the Soviet bloc and nor did India developed any intention of joining the Communist bloc either.

Joining the US bloc was out of the question, as India perceived the USA as a mouthpiece for capitalism, which it believed to be a form of neo-imperialism. Joining the US bloc would have meant that India would go against the entire tradition of its national movement. The Nehruvian idea was very clear.

Joining any bloc would lead to lessening of the sovereign space for decision making that India fought for during the INM. Because the priority for Nehru was to promote global peace and support anti-colonial struggles while adopting independence in deciding domestic, foreign, economic and military policy; it needed an independent sovereign space.

At the heart of our foreign policy was an urge to advance our national interests and ensure our space for, strategic autonomy to take decisions independently. An independent foreign policy involved interactions with all players of the system while retaining the ability to make one's own decisions regarding one's own issues. Thus, it is not wrong to say that non-alignment was an idea born out of the genius of the Indian people because this idea of maintaining the autonomy to take independent decisions evolved as the spirit of non-alignment.

Non-alignment was born out of a coordinated effort of Nehru (India), Nasser (Egypt) and JB Tito (Yugoslavia). In 1947, Asian Relations Conference was held in New Delhi, which highlighted the dangers of the neo-imperialism for the first time. Subsequently, in 1955, the Bandung Conference brought together states of Asia and Africa, which highlighted the rising threats of rising military alliances in the world.

After the Bandung conference, there was a need felt by the states to adopt common principles that these states would stand for in the era of bipolarity. It was in 1956 that JB Tito, along with Nehru and Nasser, laid the embryo of non-alignment and it finally manifested in the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in 1961.

What exactly does non-alignment mean?

Non-alignment is used in international relations to describe the foreign policy followed by states that did not align to the USSR or the US during the period of the Cold War. These states pursued the policy of an independent foreign policy with a focus of engaging all states to achieve their national interests.



NON-ALIGNMENT AND NEUTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

When these states, following an independent course of action in foreign policy, came together on a common platform, it led to the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement or NAM. It is important to note that non-alignment and neutrality are two different things. Firstly, neutrality is a legal concept whereas non-alignment is a political one. Non-alignment is not written in the constitution of a state as a law, but neutrality is written.

Secondly, neutrality is a negative concept whereas non-alignment is a positive concept. This is because non-alignment stands for engagement with all states in the world through active cooperation in the affairs of the world. The beauty of non-alignment is that it seeks to promote friendship with all the states in the world irrespective of the ideology followed by any state of the world. Its core focus was to develop peace areas in the world.


EIGHT FOREIGN POLICY GOALS OF NON-ALIGNED STATES

The non-aligned states agreed to follow the following goals:

1. These states will chart out an independent course of action in foreign policy during Cold War.
2. All the states will commonly oppose colonialism, apartheid, racialism and imperialism.
3. The non-aligned states will not join military blocs and not conclude military-specific treaties with superpowers in the Cold War.
4. The territories of the non-aligned states shall not be used as military bases by superpowers for their superpower rivalry.
5. States following non-alignment will strive for world peace to promote their economic well-being.
6. States following non-alignment will not resort to any form of arms race. They will save their resources from irrelevant arms race and channelise the same of economic development.
7. Collectively the states following non-alignment will put up a common cause of the third world in the United Nations.
8. States following non-alignment will restructure the international order by striving for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO will enhance the bargaining power of the global south over the global north.

PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF NON-ALIGNMENT

The philosophical basis of non-alignment was the ancient Indian philosophy of looking at reality from different prisms and recognising that reality is not merely black and white and that it could have many shades of grey. For the US, during the Cold War, the world was a completely polarised affair, with a clear demarcation of black and white and no other shade in between. Thus, the US found it very difficult to reconcile with the Indian concept of NAM all throughout the Cold War.



RELEVANCE OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY

In fact, since the end of the Cold War, despite opposition to the use of the term non-alignment, the essence of non-alignment remains unchanged. In this unipolar-cum-multipolar world order of today, the essence of non-alignment still remains relevant. In author's discussion with Mr. K. P. Fabian, Indian ambassador to Iraq, the idea was very succinctly put. Mr. Fabian asserted that one should look at non-alignment through the prism of Hinduism. Just like Hinduism is a way of life, non-alignment was also a way of conducting foreign policy. In Hinduism, when an individual dies, it is believed that the body is dead but the soul or the spirit remains alive. This is the same prism through which one should view non-alignment.

It is said that non-alignment is dead (as the Cold war is over), but its soul or spirit remains alive as it stood for independence, autonomy and national interests. This very aptly applies to the Indian foreign policy today. The Indian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period continues to be guided by the spirit or essence of non-alignment. Today, India practices a foreign policy of alignment, which is not ideological, but issue-based.

This clarity gives India tremendous operational flexibility in maintaining 'strategic autonomy'.

CAN INDIA REVIVE NON-ALIGNMENT?

In the post-Cold War period, India can take the following four steps to revive the spirit of non-alignment again in the post-Cold War period.

1. Today, the emerging market economies are being pressurised by the West to liberalise their intellectual property laws. This may affect the overall development of these states. Non-alignment can become a new tool of all emerging market economies to have a consensus on the intellectual property rights (IPR) issue.
2. The West has been constantly blaming the Global South for polluting the world and causing climate change problems because of its developmental strategy. This is at a time when the West itself has been the biggest polluter historically. Non-alignment can become a new platform for the emerging market economies to evolve a consensus on environmental policy. India can be a lead state here.
3. The world continues to be divided and faces a nuclear apartheid. The permanent five members of the UN Security Council continue to monopolise the nuclear weapons and associated technologies. They have denied the larger world the opportunity to use nuclear resource. The non-alignment can become a platform to seek a better bargain in the post-Cold war era. With exceptionally strong nuclear non-proliferation track record of India, it can emerge as a bridge between the West and the rest.
4. The world continues to remain imbalanced in its global representation at the United Nations. The emerging markets such as India, Brazil, Germany and Japan collectively represent a huge chunk of rising economic power. Non-alignment can become a powerful platform for seeking restructuring the United Nations.

Why is India reluctant to sign alliances?

India is still reluctant to enter alliances because it still perceives that alliances are a 'permanent wedlock' that would snatch India's independence (or now we can say strategic autonomy) to take decisions.

What is the meaning of Strategic Autonomy?

It is a new metaphysical construct in Indian foreign policy debate and a recent term for non-alignment where the foreign policy continues to follow the essence of non-alignment in conduct of international relations with priority towards national interests, independence and autonomy.

ASSESSMENT OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

Henry Kissinger on Non-alignment

According to Henry Kissinger, the strategy of non-alignment enabled India to elevate a bargaining tactic into a principle of ethics. In his book, 'World Order' he mentions that India's non-alignment during cold war had a unique parallel to the US history. If India had accepted the bipolar politics; it would have been relegated as a secondary ally in superpower camps and would have had very less influence in international affairs.

The Indian political class has perceived the British rule as a period of humiliation. The political class today has a consensus to prevent subjugation of India to foreign rule again. It is this consensus that acts as a basis for the worldview of India and its search for autonomy. Thus, if we say that during Cold War India followed non-alignment, which had an essence of maintaining a degree of autonomy in action; then in this foreign policy behaviour, that guided India's worldview, can be traced to India's historical subjugation by the British. During the Cold War, the non-alignment allowed India to blend righteous moralism and psychologies of major powers.

The strategy of non-alignment enabled India to seek developmental support of the USSR and the US. This enabled India to exercise more influence in the world than it could have otherwise exercised, had it been a camp follower in the Cold War cosmos. Preservation of peace became an integral part of our own foreign policy because only with peace in the world was consistent economic development possible.

KEY POINTS

- The strategy of non-alignment was rooted in India's past and historical tradition.
- India advocated for non-alignment during the Cold War period because it wanted to resist imperialism and colonialism, which it could not had it been a camp follower.
- India's non-alignment was not about antagonising any state but engaging with all on the principle of national interests.
- The core of non-alignment was to advance national interests without compromising the autonomy and independence to take decisions.
- The autonomy and independence would have been compromised had India become a camp follower during bipolar politics.
- Since the end of Cold War, while the term non-alignment may not be relevant, but its essence guides our foreign policy, which is called strategic autonomy.
- India can champion the cause of third world in climate change, poverty and clean energy by using non-alignment as a strategy today.
- The reforms of the multilateralism, as advanced by India today, can also be facilitated by non-alignment.



2

CHAPTER

The Foreign Policy from Indira Gandhi to Manmohan Singh

EQUALITY AS BASIS OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

After the death of Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded him as the next Prime Minister but Shastri passed away on 10 January 1966 and Indira Gandhi became the PM on 24 January 1966. Indira Gandhi brought about a recalibration in the way India would approach its international relations. She stated that equality would become the basis for India's global engagement. It was during the 1970 Lusaka NAM summit where scholars were able to get an insight into the essential tenets of foreign policy as was being adopted by Indira Gandhi. For the first time, she emphasised that India wished to be friends with all nations but on the basis of equality. She asserted that no state could look at India as an inferior state and India would conduct its diplomacy with all states (read the USA and the USSR) on equal footing. Her most important contribution was to make India into a brand equal to the great powers.

MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY FUSION

Indira Gandhi undertook the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 (contextually explained later in a separate chapter). It is a testimony to the fact that her foreign policy was determined to make India a military power.


FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD BE BASED ON MERIT OF EACH SITUATION

Indira Gandhi stated that foreign Policy should be based on merit of each situation. In 1979, due to internal political chaos in Afghanistan, Soviet Union invaded them. They did so because the neighbour of Afghanistan was Pakistan (which during Cold War was an ally of the USA) and Soviet Union thought that the US might take advantage of political crisis in Afghanistan and invade them and expand their rule. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan led the US to counter it. The US collaborated with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to train the Afghani people to wage a proxy war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The US wanted to use the Afghani people as a proxy in their indirect fight against USSR. They, in support with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, created insecurity in the Afghan people that Soviet Union is an enemy of Islam and it has invaded Afghanistan to eliminate Islam.

This generated insecurity in the Afghani people and they wanted to protect their religion, which they perceived, was in danger. The USA along with Pakistan trained these Afghan men to wage a Jihad (a holy war to protect the religion when it is in danger). From 1979 to 1988, a Mujahedeen campaign (a campaign of jihad) was launched in Afghanistan, where Afghan people fought Soviet army in Afghanistan. The USA supported these Mujahedeen with arms, ammunition and money till 1988, when Soviet Union finally decided to withdraw from Afghanistan.

India, being a friend of USSR, did not condemn the invasion and the USA asserted that non-condemnation by India is a sign of Indian support to the Soviet policy. But India stood upright stated that its policy is based on the merit of the situation and it considers invasion of Soviet as something beneficial for the stability and development of Afghanistan.

DIFFERENTIATING NEHRUVIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM INDIRA GANDHI'S FOREIGN POLICY



BLENDING IDEALISM AND REALISM AND POLICY OF 'ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTERESTS'

Foreign policy under Rajiv Gandhi had a fine blend of idealism and realism. This is visible in his Pakistan and USA policy. Since the 1962 conflict with China, the relations were frozen. India was insistent that unless the border issue is resolved, no other dimension of relationship can be explored. The ice was broken by Rajiv Gandhi. His visit to China in 1989 and meeting with Deng Xiaoping, urging to separate the border issue from economic diplomacy proved that he followed the policy of 'enlightened self-interests'. He also used Non-aligned Movement as a tool to promote the economic interests of India.

ECONOMIC REFORMS AND RISE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

By 1990, following the complete disintegration of Soviet Union, the erstwhile USSR was now succeeded by Russian Federation, which meant that India had now lost the patronage of the erstwhile USSR. What was worrisome for India was the future supply of defence products.

During the Cold War, Russia was one of the major defence suppliers to India. Now after the end of Cold War, India had to renegotiate all contracts and at certain places, even sign new contracts. However, the greater dilemma was with whom were these new contracts to be negotiated.

There was a vacuum and not much clarity. At this juncture, many in Russia felt the need to end the special favour for India. However, things normalised when Boris Yeltsin visited India in 1993. During his visit, the 1971 India–Russia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was revised with 14 additional clauses and was signed to mark a new era in bilateral relationship post-Cold War.

At the same time Narsimha Rao also developed new contacts with the five Central Asian Republics that emerged after the breakup of USSR. During the time, Rao reached out to the USA, China, Russia and Central Asia to explore economic-centric foreign relations.

THE GUJRAL DOCTRINE AND ITS RELEVANCE

In 1997, Gujral became the PM and evolved a fresh approach vis-à-vis the foreign policy that is now known as the Gujral doctrine. The basic foreign policy ideas of Gujral doctrine are as follows:

- India is a dominant power in the South Asian region.
- India should not look for arithmetical reciprocity.
- The core of the idea was to give more than what you may take from a foreign state.
- In a simpler language, the Gujral doctrine meant that if a neighbour moved an inch, India should move a yard.
- This policy would enable India, according to him, to pursue a new quality of relationship with its neighbours, leading to sober and constructive responses from the neighbourhood.
- He even instructed Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to dismantle all human assets it had established in Pakistan for covert operations, as he perceived them as tools that would hinder constructive engagement with neighbours.

SEEKING INDIA'S RIGHTFUL PLACE IN COMITY OF NATIONS

After the withdrawal of support by the Congress party, the Gujral government was replaced by that of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. From 11 to 13 May 1998, the government carried out nuclear tests. These tests were significant because one of the tests conducted in Pokhran was a thermonuclear test, which indicated hydrogen bomb capability.

India reached the sub-critical level in the tests, which meant that it generated enough data in these experiments where further improvements could be carried out through computer simulation. Thus, after the operation Shakti I-V (the code name for the tests), India declared itself a nuclear state. India thus declared a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing. Vajpayee in a letter to Clinton asserted that India faced threats from China and Pakistan and that these were compelling reasons for India to undertake nuclear tests. The letter to Clinton was leaked to the *New York Times* and these aggravated tensions further between India and China.

INDIAN DIASPORA AS BRAND AMBASSADORS OF INDIA

In 2000, the US President Bill Clinton visited India. He became the fourth USA President after Eisenhower, Nixon and Carter to visit the country. Clinton's visit saw a push towards bilateral economic diplomacy as deals worth three billion dollars were signed, ranging from broadband connectivity to energy dimensions.

The emerging economic opportunities for the USA in India and a presence of a vibrant Indian diaspora in the USA that played a pivotal role in US politics proved instrumental factors in creating a new bridge in the bilateral relationship. The Clinton administration was replaced by the Bush administration. The momentum of establishing a new relationship with India gained strength with the coming of Bush. The 9/11 attack bolstered some major changes in the subcontinent. Immediately after the 9/11 attack, India went ahead to put on record that it was willing to enter into military alliance with the US and work with it in its global war on terrorism (GWOT).

THE INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY'S GREAT POWER ASPIRATIONS

The relationship with China under Manmohan Singh took a momentous step ahead and the two sides decided to boost bilateral trade and reopened the Nathu La Pass in 2006, apart from many positive frameworks. In 2004, Manmohan Singh and Putin met at the India–Russia Annual PM Summit. The two sides decided to resolve their long pending disputes related to defence. India was concerned about the supply of defence spares and their timely delivery and pricing. Russia was concerned about India's IPR laws. During the 2004 summit meeting, India conveyed its assurance to Russia that it would respect IPR laws of all equipment supplied to India by Russia and ensured they were neither copied nor secretly

stolen by any state. The two sides subsequently strengthened cooperation in defence and energy in the years ahead. The next steps in strategic partnership launched during the Vajpayee regime between India and the USA (explained in the US–India chapter) ultimately culminated into the India–USA civilian nuclear cooperation deal in 2005. The nuclear deal between India and the USA not only opened up a new chapter in bilateral relationships but also signified that the USA had come to accept India as a major power of the future.

INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY AND GREAT POWER ASPIRATIONS

Manmohan Singh continued to deepen India's relationship with the ASEAN states, which had started with a sectoral dialogue partnership between India and ASEAN at the end of the Cold War. During Manmohan Singh's regime as the PM, India and ASEAN concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) in goods (2010) and services (2012). Singh also invested tremendous diplomatic capital to strengthen ties with Japan. The two sides, under the leadership of Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe, concluded an agreement to establish a single seamless whole envisaging free movement of navy, capital and people. Besides India and Japan, Manmohan Singh also strengthened Indian ties with Africa. India launched multiple initiatives, ranging from Focus Africa Programme to Pan-Africa-e-Network Projects, to enhance people-to-people ties.

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY'S ENERGY DIPLOMACY

The ties with West Asia saw resurgence based on the theme of oil diplomacy. It was during Manmohan Singh's regime that India and Saudi Arabia concluded a strategic partnership agreement. Our cooperation with UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman continued. India and Qatar signed an agreement on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Qatar decided to supply India LNG for energy security. The foreign policy of Manmohan Singh saw India emerge as one of the lead players in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

KEY POINTS

- Indira Gandhi ensured that no country in the world perceives India as an inferior state.
- The foreign policy responses were based on independent merit that each situation demanded and Indian response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an example of the same.
- Rajiv Gandhi was a disrupter and a moderniser. He chose to focus on economic self-interests and decided to engage with Chinese.
- Narsimha Rao built upon the legacy of Rajiv Gandhi and infused economics deep into the foreign policy.
- The Look East Policy and renewed economic diplomacy of Rao with central Asia and the US were his notable achievements.
- However, most of India's neighbours looked at India with a pejorative sense, compelling Rao to adopt a hands-off approach.
- To improvise the ties with the neighbours, Gujral adopted Gujral doctrine and emphasised the need to engage with neighbours without reciprocity.
- Vajpayee resorted to initiation of great power politics and brought diaspora on Indian foreign policy centre-stage.
- Manmohan Singh leveraged the great power politics and eventually articulated nuclear deal, development diplomacy and energy diplomacy.



3

CHAPTER

The Foreign Policy of Narendra Modi and the Modi Doctrine

THE CULTURE OF SAMVAD IN FOREIGN POLICY


The year 2014 saw Modi coming to power as the Prime Minister of India. He won his second term in 2019. The earliest signs of Modi's diplomacy date back to his tenure as the Chief Minister (CM) of Gujarat. During his decade-long stint as the CM, he travelled to various countries to get investment for his state. During his foreign visits, he developed a style of personal diplomacy where he emphasised building of strong personal relationships with leaders of the states he visited. This style of personal diplomacy is now recognised as the hallmark of Modi's way of engaging with the world. Modi's diplomatic skills were further strengthened when Vajpayee, as the PM, deputed Modi to travel abroad for party work where he always displayed avid interest in learning how foreign states solved problems related to infrastructure, roads, rivers etc. and applying that learning to Indian situations. This ability of learning from the foreign states and to replicate the same in India is visible in his style. Modi's background in RSS has also inculcated in him a sense of a wider engagement with people of all walks of life for suggestions. In fact, during his RSS days in 1970s and 1980s, Modi effectively worked upon the RSS pillar, *Samvad*. *Samvad* also eventually emerged as a key pillar of his foreign policy.

THE 'INDIA FIRST' DOCTRINE

When he travels abroad, he does not restrict his engagement with merely the heads of states but widens his reach to include private sector firms to monks, to students, to workers in factories. His idea of foreign policy or diplomacy is that it should not just be perceived as the art of government-to-government interaction but more as a leader-to-people interaction.


RETAIL DIPLOMACY AND MODI DOCTRINE

Diplomacy involving leader-to-people interactions is called retail diplomacy. In retail diplomacy, the state leader interacts, meets and shakes hands with a wide spectrum of scholars to monks to workers. Retail diplomacy not only enhances the perceived approachability of the leader in the eyes of the public but also helps in developing very strong interpersonal relationships.



INDIAN DIASPORA AND TRANSFORMATIVE DIPLOMACY

The Modi doctrine is defined by his emphasis on 4D's:



Modi has adopted Democracy, Demography and Demand as key drivers to highlight India's economic power abroad. However, Diaspora is the oxygen to his foreign policy. Modi has, from day one, addressed concerns related to the Indian diaspora. On any foreign tour, Modi makes it a point to address a gathering of the Indian diaspora. There are two purposes for the same. First, he addresses the diaspora to not only reconnect with their homeland but also to convey them the problems India faces in the twenty-first century. In most of his addresses to the diaspora, Modi outlines domestic issues of India and government initiatives to tackle them. He often discusses issues such as lack of manufacturing base in India, issues related to cleanliness and so on. In the address, he appraises the diaspora of initiatives the government has taken, ranging from Make in India to Swachh Bharat and so forth.

The intention of this exercise is to convince the diaspora that they can emerge as effective stakeholders in the problems faced by India. He intends to convey to the diaspora that their contribution is imperative for India's development story and its rise as a global power. Second, his address to the Indian diaspora in foreign countries is a message to the governments of those countries—'if you take care of this constituency, they will take care of your governments in elections'. This diaspora diplomacy is a classic example of how the diaspora can be a catalyst for transformative diplomacy in the era of globalisation. His focus, in the long run, is to use the diaspora for domestic development.


His intention is to attract the interests of the diaspora back home and affect a reversal from brain drain to brain gain. Thus, it is not wrong to say that Modi knows that the diaspora is a part of the great Indian family, which will be a partner to India's emergence as a global player. This is also in sync with the BJP's perception of the importance of the diaspora. An important thing to note here is that in his addresses to the diaspora, he would link the past, present and the future in such an array that the diaspora gets galvanised, energised and enthusiastic to play a role in India's future. His addresses to the diaspora in the USA (Howdy Modi in 2019), Australia and the UK reflect the intermixing of past, present and future. The doctrine of the diaspora here aims to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to India and use it for domestic development. Modi's idea of diaspora diplomacy is to ensure a collective Indian voice in the countries of their residence where they are simultaneously loyal citizens.

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AS A KEY TO GREAT POWER STATUS

Another very crucial dimension of Modi doctrine is his thrust on economic diplomacy. All diplomatic engagements undertaken by Modi till date are driven by the economic thrust of making India a leading commercial power. Modi from Gujarat imbibed the value of economic diplomacy. Gujarat had been an important port of international trade during the peak of trade via the ancient silk route. Trade was natural to Gujarat and this had emerged as a crucial element of the Modi doctrine. Modi understood well that domestic growth rates cannot be boosted by domestic initiatives alone and that geo-strategic imperatives arising out of external engagement with rest of the world are a key to India's growth story. The economic diplomacy strategy of Modi is based on a model where domestic growth is to be propelled by FDI in the manufacturing sector. To make FDI absorption easy, the 'Make in India' and 'Skill India' initiatives have been launched and steps have been taken to improve India's performance in the ease of doing business.

In 2019, Modi addressed the IFS probationers and instructed them to focus on enhancing India's export potential in textile and traditional medicine. Modi understands the need of the investors well and has worked upon government-to-business contacts. During an address at a business lunch in Tokyo, in 2014, Modi said that while he had been the CM of Gujarat,

he had invited Japanese investments. As Japanese businesses came, he began to study Japanese culture and found that the Japanese like to play golf. This led Modi to establish world-class golf courses in Gujarat, thereby showing what a proactive government can do for investors. For Modi, economic diplomacy is about marketing, streamlining, downsizing and modernisation brought about in a seamless manner within a global economy.



Media Diplomacy

Indian diplomats face two constraints. First is a cultural constraint. Many are neither attuned to nor professionally trained to deal with the highly opinionated opinion makers. Second is financial. The government does not provide adequate funds to diplomats to conduct such outreach in an adequately suitable and subtle manner. Media outreach is not conducting a press conference. It requires systematic relationship building that requires considerable investment of time and money. The government is trying to address these concerns.

Soft Power is India's Power

His usage of India's soft power capabilities has taken primacy in the Modi doctrine. For instance, the intense diplomacy to get 21 June declared as the International Day of Yoga at the UN General Assembly is an example of soft power diplomacy. Thus, one may conclude that the Modi doctrine is all about putting India into a higher international orbit and for achieving the same; tasks have been clearly cut out for the future. Modi believes that a joint co-action of all the neighbours can also help each one of us to tackle problems collectively. In April 2020, Modi emphasised upon the SAARC as a platform to be used by all states in the region to tackle the novel COVID-19.

Vaccine Maitri and COVID-19

During the Covid-19 pandemic, India seized the opportunity to project itself as a global saviour by exporting Hydroxy chloroquine (a drug required for the treatment of the virus) to the US, Brazil and Maldives. Thus, by assisting others in an unfortunate situation, India established 'India Model'. China too exported relief assistance following 'China Model' but the quality for those were poor and some conditions were applied to it.

THE NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST DOCTRINE

Under the new Neighbourhood First policy, Modi's key focus vis-à-vis India's relation with its neighbours is economic trade. Modi believes that aggressive economic trade with neighbours will benefit all and the benefits will percolate deep down in the society. This will bring about a radical shift in the way its neighbours perceive India. The erstwhile image of India, projected to its neighbours as a 'Big Brother', will transform into one of a collaborative ally and shall prove positive spill over for the entire region. At the neighbourhood level, connectivity has emerged as an inbuilt dimension of economic diplomacy. Our understanding of the foreign policy of Modi helps us to analyse few goals the IFP intends to achieve in the future. Modi has clarified that India is not going to be a balancing power but intends to aspire to be a leading power. India needs to have a three-step foreign policy:

Observe and react to international events

If needed, infuse energy to shape international events
--

Occasionally, play a role to drive the events

Modi focuses on the following three core points in diplomacy.

Personal energy with pragmatism
Focus on problem solving based diplomacy
Prioritising national interests with economic diplomacy

DOCTRINE OF CIVILISATIONAL AND FAITH DIPLOMACY

While interacting with world leaders, Modi ensures that he develops a strong personal chemistry with them. Modi's idea is that a strong personal bond helps India to bargain its national interests at the highest level possible. One of the most important influences of RSS on Modi's foreign policy has been his interest in spearheading India's culture and values and promotion of the same at a global level. The RSS background has infused this value in Modi who practises the same with much vigour in the foreign policy. His cultural and civilisational diplomacy is clearly reflected in his visits to temples in foreign states.

In the recent times, Modi has taken steps to bridge a link between faith and diplomacy. In India's Asian policy, Buddhism has acquired a new focus. When Modi went to Mongolia, he delivered a lecture in their Parliament where he highlighted the importance of Buddhism to solve contemporary Asian and global challenges. The IFP has always emphasised upon cultural, historical and civilisational ties and has tried to keep religion out of foreign policy engagements. Modi has initiated a new diplomatic path of using religion, as a tool to promote global harmony. Globally there is a trend of using religion as a diplomatic tool. The US have an office of Religious and Global Affairs in the Department of State, which assists the US Secretary of State on religious issues. European Union does so in case of West Asia while China has been doing so since long. India is trying to put its IFP in line with this global trend. It has begun with Buddhism, which helps India reinforce its leadership in South East Asia.

OMNI-ALIGNMENT AND STRATEGIC AUTONOMY DIPLOMACY


Indian PM participated in the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2019. This is the first time the Indian PM outlined a foreign policy framework that will remain as a dominant doctrine in Indian policy for long. Some core ideas can be ascertained from the speech of the Indian PM. He stated that the world is witnessing tremendous uncertainty. There is a competition over various geopolitical ideas and political models in the world. At this juncture, the Indian PM stated that India would position itself as an independent actor and an independent power across Asia. For the first time, he stated that the USA and Russian Federation are India's partners. With these partners, India's relationship is based on geopolitics in Asia and overlapping interests globally. He asserted that the relation with China is complex and has 'many layers'. But, still the relation with China has an undertone of stability and is crucial for the world. Importantly, India asserted that it would not be a part of any closed group of nations or even any aggregate power or any bloc. In fact, India asserted that based on its own power, capacity and ideas, India will chart out its own course. Some asserted the revival of non-alignment, though the PM used the term 'strategic autonomy'.

DIPLOMACY OF MINILATERALS, INDO-PACIFIC AND QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE

India asserted that Indo-Pacific is not perceived by India as a China-centric or a club of limited members.

India perceives Indo-Pacific as an inclusive bloc of pluralism and co-existence. India continues to assert that it looks the world as free, inclusive and open rules based on global order where these rules are to be centred upon the consent of all and not just a few. Indian PM categorically stated that the rivalry in Asia will descend into conflict but cooperation of rivals will be conducive for stability. In conclusion, India positioned itself to seek a multi-polar world with capability for making its own destiny. Reflecting its own unique geography, India has asserted that it wants to leverage its position in

the Pacific and Eurasia. India, now, is a leading power with strategic intent of 'Omni-alignment'. If India intends to play the leadership role in the world, India would have to advocate for more global investment and trade flows.



PRACTICING DOCTRINE OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

The foreign policy of Modi believes that long-held assumptions and alignments rooted in the legacies of colonialism and the ideology of the Cold War are making way for new configurations and partnerships but India remains committed to the principles and objectives of the non-aligned movement, including its long-standing solidarity and support for the Palestinian cause. The question that arises is that does the government's decision to send Vice President Venkaiah Naidu to the 2019 NAM Summit represented a "downgrade" of India's representation? The answer is no. It may not be possible for PM Modi to attend all multilateral events, given the huge demands on his time. In fact in the past, many Prime Ministers attended the UN General Assembly, but PM Modi has not followed that tradition and spoken at the General Assembly only on three occasions. There are some scholars and analysts who are of the opinion that as non-alignment was a tool of the Cold War, it has lost relevance in the post-Cold War period. Some scholars also argue that whatever non-alignment aspired for, it has achieved as the countries are now decolonised and there is no more apartheid etc. However, it is important to remember that non-alignment was only an independent choice of foreign policy. It has nothing to do with the existence or absence of the Cold War. No doubt decolonisation was one of the central tenets of non-alignment as it coincided with Cold War, but its essence remains relevant till today.

What is Strategic Autonomy in Indian Foreign Policy?

The essence of non-alignment, called by Modi as strategic autonomy, can be seen in three points as follows: Looking at every issue through the prism of merit. States reserving the right to take actions against an issue they perceive as wrong by any major power. States reserving the right to take actions in their foreign policy on the basis of their independence, national interest and thereby reserving their autonomy.

INDIA AS A RISING POWER AND AVOIDING THE KINDLEBERGER TRAP

In the past 20 years, there have been three clear instances when India's actions have not only forced its diplomacy out of South Block and to the rest of the world, but have been inflexion points in its larger foreign policy, forcing India to articulate its way forward. One was the nuclear tests of 1998 and the second, the India-US nuclear deal of 2008. The third was India's decision to nullify Article 370 and reorganise Jammu and Kashmir. In an unnoticed remark, India's Foreign Minister, Jaishankar informed the UN's new grouping on multilateralism. "The Kindleberger trap on the shortage of global goods is far more serious than the Thucydides Trap." Basically he was saying China's mercantilism rendered it a selfish superpower because it disregarded existing international norms (like UNCLOS) without helping to create a new order. It was the clearest indictment of the Chinese view of power, as well as an exhortation of the US's withdrawal from its traditional role of being the provider of global goods (defined as "stable climate, financial stability or freedom of the seas" by Joseph Nye). That is the space India sees for itself in the coming decades, a middle power raising by sharing the global burdens in providing for global goods in coalition with large powers such as the US. Indian Foreign Minister, in 2020, outlined India's foreign policy mantras as greater pluralism, pragmatic cooperation, convergence with many, congruence with none, not pure transnationalism, but accommodation, nationalism and internationalism to co-exist.


What is Kindleberger Trap?

The term Kindleberger trap was coined by Joseph Nye, which signifies the dangers inherent when world witnesses changing balance of power. The Kindleberger trap is similar to the concept of weaponisation of supply chains analysed in Section 1 and here the idea is that when balance of power changes, some countries will leverage their power and deny others' public goods.

He rightly stated that in this intensely competitive world India's goal should be to move closer towards the strategic sweet spot. Even India looks at an era of more dispersed power and sharper competition, the way forward is more likely to be new forms of accommodation rather than pure transactions. While nations will, naturally, strive to advance their particular interests, similarities and affinities will always remain a factor. No doubt, if India aspires to be a leading power, it cannot continue to have unsettled borders, unintegrated regions and under-exploited opportunities.

Thus, India in the future is going to be:

1. A stabilising force and not a global disrupter.
2. Not self-centred and mercantilistic but someone which is law abiding and consultative.
3. A nation that is a net security provider, net development provider, connectivity provider, firm in dealing with terrorism, one, which has values in place, and one that will address global issues.
4. A nation that will remain a voice of the global South (means developing states and emerging market economies) and connects uniquely to the diaspora to project 'Brand India'.



KEY POINTS

- The foreign policy under Modi has adopted many new paradigms.
- Development of India is at the heart of Indian foreign policy goals now.
- The focus is on faith diplomacy to leverage India's civilisational strengths.
- India favours summit style diplomacy to give emphasis on great power politics.
- India is more interested in shaping international events now than merely reacting to them.
- The focus is on emerging to as a rising power by display of capabilities.



4

CHAPTER

The Ethical Dilemmas of Indian Foreign Policy

INDIA'S MIDDLE PATH

When India became independent, we were wooed by the Americans to join their capitalist camp. But, had India joined the US camp, what could have been the result? Probably, a mini Marshall Plan for India, settlement of Kashmir issue in the UN and a powerful India to take on Chinese in 1962. The leap into the lap of the US would have definitely transformed India but India chose self-respect by articulating non-alignment, wisely because aligning would have meant accepting a subservient status, which would have been akin to centuries of humiliation we had already faced. India chose the middle path, a difficult choice, but foreign policy is seldom easy because the gains are incremental and reverses are common. India chose the third way in a bipolar world and found non-alignment as a low-cost influence enhancer in the world. However, the non-alignment as a brand punched far above its weight during the Cold War and was shorn of moralistic hyperbole and lacked any solid foundation on which it could flaunt its muscles, nothing but an ethical dilemma.

INDIA'S EMERGING WORLDVIEW

Since the end of the Cold War, India has moved away from non-alignment. Diplomatic practitioners argue that non-alignment is dead and India today follows strategic autonomy. However, as argued in the chapters previously, the strategic autonomy is an old wine in the new bottle. There is a growing belief amongst the global diplomatic community that India has shed off old beliefs, but it is yet to clearly articulate an effective doctrine for the future. While strategic autonomy is the blunt answer, but the question is, how can India exercise strategic autonomy when it has a weak indigenous defence industry? This is an ethical dilemma because if India is to rely on foreign players for military equipments, it will continue to remain strategically dependent. Also, presently, India needs a strong economic heft to advance the notion of strategic dilemma. The economic and military dimensions are not the only dilemma because chains around India's machinations also include Pakistan and China. Pakistan continues to bleed India and chip away its territorial integrity, thereby acting as an irritating bee that does not go away. Afterall, it is rightly said that history is to nations what character is to people.

INDIA AS A MINI GLOBAL POWER OR A SWING STATE

The global commentators have often debated on whether India has done well for itself! Is India rising as a power and on way to become a global power? This is a serious ethical dilemma that Indian foreign policy mandarins are unable to explain because there is a lot of ambiguity about India's ambitions for itself and the envisaged global role. Whatever be the status, one fact that has remained constant is that India counts in the world affairs today. This has been the case since Nehruvian times of moral leadership to present quest for a leadership role in shaping world events.

INDIA'S STATECRAFT OR STAGECRAFT

What will determine our global presence is contingent upon how we deal with our neighbours and the major powers. A key determinant would be on how India will ensure peace and security. Existing theories argue that a blend of coercion, payment and attraction are good optics of a national strategy. Put simply, great power politics is a mixture of soft power, hard power and smart power. The dilemma that confronts India is that does India have the capacity to absorb this wisdom? Can India manage the challenges in the neighbourhood through a doctrinal approach of 'speaking softly but carrying a big stick' to ensure that its national interests and territorial integrity is not challenged? It has been argued that India has found use of 'sharp power' more conducive as a strategy where the focus is on playing spy games that use manipulative diplomatic practices to influence and undermine the political systems of the adversaries because the strategy has the ability to pierce, penetrate and perforate the political and information systems that the adversaries have used against India.

INDIA AS A CONFUSED POWER

The biggest contribution of globalisation to the society of Asia has been the spectacular rise of China. The Chinese were born in 1949, after the civil war ended. Initially they remained a communist economy till 1978 but owing to their frictions with the Soviet Union, the Chinese switched the gears and embraced capitalism. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping made the embrace and propelled Chinese on path of economic growth via capitalism. Since then, till today, the Chinese have not only grown but have acquired tremendous economic and military power. The power acquired by the Chinese is such that they have disturbed the balance of power in Asia today. At the systemic level, Asia faces a regional order threat centred either on the US or China, leaving India in the foray. Secondly, Asia today is confronted with several powers of varying sizes and capabilities that are contending for primacy and influence to maximise their individual interests, a pattern which is quite similar to what was seen in Europe in the nineteenth century. The question that arises is that in this geopolitically contested and crowded Asia, what is India's strategy? Though India asserts that our approach is of multipolarity but multipolarity can only lead to crisis management and confidence building but not give strength to shape international events. The dilemma for India is, at one place it aspires to be a great power and at the other place, the assertion of multipolarity limits its ability to shape and influence global events. How will India find the answer to this?

INDIA'S FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY TASKS

India is witnessing a challenging global order where it needs to articulate a response to three challenges. The first is an intellectual challenge, where it has to develop a coherent understanding of present world and place India in it. Secondly, it has to define policies that are going to sustain the transformation India has embarked in foreign policy. Thirdly, India has to generate the core tenets of its grand strategy. Today, India is unable to intellectually understand its present state in the world because of the partition. Till India was a British colony, it was a coherent unit that exercised geopolitical significance and was the ultimate pivot state. However, since the partition, India is not a single geopolitical unit anymore and Indian borders do not conform to the geographic borders of the subcontinent. This is the heart of India's continental dilemma because Pakistan and China are today robbing India of political energy which India could have harnessed to display power in Eurasia and Indian Ocean. While it is good to argue that 'India will be a great power', 'India is a rising power'; the problem is that we lack any defined tangible matrices to assess how we make such assertions. In the absence of the matrices, these narratives are then merely ideas of hierarchy and perception and reduce the international relations in the minds of the people to a macho contest. India is and will remain an important player in world affairs but the power of India will not be asserted through how many countries it can outdo or push down but how well can it uplift its own people from ambitious poverty. The desire for a great power status has to be driven by quest for a great power status and not by a desire to be recognised by few states in joint statements.

MANIFESTING INDIA'S DESTINY IN THE WORLD

The future of India resides in the hands and heads of the citizens of India. How the citizens will perceive India and build the narrative will affect the destiny of India. When India became independent, it sought no apology from the British

but used the national confidence of the national movement to build our future, our way. The confidence was seen in our national narrative which accepted history for what history was and did not focus attention on exaggerated boasts. Today, India requires a similar confidence and objectivity if it aspires to be a great power because emotions and sentiments do not make a country a great power but logic, reason and clarity does. Bravado and extravagant statements might enthuse some domestic elements but do not auger well for a country that claims global power status on civilisational strengths. India should not accept simulacrum of leadership or prejudices masquerading as ideas but allow India to stand for a message with a universal appeal of peace, harmony, tolerance and growth for all.

CHALLENGES FOR INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN POST-PANDEMIC WORLD

A common theme that has dominated our foreign policy is an understanding that ideas matter more than material power. This is why the bigger challenge for the foreign policy today is to conceptualise the ideas that we should stand for. There is a consensus in Indian strategic community that India's power is different and its power is the 'power of example'. This implies that India today does domestically what it speaks internationally. For instance, if India today intends to promote a healthy living and spirituality, then it is promoting use of Yoga domestically and internationally as International Yoga Day. However, there are a few proponents in the foreign policy establishment who argue that in a changed global environment, India must not neglect material or hard power. This itself is at the heart of Indian dilemma, that how does it find a balance between material power and power of ideas. The second challenge for Indian foreign policy is that it is unable to articulate an idea whether it should promote democracy abroad or not. While India is proud of its democratic credentials and has been advancing democracy as a soft power through multiple diplomatic and academic initiatives. However, what India lacks is a clear vision and an institutional architecture to promote democracy as a foreign policy goal. The dilemma in policy makers is whether the Election Commission of India, which has been a temple of Indian democracy, should collaborate with Ministry of External Affairs or not, for promoting democracy internationally. In the current post-pandemic age which is witnessing democratic recession, it is imperative for India to robustly assert democracy. Come what may, India must resolve this challenge by developing a coherent response. The third challenge for India is to clarify what exactly it stands for as a value in foreign policy. This is crucial because India though asserts 'strategic autonomy' but has often been identified as a 'camp follower of the US'. For a nation in transition that is witnessing multitude of challenges, it is important that India clarifies what it means by strategic autonomy and defines the policy underpinnings to avoid uncalled for criticism.

QUESTIONS FOR PRACTICE

S. No.	Questions for Practice
1.	How to blend ideas and material power ambition?
2.	Should India use democracy as a value of foreign policy and promote democracy in international relations.
3.	Defining what are India's national interests and the underpinnings of what is meant by strategic autonomy.
4.	Turning statesmanship to salesmanship is a new phenomenon in Indian foreign policy. Examine.
5.	Does India's hyper-activism on the foreign policy front enable it to be a system-shaper and a global rule-maker or is it still a rule-taker?
6.	Do you observe a fundamental foreign policy shift or is it just a large number of optics-friendly acts that are well choreographed but not visionary? Analyse.
7.	When the world is struggling to manage the most pressing existential risk, is it any surprise that other international regimes are equally gridlocked? Analyse.
8.	Is India's current foreign policy guided more by economic than strategic interests? Examine.
9.	Is there any significance of religion in shaping Indian foreign policy making or its discourse in the past or today?
10.	Does India's religious demographic profile play any role in framing foreign policy towards Islamic states?

SECTION 4

INDIA AND NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS

- 1. India and Neighbourhood Policy – Key Drivers of the Relationship
- 2. India's Relationship with Bhutan
- 3. India's Relationship with Afghanistan
- 4. India's Relationship with Pakistan
- 5. India's Relationship with Bangladesh
- 6. India's Relationship with Myanmar
- 7. India's Relationship with Nepal
- 8. India's Relationship with Sri Lanka
- 9. India's Relationship with China

AN OVERVIEW

Neighbourhood is an area mentioned in the syllabus. The nature of questions, if analysed carefully, clearly gives an indication that current happenings are fused with the background of neighbourhood studies and a question is constructed. In 2013, five questions on neighbourhood were asked and they ranged from Sri Lanka, protests in Maldives, String of Pearls to protests in Bangladesh. In 2014, when the US announced that they would move their troops out of Afghanistan, a question was asked on its implications on India. Similarly, in 2015, when Pakistan resorted to the use of terrorism as a state policy to destabilise India, a question on the use of soft power as a tool was asked. In 2017, a question on China was asked when the use of Chinese economic power status to alter regional power equations after its BRI became a destabilising force.

Potential foresight On the basis of the insights developed from the questions visible, we can be certain that if a major event happens in our neighbourhood, then a potential question can be asked on its implications in India. In the next two years, the author feels questions on implications of debt crisis of Sri Lanka on India, Indian ability to manage the art of balancing military Junta and democracy in Myanmar, rentier state politics of Pakistan and possibilities of state failure on security of India, implications of Bhutan's tilt towards China on India, role of India in development of Nepal, Nepali map machinations, Chinese attempts of salami slicing, its utilisation of sub-conventional tactics in Ladakh and great power rivalry between India and China in tech diplomacy and marine realm are prominent areas of questions.



1

CHAPTER


India and Neighbourhood Policy – Key Drivers of the Relationship

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NEIGHBOURS


The entire South Asian subcontinent was unified under the British for the first time after the decline of the Mughal Empire in India. The British established a double line of defence, on the basis of the policy of reverse slopes. Under this policy, China and Russia were to have no presence in the subcontinent and the British tried to ensure this through the subordination of individual states. The British established a buffer state fences on reverse Himalayan slopes. The partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 saw a reversal of the reverse slope policy and opened up the possibility of foreign intervention in the region, which India did not favour. After the partition, despite a loss of territory in borders of the West and the East, India emerged as a pre-eminent regional power since a huge amount of land still came to India. Because of a huge territory and its geographical importance in the subcontinent, the subsequent security conception of India was not national but geopolitical and regional in nature. India realised that, due to its geopolitical location, it would witness a threat first from powers of the region than powers outside the region. India felt that it might witness a threat from the neighbours who may be weak or unstable because such a weak neighbour would always invite a powerful foreign player to intervene on its behalf against India. This would bring external powers to a zone; India felt fell in its own sphere of influence, where India can be the only power that can intervene. Thus, for India, security of South Asia is based on stability of South Asia. Jawaharlal Nehru propounded this view and some scholars have referred to it as the Indian Monroe Doctrine (drawing a parallel from the 19th century where the US President James Monroe exercised a similar influence of power in the Western hemisphere to prevent the European colonisation of America) as Nehru, after independence, resonated with similar views when he advocated that foreign colonial powers should stay out of South Asia. During the Cold War, India followed this foreign policy of trying to limit the influence of foreign powers in Asia, but such an attempt proved difficult for India as India lacked both the resources and the experience in governance to extend security to its neighbouring states. However, India today tries to extend this security to its neighbours and has tried to position itself as a Net Security Provider.

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY OF INDIA FROM NEHRU TO MANMOHAN SINGH


India, during Nehru's times, followed a global strategy of non-alignment to keep India away from the Cold War politics. The neighbourhood policy did not receive the same attention as India tried to position itself as a neutral force in the era of bipolarity.




The coming of Indira Gandhi brought about a change in India's neighbourhood policy. She added a new component of bilateralism in the neighbourhood policy. This means that Indira Gandhi insisted that India should bilaterally resolve issues of the region without any intervention from external powers. Indira ensured that external powers have no role when matters are resolved bilaterally by India. The Indian neighbourhood policy, for that matter, was always fraught with contradictions. Regionally, in South Asia, India clung to the precepts of the balance of power and sphere of influence, while rejecting the same internationally. Regionally, under Indira Gandhi, India provided security to small nations while internationally opposing the intervention of the great powers in the affairs of the weak states. India, under Indira Gandhi, preached bilateralism at a time when it globally advocated for multilateralism. Another feature of Indira's neighbourhood policy was that she resorted to military interventions with a neighbour if it threatened India's security. India's intervention in 1971 during the East Pakistan crisis is a testimony to the fact. Many of the neighbours began to perceive India's military strategy as an interventionist approach.



When Rajiv Gandhi assumed control, the Indian intervention in Maldives and Sri Lanka in 1980s (explained in the subsequent chapters) transformed India into a perceptual regional hegemon. Many scholars raised issues with India establishing itself as a regional hegemon. They asserted that India, during Indira and Rajiv's times (under Indira Doctrine and Rajiv Doctrine), did not provide economic and security benefits to the neighbours (as the definition of a regional hegemon warranted) but intervened militarily to assert hegemony.



When the Cold War ended, India began to realise that the interventionist approach had become unsustainable. India was visibly upset by this rising anti-Indian sentiment. When P. V. Narsimha Rao became the Prime Minister, he evolved a fresh approach to the neighbourhood policy. He followed a hands-off approach. His idea was that India should not interfere in the functioning of the neighbouring states. If the hands-off policy did not create new tensions, it also did not contribute to reducing old problems. Later the, approach of Rao was carried forward by the then Prime Minister I. K. Gujral. He introduced a proper doctrine for the neighbourhood for the first time and tried to reduce the problems.




I. K. Gujral's foreign policy doctrine was based upon the logic of non-reciprocity and generosity. Under Gujral, India re-evaluated its self-interests and decided to be more generous towards its neighbours. Under the Gujral Doctrine, India's avowed aim was to build goodwill amongst its neighbours instead of leaving space for the development of anti-India sentiments. India, though its non-reciprocity and generosity, wanted to show to the neighbours that there lay a huge economic and political benefit in cooperating with India.


The "Gujral Doctrine" enunciated in September 1996, sought to assert that no South Asian country would allow its territory to be used against the interests of another country of the region; that none would interfere in the internal affairs of another; that all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; and that they would settle disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. For India specifically, Gujral also declared that it "does not ask for reciprocity but gives all it can in good faith and trust".



Some scholars in the Indian foreign policy establishment found that the Gujral Doctrine was too idealistic, but the neighbours and the other states appreciated non-reciprocity and generosity. The first missing link in the Gujral Doctrine was that Gujral did not have ample amount of time as the Prime Minister to force the foreign bureaucracy of India to accept the value of cooperation. Moreover, despite advocating openness and generosity, the Gujral Doctrine was reluctant on opening up foreign trade in the region.




When the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in 1998, it became busy in managing the fallout of the Pokhran-II test at the global level. As the BJP government began to shift its focus to its neighbours, it decided to use SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) as platform for regional cooperation. The Vajpayee government wanted a kind of South Asian Union by upgrading the SAARC where there was a free trade amongst states and a very small negative list. India had a grand vision of using the South Asian Union under SAARC not only for economic cooperation but also as a political union on the lines of the European Union. However, one reason why the idea failed was that India, under the BJP, insisted on a security guarantee for economic cooperation. However, the government was also not able to achieve much success in using SAARC as a platform due to problems caused by Pakistan.




The Manmohan Singh government too tried to use SAARC as a platform to further integration amongst the neighbouring states. The UPA government favoured political dialogue with neighbours. It almost followed all dimensions of the Gujral Doctrine without publicly accepting the same.

INDIA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST POLICY AND MODI DOCTRINE


India has realised the need to be a leading power in the post-Cold War times, which, many scholars read as India's tendency to behave like a proto-imperialist power. India, according to such scholars, has not been able to enhance its influence in South Asia and has instead been perceived as a second-tier imperialist power by the South Asian states. Since the beginning of the Cold War till the present, the societies of South Asia, instead of working with each other to enhance cooperation at the regional level, have preferred to look towards the North for technology and resources. Because of this, economic interaction and integration of the South Asian region has remained largely neglected. Some scholars assert that India has tried to emerge as the regional hegemon, but this may not be a genuine assessment of India's neighbourhood policies because a regional hegemon provides economic and security benefits to other states while India has not done any such thing in South Asia. It is in this context, to rectify its earlier shortcomings in the neighbourhood policy, that India announced its 'Neighbourhood First' policy in 2014. India now tries to provide those economic and security benefits to the neighbours that range from resources to technology, and is trying to position itself as a Net Security Provider and a Net Development Provider, the core goals of 'Neighbourhood First' policy.




The idea of the neighbourhood first policy is to link India's development to the development of South Asia. In order to realise this vision, a special focus is given to SAARC and the idea is to transform the entire South Asian region into an integrated economic union with enhanced connectivity. The neighbourhood first policy has picked up grains from the Gujral Doctrine without publicly accepting the same. A special thrust is laid upon improving connectivity within South Asia so that all the states in the region can benefit from mutual cooperation leading to shared prosperity for all. India believes that the economic integration can create a conducive environment for political negotiations to resolve pending disputes (Pakistan remains the slowest camel in the caravan) and end up in stabilising the South Asian region as a whole.




The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) launched the SAARC satellite in May 2017 for India's neighbours so that they would take advantage of telemedicine and e-learning.



The basic idea of the neighbourhood first policy is that India would shape events in its neighbourhood rather than merely reacting to them. Such an attempt to shape events is in sync with India's quest to play an important role in global affairs. It also signified that India is now willing to shoulder responsibilities in its neighbourhood. India wants to use the neighbourhood first policy to expand India's influence in South Asia through commercial, cultural, connectivity and cooperative diplomacy. The essence of India's new policy is to build up a new geo-economic constituency in the neighbourhood.



The core idea of Neighbourhood First Policy is *Vistaarvaad Nahi, Vikasvaad* (the focus is not expansion but development for all) and *Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas*. India wants to establish a developmental compact by positioning itself as a Net Development Provider in South Asia by line of credits, grants, skill development and technology transfers to all in the neighbours. India wants the development compact to act as a catalyst for growth in South Asia.




Under the Neighbourhood First Policy, India wants to work upon building up of defence relationships. In the post-Cold War period, India has realised that the growing economic influence of China in India's neighbourhood is likely to have strategic consequences. This is largely in sync with India's new vision called SAGAR or Security and Growth for All in the Region, which is based on the spirit of generosity without insisting on reciprocity.

CONSTRAINTS IN INDIA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD DIPLOMACY

Firstly, inadequate resources create a constraint. Secondly, most of the diplomatic scholars assert that even if India is able to commit projects, it fails to invest proportional diplomatic capital to pursue the projects. Because of this, the projects get delayed and lags are imminent. Thirdly, the strategic diffidence in the strategic culture of India is aggravated due to

its insistence on going solo for such engagements. To address such issues, India needs to evolve a multilateral approach based upon global consensus on core challenges. In fact, developing a loose multilateral coalition driven by the strategic objectives and interests of India can help in mitigating the self-imposed unilateral biases we have in engaging with our neighbourhood.



India has to embed deep that it cannot compete with China. China has deep pockets due to which it is able to sponsor massive infrastructure projects. India does not have such material capabilities like China as of now. So, India must focus on identifying the weaknesses of China and make them its strength. For instance, India can play an important role in institution building and soft power. India should open new vistas of two plus one format of cooperation (a minilateral coalition as explained above) and open up Para diplomacy.

INDIAN CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT ACT AND IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA'S NEIGHBOURS

In 2019, Indian government passed the Citizenship Amendment Act. The act aims to legalise religious discrimination as a basis for citizenship. It aims to amend the definition of illegal immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh for Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and Parsis, who have lived without documentation and aims to provide them fast-track citizenship in six years. The logic of the government is that these groups have faced persecution in Muslim-majority nations and have escaped to India and need protection. The logic is not sound because it does not apply to all neighbours and does not protect all religious minorities. The opinion of the government is that Muslims can seek refuge in Islamic nations while these other groups can seek refuge in India. Such a rationale of the government has caused angst amongst Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The government has mitigated the concerns through its diplomatic approach that we have explained in the chapters on India and Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh and India and Pakistan subsequently.

SECURITY DIPLOMACY OF CHINA AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS

In the recent times, China has started undertaking bilateral security cooperation with states in South Asia. By bilateral security cooperation, we are not referring to military and defence exchanges but to the expanding engagement between the

police forces, intelligence agencies, border management organisations and law-enforcement authorities of the two nations. Chinese “security diplomacy” is separate from “defence diplomacy”. The globalisation and digitalisation of the Chinese economy, the growing movement of people across Chinese borders and expanding capital and human assets beyond borders have made law enforcement cooperation with the rest of the world a major priority for China. The range of issues involved in security diplomacy include tracking down fugitives from Beijing’s anti-corruption campaign, criminals seeking safe haven in other countries, countering terrorism, preventing drug trafficking, assisting Chinese citizens and tourists abroad and reining in political dissidents active in other countries. In the case of neighbours, security diplomacy takes on an added dimension, given the dynamic interaction between internal political stability and the situation across the frontiers. The agreements in security diplomacy have touched areas ranging from border management, supply of border security equipment, mutual legal assistance and collaboration. Massive modernisation of its internal administrative structures, significant investments in new technologies and an effective integration of law enforcement into China’s foreign policy have transformed China’s pursuit of security diplomacy. It is by no means limited to neighbours and is now spread across all geographies, from developed countries in the North America and Europe to the developing world in Asia and Africa. China is also participating in the development of new international rules on law enforcement, shaping the discourse on issues at hand, and seeking leadership positions in multilateral organisations dealing with law enforcement. Like the other great powers that preceded it, China sees security diplomacy and law enforcement cooperation as important tools of statecraft. India has to develop counter measures to this strategy of Chinese.

AGARTALA DOCTRINE AND INDIAN NEIGHBOURHOOD DIPLOMACY

The Agartala Doctrine is a distillation of the principles derived from the policies and postures adopted by successive governments in Tripura vis-à-vis East Pakistan and later Bangladesh. The same has been recommended for the Union government’s consideration. According to its advocates, the doctrine would not only help state governments in safeguarding the interests of their own people but also work towards strengthening the Union government’s neighbourhood policy.

The three most basic components of the doctrine are: (a) states should have a greater say in foreign policy matters involving neighbours so that their core interests are protected; (b) states should act as responsible stake holders and not as spoilers seeking narrow domestic electoral gains; and (c) states should take the initiative to improve relations with neighbouring countries while keeping in mind the broader national interest. The conception of the doctrine, which emerged from the deliberations at the first Tripura Conclave, held in Agartala in July 2014. In essence, this doctrine highlights Tripura’s seemingly “appropriate, proactive and befitting response” to challenges arising from East Pakistan/Bangladesh with a view to protect its own core security and economic interests.



2

CHAPTER

India's Relationship with Bhutan

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INDIA AND BHUTAN

The ancient kingdom of Bhutan was originally the State of Monyul. The traditional name of Bhutan is Drukyl, that is, the country of Drukpas or the 'land of thunder dragons'. India's relations with Bhutan go back to 747 AD when a Buddhist monk Padmasambhava went from India to Bhutan and led the Nyingmapa sect of Buddhism. Thus, India contributed to the cultural growth of Buddhism in Bhutan. In the modern times, there were Anglo-Bhutan wars and Bhutan became a part of British Empire. In 1910, as per the Treaty of Punakha, between China-Tibet and Bhutan, Bhutan was not officially annexed but the legal status of Bhutan remained undefined during the period of the British. Bhutan also preferred India to China as, in 1949, when China took over Tibet, it did create tensions and fears of annexation in Bhutan. In fact, in 1949, China snatched away some villages of Bhutan on the China-Bhutan border. This upset Bhutan to the extent that they decided not to have diplomatic relations with the Chinese. In 2014, after the swearing in of the new government, the thrust towards neighbourhood first policy saw the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visiting Bhutan. During his visit, the Prime Minister inaugurated the Supreme Court building in Bhutan, made with Indian assistance. He addressed a joint session of the Bhutanese Parliament. Normally, the people of Bhutan do not use clapping as a congratulatory gesture as they find clapping inauspicious and evil. However, when the Prime Minister delivered a speech, the Bhutanese legislators in the house clapped to him.

INDIA AND BHUTAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND TREATY-RELATED ISSUES

When India became independent in 1947, Nehru went on a horseback to Bhutan to build relations and advised King J. D. Wangchuk to build relations with India. In 1949, India and Bhutan concluded a Treaty of Friendship. The treaty discussed peace, trade, commerce and equal justice between India and Bhutan, which became the bedrock of India and Bhutan relationship. India in 1971 took up the matter of the UN membership for Bhutan and succeeded in making Bhutan a member of the UN.


As per the Treaty of Friendship in 1949, India and Bhutan agreed to extend national treatment to the citizens of each other's states. As per the precepts of national treatment, Indian citizens have same right for employment in Bhutan as Bhutanese nationals do in India. Under the treaty, India and Bhutan have agreed to have an open border. Under the open border system, citizens of India and Bhutan have a right to move into each other's territory without a visa. However, to preserve the fragile environment of the state, Bhutan from 2020 has imposed a visa fees on tourist travels. The treaty has a special mention of a clause of extradition. In the treaty, as per Article 2, India accepted the sovereign and independent status of Bhutan but advised that Bhutan, in matters of external affairs, seek assistance from India. In 2007, Bhutan raised the issue of Article 2 with India and advocated the modification of Article 2. India, immediately agreeing to revise the treaty, modified Article 2 in the treaty. Under the revised treaty of 2007, India and Bhutan would cooperate with each other on matters of 'national security'. This instilled confidence in Bhutan about its broad relations with India and made an impression that India is a partner in Bhutani progress. India recognises the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Bhutan. The treaty also talks about cultural cooperation, sports development, cooperation in science and technology and healthcare.

INDIA AND BHUTAN COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The origin of commercial diplomacy goes back to 1961 when India began to provide assistance to the First and the Second Five-Year Plans of Bhutan. In 1971, when Bhutan became a UN member, the external aid it received got diversified as other nations in the world began to contribute. Bhutan has 80% of its trade with India and it majorly happens through the Kolkata port. There is a Phuentsholing to Paro road that facilitates Indo-Bhutan trade. Indian banks, such as the State Bank of India and Bank of Baroda, have presence in Bhutan. Indian firms are undertaking work related to hydroelectric power, minerals exploration and construction in Bhutan. India imports from Bhutan, minerals, hydropower, wood and chemicals while it exports machinery and food products. The trade is governed by the Agreement on Trade and Commerce, 2006, which also provides for duty free trade and use of territory for third-country transit.

INDIA AND BHUTAN DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP

India and Bhutan also have a developmental partnership and India has assisted Bhutan in development administration, as can be seen in three phases. In the first phase, from 1960 to 1980, initially, India provided support for physical infrastructure creation. The second phase, from 1980 to 2000, was a period when Bhutan explored the dimension of a transition to democracy. During this period, India provided assistance for development of democratic values and provided capacity support for decentralisation. In this period, institutional sharing of the best democratic and decentralisation-related practices were encouraged for exchange. The third phase, which is ongoing from 2000 till present, is where Indian developmental assistance has been diversified. Today, the assistance ranges from hydroelectricity generation to IT services including support in education and skill development.



INDIA AND BHUTAN RELATIONS DURING PANDEMIC

Ahlay Trade Route

Ahlay is located in Pasakha Industrial Estate of Bhutan and is a hub of industrial activities. This route is an alternative to Jaigaon–Phuentsholing route. When Bhutan decided to seal international borders owing to the pandemic, This route has been used to seek international aid.

It is often stated that difficult times are true reminiscent of true character of the relationships of two countries. The pandemic has unfolded multitude challenges for the globe but India and Bhutan have exhibited robust ties during pandemic. The wisdom of the monarchs of Bhutan, the Neighborhood First policy of India and a win-win partnership throughout the historical past have sustained the 'special ties' between India and Bhutan. When the pandemic affected the world in March 2020, the Bhutanese decided to seal their international border. India decided, based on the core tenet of Neighborhood First policy of being responsive to the needs of the neighborhood, to supply Bhutan with essential supplies, medicines and Covid-19 toolkits. India also opened a new trade route through Ahlay and issued a notification to allow import of potatoes grown by farmers of Bhutan, who were distressed as they did not have a market to sell as the pandemic shut down tourism. The two sides are working closely to ensure that they both tide away the

pandemic by being on the side of each other.

BHUTAN AND BANGLADESH RELATIONS AND IMPACT ON INDIA AND BHUTAN

A comparison with Bangladesh–Bhutan trade is warranted at this stage. The relationship between Bhutan and Bangladesh is at three levels viz., trade, culture and environment. Bangladesh is very keen on purchasing power from Bhutan and allows Bhutan to use their seaports for third-country trade. A lot of Bangladeshi workers have been significantly present in Bhutanese construction companies. This also upset Bhutan because this deprives their local people of job opportunities, as most of the Bhutanese construction companies prefer to recruit the cheap labour from Bangladesh.

INDIA AND BHUTAN HYDROPOWER DIPLOMACY

Bhutan is a Himalayan state with tremendous hydropower potential. It is an upper riparian state where rivers originate. Bhutan exports around 45% of its hydropower to India. Surprisingly, the electricity generation in Bhutan was developed in 1960s with Indian assistance itself. India in the 1960s had provided Bhutan with diesel sets, which helped in providing electricity in towns. During this period, Bhutan lacked capacity to generate electricity and in 1967 Bhutan began to replace Indian diesel sets with import of electricity from Jaldakha plant in Bengal. In 1989, India helped Bhutan with the establishment of a 33-megawatt electricity plant in Chukha.

It is only in the 1980s that, with Indian assistance, Bhutan realised the potential of hydropower. Bhutan also became convinced that hydropower generation is safe and is environment-friendly. Bhutan realised that if it succeeds in developing hydropower, it can also emerge as a net exporter of the same which can eventually help Bhutan generate foreign exchange. They began to seek Indian assistance, which can be broadly seen in two phases.

Phase 1—1987 to 2007 In this initial phase, India helped Bhutan in the establishment of specific site-based plants at Chukha, Kurichu and Tala. India provided monetary assistance in the form of 60% grant and 40% loan for these projects. Meanwhile, India domestically worked to establish grid infrastructure in its territory. As these plants became operational, they supplied electricity to India and this electricity from Bhutan fed the Northern and North Eastern power grid in India.

Phase 2—2007 to 2020 In this phase, India has committed to undertake creation of mega hydro plants in India primarily to harness the targeted 10,000 megawatt electricity by 2020.

Over a period of time, due to the existence of hydro diplomacy between India and Bhutan, some issues have erupted on both sides. The Indian side witnessed massive flooding in the downstream state of Assam in 2014. Bhutan alleges today that due to hydro cooperation with India, there is a dominance of Indian firms in Bhutan. It feels that an overwhelming presence of Indian firms in Bhutan has restricted the space of growth for the Bhutanese corporate sector. Moreover, Bhutan feels that the Indian firms end up recruiting cheap Bangladeshi labour, as a result of which Bhutanese do not stand to benefit from the hydro diplomacy. To pacify fears of Bhutan related to dominance of Indian firms in hydropower sector, the Indian Prime Minister has agreed to establish a Power Training Institute in Bhutan to provide its youth skilled training to ensure they contribute to the Bhutanese workforce. The hydropower generation of Bhutan is basically seasonal in nature. In the recent times, domestic consumption of power in Bhutan is on the rise. In the winter season, Bhutan imports electricity from India while in summers it exports electricity to us. To address the problem, India has agreed to establish a power bank in Bhutan in future. The Prime Minister also laid a foundation for a 600 megawatt Kholongchu Hydroelectric power plant in 2014.

INDIA AND BHUTAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY DIPLOMACY

Since the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, India has been focusing on forward access to the upper reaches of Himalayas to keep an eye on China. In this respect, Bhutan becomes strategically significant from the Indian point of view. India has strategic presence in Bhutan. Bhutan, due to its border skirmishes, does not have a diplomatic relation with China. An absence of diplomatic relation with China enhances India's chance to exercise its sphere of influence in Bhutan. India has established the IMTRAT, that is, the Indian Military Training Team unit, in Haa district of Bhutan. Under a bilateral agreement, India also provides training to army officers of Bhutan in India. The Border Roads Organisation has, since 1961, run Project Dantak. Under this project, the BRO provides for roads construction, telecom works, colleges, schools and other infrastructure. Under the project, there have been notable achievements too.



CHINA FACTOR IN INDIA AND BHUTAN RELATIONS AND CHUMBI VALLEY ISSUE

Chumbi valley is a tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China. It is close to the chicken's neck (the Siliguri corridor) and a gateway to India's northeast. Chumbi valley holds significance for China as it connects Tibet and Sikkim and China wants to expand its manoeuvres here. The Bhutan–China border problem began in 1950 when China published a map and claimed the West Bhutan area. This map also included Chinese claims on North Bhutan. China and Bhutan began negotiations on border issue in 1984. China, in West Bhutan, claims Doklam, Charithang, Sinchulimpa and Dramana pastures. This brings China close to Chumbi Valley, between Sikkim and Bhutan. The Chumbi Valley has one artery running from the Tibetan city of Shigaste to Yatung. By claiming area in West Bhutan, China can widen its land and in the eventuality of war, it can have more space on their side as otherwise, the size of Chumbi Valley is less for the stationing of any number of troops. For India, any such claim is dangerous as Chumbi Valley is barely 500 km from the Siliguri corridor, which is a narrow strip of Indian Territory connecting the Indian northeast to the rest of India.

Even in the recent times, the border issue between Bhutan and China has not been resolved and China has undertaken tremendous intrusions into the border areas around Bhutan. These intrusions deprive the people of Bhutan of forest produce and create uncertainty about their resources and livelihood. Since 2012, China has begun to engage in cultural and religious diplomacy with Bhutan. China has gifted the tallest statue of Buddha in Bhutan, in Thimpu. It is investing in the telecom sector of Bhutan as well. There is rising tourism between Bhutan and China and a lot of Chinese tourists have been visiting Bhutan in the recent times.

BHUTANESE PERCEPTION OF INDIA AND KEY LESSONS TO MATERIALISE BHARAT TO BHUTAN VISION

Why does Bhutan want to go digital?

Bhutan wants to reduce its dependency on hydropower due to its lack of sustainability in the long run. Being armed with a youthful population, digital and IT and IT-Enabled Services is a natural choice for Bhutan. With India being a global leader in IT, it becomes a natural 'pull' factor for the two nations to explore in the future and India will be able to realise the Bharat to Bhutan Vision.

Today, Bhutan has 60% of its population as youth. The youth of Bhutan is the key driver of the destiny of the nation. It is imperative for India to understand the pulse of this youth because they will be the determinant of how India and Bhutan will shape the narrative. While the older generation people of Bhutan have appreciated India for the role India played in security, economic development and infrastructure building in Bhutan, the same is not the feelings of the youth. There is a growing disenchantment in the youth on over reliance on India and they feel that Bhutan seems to be 'dependent' on India. Today, there is 10.6% unemployment and high external debt in Bhutan, which has compelled the youth to question the 'loans and grants' model. The youth today favours 'investments' over 'aid' and want the leadership of their nation to adopt an open door policy because some segments of youth believe that India is hampering the development of relations of Bhutan with other states. By skillfully using non-diplomatic levers, Chinese are trying to position themselves amongst the youth as new job, revenue and growth creator. It is at this juncture that India needs to re-orient the relationship with Bhutan and enter the digital and space domains and fulfil the aspirations of the youth.



3

CHAPTER

India's Relationship with Afghanistan

THE EMOTIONAL AND HISTORICAL BOND BETWEEN INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN

The relation of India with Afghanistan is a mixture of an emotional and historical bond. The emotional bond is because of Rabindranath Tagore's famous Kabuliwalla (a short story). The generations of people in India are still aware of those old Afghans who used to settle down as Kabuliwallas. Historically, the relations between the two go back to the Indus Valley Civilisation. Afghanistan has been noted in empires of Maurya, Asoka, Kushans and Indo-Scythians. The medieval period's Great Trunk road captures the depth historically. The British fought the Anglo-Afghan wars. They tried to keep Afghanistan as a buffer between India and Russia. Modern India and Afghanistan relations are traced back to India and Afghanistan Treaty of Friendship in 1950. The treaty laid down the foundation of diplomatic ties and enabled the foundational relationship in culture and trade. During the World War II, an agreement was signed between the British India and Afghanistan. As per the 1945 agreement, British India would supply arms and train the Afghan soldiers. After Indian independence, India asserted that it can continue to train Afghan soldiers but it will not go ahead with arms supply, as it would contradict India's non-alignment credentials and its quest for international peace. Afghanistan was an important participant in the Bandung Conference. Both India and Afghanistan used the non-alignment as a platform to criticise states (namely Pakistan) that had joined military alliances such as CENTO and SEATO.

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA AND AFGHAN RELATIONS IN THE COLD WAR AND CHANGING POLICY CONTOURS

In the initial years, Afghanistan continued to favour Pakistan. Afghanistan had a reason for this. It is important to note that the British created Durand Line in 1893. This line artificially divided Pakistan and Afghanistan. This line has never been accepted by Afghanistan as a border (even till today) as Afghanistan has asserted that the line has artificially divided the families on both sides of the boundary. Afghanistan still claims the Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) region, both of which have been forcibly acquired by Pakistan. The Afghanistan government thought that by siding Pakistan and not upsetting it, Afghanistan could seek a solution for Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The 1965 India and Pakistan war was a testing time for India and Afghanistan relations. In 1965 war, Pakistan attacked India by launching Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam. Through them, Pakistan tried to create an anti-India uprising in Kashmir. Pakistan thought that they would incite Indian Kashmiri people and once they revolt against India, Pakistan would send its army to support them and militarily snatch away Kashmir from India. As the war began, India used its military power and gave a befitting response to Pakistan and eventually defeated Pakistan. At the UN, Pakistan subsequently raised the idea that India is suppressing the people of Kashmir and is not giving Right To Self-Determination (RTSD) for Kashmiri people. India countered the Pakistani narrative by raising the RTSD denied by Pakistan for the people of KP, Baluchistan and East Pakistan. This Indian narrative was not perceived well by Afghanistan as they claimed the area of KP and Baluchistan. Afghanistan thought that the India raising the RTSD for KP and Baluchistan contradicts the Afghan claims. After Indo-Pakistan war 1965, India publicly supported Pashtun nationalism in KP and Baluchistan.

In return, Afghanistan began to support Pakistan. Thus, the bilateral ties got affected. But, when Afghanistan saw that the entire international public opinion was against Pakistan for their initiation of 1965 war, Afghanistan immediately did a U-turn and started asserting the RTSD for Baloch and Pashtuns in KP. The Afghans thought that their support to Pakistan in 1965 war with India would compel Pakistan to go for revisionism and peacefully handover the disputed territories to Afghanistan. This did not happen. In the late 1960s, West Pakistan began to suppress the Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan. Afghanistan became very concerned about the fate of its own ethnic community in KP and Baluchistan in Pakistan. After creating Bangladesh in 1971, India covertly supported Baluchistan people and ensured the victory of a pro-India aggressive and a nationalist party in Baluchistan. This led to massive suppression of the Baloch people by the regime of Pakistan. This Pakistani suppression of Baloch and Pashtun people in 1974 led to the birth of a new resistance group called Baloch Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF). The BPLF began to target Pakistani establishment. Pakistan army began to suppress the BPLF. This led the BPLF to shift their cadres from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Throughout 1970s, Afghanistan tilted to the USSR. This was similar to the tilt by India. This enabled both India and Afghanistan to use the USSR as a shield to balance Pakistan. In 1968, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was created. A secret alliance was established between RAW, KHAD (Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati, the intelligence agency of Afghanistan) and KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, the intelligence agency of USSR). Indian RAW began to provide BPLF with arms, ammunition and money to fight Pakistan. In 1973, in a bloodless coup, the Afghan king Zahir Shah was removed and Mohammad Doud Khan acquired power. He was very aggressive towards Pakistan and wanted a military solution to the KP and Baluchistan issue. Even though India was appreciative of Doud Khan's policy, but it feared the Balkanisation of Pakistan, if Doud succeeded in the military solution. As Doud began to initiate a covert war on Pakistan for KP and Baluchistan issue, two things happened. Firstly, the US lifted the arms embargo on Pakistan and supplied them with arms. Secondly, ISI started supporting the opponents of Doud in Afghanistan. This led the ISI to create an organisation called Jamat-e-Islami (JEI), which consisted of Ahmed Shah Masood, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulubuddin Hikmatyar. In 1975, the JEI, with the support of the ISI, attempted a coup against Doud. The coup failed. This led to a split in the JEI. Hekmatyar and another Qazi Mohammad Amin Waqad came out and formed Hizb-E-Islami Afghan.

INDIA'S AFGHAN POLICY AFTER SOVIET INVASION, 1979

In 1978, there was a coup again in Afghanistan and this created a massive political crisis in Afghanistan, which only ended with the Soviet invasion in 1979. The Soviet began to think that as Pakistan is behind these multiple coups in Afghanistan, the US might use Pakistan to expand influence in Afghanistan. Thus, to prevent the US to gain advantage in Afghanistan, the Soviet invaded it and installed their own puppet government. The Soviet installed a government led by Babrak Kramal. In 1985, Babrak Karmal was replaced by the Soviet in Afghanistan and they installed another puppet ruler named Najibullah. When Soviet invaded Afghanistan, India had a caretaker government led by Charan Singh. The government criticised the Soviet invasion. In 1980, Indira Gandhi came to power. She initiated a new strategy. She decided to credibly offer a pro-USSR stand on Afghanistan. This happened because the US, Saudi and Pakistan began to initiate a Mujahedeen campaign to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan. The strategy of the US was simple. They would use Pakistan and Saudi to radicalise the Afghani people and use them in a jihad against the Soviet in Afghanistan. In 1979, Pakistan began to mobilise Afghani people and brought them to Pakistan. Saudi sent their religious clerics to Pakistan and they launched a narrative amongst the Afghani people in Pakistan that Soviet has invaded Afghanistan to eliminate Islam, thus, Islam is in danger in Afghanistan. This Saudi narrative frustrated and alienated the Afghani people and they wanted to do something to protect their religion. As a solution, Pakistan suggested the need to wage a jihad against Soviet and Saudi also supported the jihad. This motivated the alienated Afghani people to pick up arms and resist the Soviet. This is where the Americans stepped in and supported these Afghani people by giving them arms, ammunition and money. Saudi Arabia radicalised the Afghani people while Pakistan trained them in violence and the Americans gave them the support for the Jihad. Thus, in 1979, Afghani people launched the Jihad against Russia in Afghanistan. To make the Jihad more virulent and stronger the Americans also falsely promised the Mujahedeen that once they succeed in removing Soviet from Afghanistan, the US would help the Mujahedeen to acquire power in Afghanistan and if the Afghani people have their own government in Afghanistan, they can also safeguard their religion in Afghanistan. This motivated the Mujahedeen to fight more aggressively.

INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MUJAHEDDEEN FIGHTERS AND EARLY TALIBS IN AFGHANISTAN

Indira Gandhi revived the RAW–KHAD and KGB axis to covertly establish links with the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. The Indian support to the Soviet in Afghanistan alienated India from the aspirations of the Afghan people. This also alienated Indian Muslims and gave CIA and ISI an opportunity to incite troubles in India. Indira Gandhi's decision of not respecting the sovereignty of the people of Afghanistan was criticised domestically. It was believed that India had compromised its non-alignment credentials by not respecting the sovereignty of the people. A common statement was that India's non-alignment was not genuine and tilted like the leaning tower of Pisa. This policy of Indira Gandhi fractured India's long-term approach and created a crevasse in seeking 'friends'. Since the debacle of Indira Gandhi, India's policy in Afghanistan has been to search for 'friends' in Afghanistan who would sympathise with the national interests of India. However, one question always haunted Indira Gandhi. It was, what if Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan? Her fear was that if this happens, it will strengthen the US–Pakistan axis and leave India in out in the cold. To bring back India as a credible player on the scene again and to mitigate India's fears, Rajiv Gandhi brought about the shift in Indian policy on Afghanistan. He adopted the policy of peaceful equilibrium with Pakistan, which on the face was peaceful but he covertly activated RAW to create havoc in Pakistan. The RAW created the Counter-Insurgency Team-X which planted bombs across different cities of Pakistan. The objective was to destabilise Pakistan and make their attempts to sponsor terrorism in Punjab costlier. He also launched a Grand dialogue to engage with America and Russia. In 1980s, Russia was looking for options to exit Afghanistan. India asserted that if Russia leaves Afghanistan and then there has to be an independent and non-aligned government in Afghanistan. Russia thought that India wants to free ride the Russians and wants to use the Russian withdrawal to assert its own hegemony in South Asian. This caused a fracture between the relationship of Russia and India. Russia in return began to court Pakistan. When India communicated its concerns to the US, the US too rejected the demand of India for a non-aligned government in Afghanistan that would be favourable to India. As the USSR and the US sidelined India, the RAW began to court Zahir Shah. He was living in Rome. Teams of RAW operatives from Geneva were dispatched to deal with Zahir Shah and other exiles. The RAW wanted to play the Zahir Shah card before the USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indian RAW hoped of bringing Zahir Shah back to Afghanistan and this upset the US, the USSR and Pakistan. Thus, at the insistence of Pakistan, India was not allowed to take part in the Geneva Accord, 1987 (signed by Americans, Soviets and Pakistanis seeking the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan) even as an observer state. The Zahir Shah episode proved that India punched much above its weight and this was the reason for it being sidelined at the Geneva Accord. The Zahir Shah gambit of India failed. India was unable to contemplate a post-Najibullah scenario.

INDIA'S AFGHAN POLICY AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Despite covert links of RAW with the Mujahedeen, India was not able to build concrete links with them for post-Soviet withdrawal. From 1988, Soviet began to initiate their withdrawal. The Mujahedeen perceived this as a victory against 'evil' Russia that had threatened Islam. The Mujahedeen now told the Americans to assist them to acquire power as they had promised. But the Americans too retreated from Afghanistan. The US never had any genuine motive to assist the Mujahedeen to acquire power, as they only wanted to use the Afghani people to resist and remove Soviet. The US succeeded in achieving their objectives. This angered the Mujahedeen. One group of them wanted to take revenge against the US for using them. They came together and formed an extremist group called Al Qaeda in 1988 and Abdullah Azam and Osama Bin Laden-led Al-Qaeda. The Al-Qaeda began to use the territory of Afghanistan to train extremists for seeking revenge against the US. The other group of Mujahedeen favoured a political solution and was not interested in seeking revenge against the US. They took support of Pakistan to form a government. After the Soviet left Afghanistan finally in 1989, Najibullah continued till 1992 while the other group of Mujahedeen sought support of Pakistan to form a government. In 1992, Mujahedeen, with support of Pakistan, eventually replaced Najibullah. The US too provided the needed legitimacy to the Afghan Mujahedeen government and asserted that they fulfilled their old promise.

INDIA'S DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF MUJAHEDDEEN GOVERNMENT UNDER PESHAWAR ACCORDS

In 1992, India was compelled to recognise the Mujahedeen government. Pakistan played a very crucial role in brokering the Peshawar Accord (which brought the Mujahedeen to power in Afghanistan) in 1992. India led by Narsimha Rao as the Prime Minister initiated a new policy for Afghanistan. He asserted that India would engage with the Mujahedeens. India would not distinguish whether the Mujahedeen is a Wahhabi or he is supported by Pakistan. It would engage with all factions in Afghanistan. It would maintain people to people ties in Afghanistan and focus on the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In 1992, the Indian government recognised the government of Mujahedeen, which was then led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

EVOLUTION IN INDIA'S AFGHAN POLICY NULLIFYING THE ISI'S K-2 PROGRAMME IN KASHMIR

Thus, India adopted a conciliatory approach. There were many reasons for the shift in the Indian policy. Firstly, during the era of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, even though India supported Najibullah, but now, as per the changed ground realities, Najibullah too accepted the Mujahedeen government. In 1991, Najibullah changed the name of the communist party (called PDPA in the Cold War) to Hizb-E-Watan Party. The new party was symbolically Islamic now. As the international community too accepted the new Afghan realities, so did India. Secondly, even though India favoured the government of Najibullah (also called as 'Najib Model' in the corridors of RAW), but it failed due to the rise of Mujahedeens. India also had concerns regarding Indian diaspora in Afghanistan; thereby, India agreed to support Mujahedeen government. Thirdly, India realised that as Pakistan was heavily supporting the Mujahedeens; allowing Pakistan and Afghanistan to strengthen at the cost of India would end up in undermining India's interests. India did not look at Afghanistan from the context of South Asia only but the larger context of geopolitical significance of Central Asia, which had resources that India sought via Afghanistan. Fourthly, not engaging with the Mujahedeen's would give ISI the leverage to exploit fertile ground of Afghanistan to wage a jihad against India in Kashmir. The RAW was able to identify that HEI did train a few Kashmiri Muslims. JEI was anyway sympathetic to the Kashmiri cause, but the RAW, through their intelligence network spanning Afghanistan to Kashmir, ensured that they did not end up in supporting the cause of ISI-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir. The Afghan Mujahedeens were also never interested in meddling in between the rivalry of India and Pakistan. Thus, to prevent the micromanagement of Mujahedeen government by Pakistan, the Mujahedeen too balanced Pakistan by favouring a dialogue with India. Even though Pakistan tried to micromanage Mujahedeen government, it failed to understand that there were serious intra-Mujahedeen differences. India, on the other hand, played well between Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masood and Hekmatyar, to safeguard its own interests. However, the internal differences descended Afghanistan into a civil war in 1992. ISI was also alarmed to see the growing proximity of India and the role of RAW in supporting the Mujahedeen government. This is why at the end of the Cold War; ISI of Pakistan initiated the K-2 programme. It was the brainchild of Brigadier Imtiaz of ISI and Brigadier Badam of ISI. They began to infiltrate in Afghanistan to search for Kashmiri looking Afghan Pashtuns, train them and send them to Kashmir. This strategy was deliberately followed by the ISI to break India's ties with Mujahedeen government. This was so because if the Kashmiri looking Afghan Pashtuns begin to carry out attacks in Kashmir, then India would think that Afghan Mujahedeen government is supporting Kashmir Jihad. This would create acrimony between India and Afghanistan and give Pakistan leverage in Afghanistan. The RAW was able to counter-infiltrate K-2 and weakened it from within by assassinating ISI officers involved in the programme. The influence of Pakistan outweighed India amongst the Mujahedeen government.

INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TALIBAN FROM 1996 TO 2001

As Afghanistan descended into a civil war after the breakdown of Mujahedeen government, Pakistan realised that it would find it difficult to bring these Mujahedeen together again in the future. So, from 1994 to 1996, Pakistan began to knit together the radicalised educated students to come together to establish a group to provide leadership to their country. This group was called Taliban. Taliban comes from the first few letters of the word called TALIB, which means educated students. In 1996, ISI was able to successfully bring the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. To counter Taliban, India along with Russia and Iran began to support the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan or Northern Alliance (a

group of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras). The Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, removed Rabbani from power and Rabbani then became a part of Northern Alliance. Taliban killed Najibullah in public display. His death sent shock waves down the spine of the entire world. The Al-Qaeda found an ally in Taliban. The Al-Qaeda provided the needed legitimacy for Taliban to unleash a Sharia rule in Afghanistan and Taliban provided Al-Qaeda a breeding sanctuary of people in Afghanistan to radicalise and seek revenge against the US.

INDIAN PM, MULLAH MUTTAWAKIL OF TALIBAN AND INDIA'S TALIBAN POLICY

In 1997, Taliban sent a direct feeler to India. In a secretly arranged and covert meeting of an Indian RAW officer in Indian embassy in Afghanistan, with Mullah Omar, he conveyed to him that if India is willing to stop its engagement with Rabbani and help Taliban, then Taliban is willing to engage with India. One Indian RAW officer in Indian embassy in Afghanistan had a covert meeting with 'Mullah Muttawakil', the Foreign Minister of Taliban and he communicated to the RAW officer that India should stop engaging with Rabbani, Northern Alliance and halt its policy of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Doing so, as per Mullah Muttawakil would create a condition for negotiation with the Taliban for India. On the basis of the inputs from the ground intelligence, hectic meetings were organised between RAW Chief, Indian Military Intelligence Chief, Indian Chief of the Army Staff, Director of Intelligence Bureau, Research Secretary and Indian Prime Minister. The above officials did a very deep analysis of Taliban. A senior RAW officer who met Mullah Muttawakil, met the Indian Prime Minister and informed him of her ground analysis. She informed the Prime Minister that Taliban is a Pashtun movement. Most of its members are Pashtun tribals from rural areas. Taliban, wanted to seek international recognition, for which they sought India's support. This was because that Taliban was not sure as to how much time will it be in power and how much control would it be able to yield over non-Pashtun in Afghanistan. More importantly, she told the Prime Minister that, contrary to the narrative, a massive segment of Taliban is not pro-Pakistan. Prime Minister was informed that Pakistan and Taliban have very serious differences on Durand Line issue, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan issues. The Prime Minister was informed in 1999 that India should seriously consider giving Taliban the political recognition if not diplomatic recognition. However, the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) bureaucracy overpowered the RAW and MEA mandarins told the Prime Minister that Taliban is a creation of ISI and thus, India should have no business with Taliban. The MEA told the Prime Minister that any recognition to Taliban would only be a certificate to them to do Jihad. The MEA said that Taliban is an extremist group that is designed by Pakistan to harm Indian interests in Afghanistan. For the MEA, terrorism meant Taliban. However, the RAW officials who spent time talking to Taliban leaders convinced the Prime Minister that all Pashtuns are not Talibanis and fundamentalists. The MEA countered this in front of the Prime Minister by stating that as per some reports they have, Taliban and Harkat-ul-Ansar share facilities where ISI trains militants for Kashmir. The Prime Minister finally took a decision. He stated that India should continue to follow the MEA and support Northern Alliance. But the Prime Minister told RAW to do two things. Firstly, they would provide covert military support and overt moral and diplomatic support to the Northern Alliance. Secondly, RAW would work on the ground covertly and maintain, nurture and strengthen the links with Taliban. India followed this overt and covert policy till 2001 and mitigated the Taliban dilemma. Covertly, Taliban was also very happy to engage with India because they knew that India was the only country that could balance Pakistan on issues related to Afghanistan.

WHY TALIBAN WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE HIJACKING OF IC-814 AND INDIA'S NEW PERCEPTION OF TALIBAN

In 1994, Masood Azhar was travelling in an auto rickshaw with Sajjad Afghani. At that time, Masood was a part of a group called Harkat-ul-Ansar while Sajjad Afghani was a part of Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM). The Military Intelligence was intercepting both of them. Both were arrested after a small chase at the Khannabal Chowk, Anantnag in Kashmir. Both were sent to Jammu for interrogation. Later it was stated that Masood was initially very rigid and unwilling to speak out to the Indian army regarding any information after his arrest. Senior Officials intervened to interrogate Masood at Kot Bhalwal Jail in Jammu. He showed him the picture of Omar Saeed Shaikh and Ilyas Kashmiri. Both of them had a relationship with Masood. Masood opened up in front of him. During interrogation, he told him that he had landed in India through a fake Portuguese passport and ISI had instructed him to carry out the merger of HuM and Harkat-ul-Jihad-E-Islami (HuJI), led

by Nasarullah Mansoor Langriyal, who was also in the Indian custody. When asked about Abdul Hamid al-Turki, Masood said that Turki was a man of low intellect and one who had been a Turkish national and presently living in Anantnag. The army used this input and on 4th December 1995, killed Turki in an operation in Anantnag. However, throughout his interrogation, Masood always asserted that India is underestimating his popularity. He used to say that ISI would do anything and everything to secure his release. The words of Azhar proved out to be prophetic. On 31st December 1999, an Indian Airlines aircraft was hijacked by the terrorist (sent by ISI) from Kathmandu in Nepal and taken to Kandahar in Afghanistan. The Taliban, which controlled Afghanistan, was reluctant to allow IC-814 to even land in Kandahar, but the ISI put its foot down and began to threaten the Taliban leaders that not allowing the IC-814 to land in Afghanistan will have serious consequences for the family members of Taliban living in Pakistan. In the process of negotiations to get the passengers of the IC-814 released, Masood was released in exchange. The moment Masood reached Pakistan, he was declared the ultimate 'Ghazi' against India and ISI handed over to him all the training camps cadre of HuM. The cadre was now merged into a new group called Jaish-e-Mohammad. The IC-814 incident not only cemented the Pakistan-Taliban nexus but also was an eye opener for India. India realised its strategic failure of not being able to establish contacts with Taliban. But the IC-814 incident also softened India's stand on Taliban as India realised that Taliban had no role to play in executing the IC-814 incident, which was solely the brain of ISI. This also helped India realise that Taliban was not a threat to India. All these helped India to gradually change their perception of Taliban.

INDIA-TALIBAN RELATIONS AFTER 9/11 AND GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

In 2001, Al-Qaeda finally took their revenge against the US and attacked the World Trade Centers on 11th September. The 9/11 attacks were executed by Al-Qaeda and planned by them in Afghanistan with support of Taliban. This led the US to officially invade Afghanistan and remove Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The US responded to the 9/11 by launching the Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Anaconda and unleashed Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In 2001, a Bonn Conference was organised by the US to seek political reconstruction of Afghanistan through a democratic government. In 2003 Afghanistan witnessed their first ever-democratic election and elected Hamid Karzai as their first President. India also saw this conference as an opportunity to rectify its past errors and used the conference as an opportunity to go to Afghanistan and broaden its engagement with each constituency in Afghanistan. The Bonn also provided India an opportunity to deepen ties with Pashtuns, which India till now was unable to build because of Taliban. India finally accepted that Afghanistan is a potpourri of different ethnic groups. The RAW were told to develop strong links with all groups of Afghanistan (while maintaining links with Taliban) that can help in advancing Indian national interests. A strong covert architecture was laid down by RAW in Afghanistan. This also enabled India, with the help of Pashtuns, to expand its covert footprint in Baluchistan. The US continued their GWOT and tried to dismantle Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda immediately shifted over to Pakistan. The ISI of Pakistan gave shelter to Taliban, as it was their baby that they had created and nurtured. They also gave shelter to Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. The RAW kept on covertly engaging with Taliban even while it was taking shelter in Pakistan.

ROLE OF INDIA IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2001

India launched a massive humanitarian programme with a strong developmental component to rebuild war-torn Afghanistan. The new diplomatic presence not only enhanced India's developmental diplomacy, but also its consulates and Indian embassy in Kabul were used to reach out to Pashtuns and other factions. They also enabled India to keep a strong watch on Pakistan in Afghanistan and their activities. The US was also happy to see the development work of India and the US often used to call India as a 'nice big brother' that is here to stay in Afghanistan. The RAW and Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) played an important role in constituency building amongst different political and ethnic factions in Afghanistan. The ICCR decided to provide scholarships to Afghan students to study in India. The Indian consulates in Afghanistan based upon the diplomatic officials independent political judgment would provide the scholarships. This enabled the local politicians to nurture their constituencies by sponsoring candidates and widening their political base. Whenever a local politician came up with names of students, a deal was struck that he would have to safeguard Indian national interests and build a reputation in his area that India is 'helping' the constituents through education and development. It was a win-win situation where India was able to develop micro level contacts with Afghan politicians. The constituency-specific Small

Development Projects (SDPs) were designed by India to win hearts and minds of local people, enabling India to generate goodwill. India also began to provide medical assistance to Afghan citizens by allowing them to visit Delhi for medical treatments. The Indian government also provides funds to Afghan politicians and gives them the freedom to use the funds. There is no accounting of these funds done by India. India has also not established a vast developmental bureaucracy like the US AID or DFID of the UK and prefers to go for a hands-free approach where Afghan people decide for themselves. The developmental work by India in Afghanistan is such that today even Taliban is highly appreciative of India in Afghanistan.


INDIA'S POWER POLITICS FOR STABILISING AFGHANISTAN

Central Asia is crucial for India's energy security. India is deepening its proximity with Iran to reach Central Asia. India is developing the Chabahar port of Iran for this purpose. By accessing Central Asia, India will be able to tap a vast energy and resource market. The access to Central Asia will also enable India to reach Eurasia region. (Refer the chapter of Central Asia and Europe for more details.)

AFGHANISTAN IS A LITMUS TEST FOR INDIA'S REGIONAL POWER

India, today, successfully uses Afghanistan as classic case to assert its regional hegemony. As India's economic and military profiles grow, India is trying to use Afghanistan to establish its own credentials as a regional security provider and a regional stabiliser and a committed developmental provider. India knows that its ability to emerge as a great power in the near future hinges upon its strategic capacity exercised in dealing with its own region. Afghanistan has a pivotal place in this regard to Indian Foreign Policy's goal of power play.

Since 2001, Bonn-I conference, India has provided almost 3 billion dollars for the reconstruction of the Afghan society and has pledged 3 billion dollars for overall development. Indian assistance has been largely focused on infrastructure, irrigation and defence.




In 2011, India and Afghanistan concluded a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA).



The Indian has built the parliament building of Afghanistan in 2015. India had also decided to open a new consulate in Hyderabad of Afghanistan in 2015 to further development diplomacy. In June 2016, the Prime Minister again visited Afghanistan. India constructed the Salma Dam (called as Afghan-India Friendship dam). The project would irrigate fields of 640 villages in Chiste, Obe, Koshan, Karokh, Pashtun, Zarghun, Gozura, Injil, Zindijan and Ghoryan. It will generate 42 megawatt and irrigate 75,000-hectare land on Hari Rud River. The two countries in June 2017 established an Air Corridor, which was envisaged, by Ashraf Ghani and Modi in 2016. The air corridor will be a big enabler to the bilateral trade and will send a strong message to Pakistan that despite its obstructionist behaviour, India will continue to engage with Afghanistan. In 2010, Pakistan and Afghanistan concluded an Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA). Under the APTTA, Afghanistan could send goods in trucks till India (at the Wagah border near Amritsar, Punjab) but its trucks had to return back to Afghanistan empty. Also in APTTA, Pakistan could send its trucks via Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and the Pakistani trucks were allowed to carry goods back from Central Asia, thus the Air corridor.

HEART OF ASIA OR ISTANBUL PROCESS AND INDIAN DIPLOMACY


In 2011, in Istanbul, Turkey, the Heart of Asia (HOA) process was launched as a platform involving regional players to ensure a stable and a secure Afghanistan. There are 14 participating countries and 17 supporting countries in the HOA process.



India is one of the participating countries and has held the chair of the HOA process in 2016. Narendra Modi and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani had inaugurated the 6th edition of HOA Istanbul Process of Afghanistan in December 2016 at Amritsar. Amritsar was deliberately chosen as it lies at the heart of the Grant Trunk Road connecting Bangladesh to Peshawar. More so, India tried to convey a strong symbolic message to Pakistan by holding the conference in Amritsar that Pakistan remains an irritant in facilitating regional connectivity.



REGIONAL POLICIES OF IRAN, TURKEY, QATAR, CHINA AND RUSSIA IN AFGHANISTAN



AFGHAN TALIBAN AND PAKISTAN TALIBAN—CIA AND ISI DEAL

From 2001 to 2008, India overtly tilted to engage with Pashtuns and engaged with Taliban in Pakistan covertly. Such a policy neglected the non-Pashtuns. The RAW often told the government that India is losing the plot in Afghanistan if it keeps tilting only in favour of Pashtuns. The US too by 2008 realised that they only succeeded in ousting Taliban and not eliminating Taliban. Since 2007, ISI supported Taliban in Afghanistan to violently snatch power in Afghanistan. The ISI and the US struck a deal in 2007. The deal was that ISI would give intelligence to the US on the cells of Al-Qaeda and allow the US to target the Al-Qaeda. The US in return would allow the ISI to nurture Taliban and later, when required, help them to acquire power in Afghanistan. The reason why the US had no problem with Taliban was because the Taliban was not involved directly in 9/11. Also, the US wanted to act against Al-Qaeda because they had to show to their domestic American public that the US is acting against the perpetrators of 9/11. The ISI too had realised that they could not bring Taliban back to Afghanistan through brute force now and needed the US support in future. The only option was political reconciliation of Taliban in Afghanistan, which can happen when the US seriously helps them. However, the US were more interested in hunting down and killing Osama and were not interested in Taliban for the time being. This is where ISI and CIA differed. For ISI, Taliban was crucial while for CIA, Osama and Al-Qaeda was. In 2007, Al-Qaeda created Pakistan Taliban. The Pakistan Taliban was created to hit Pakistan internally. Its members were of Al-Qaeda. Pakistan Taliban is distinct from Afghan Taliban, as Afghan Taliban was the Taliban that ISI nurtured with American support. The Pakistan Taliban did not position itself as a monolithic organisation. Rather, it adopted a fragmented and decentralised strategy to hit Pakistan internally. They created multiple groups that ranged from SWAT Taliban, Punjabi Taliban, Bajaur Taliban and Tehreek-E-Taliban Pakistan. The ISI on the other hand played it cool and successfully initiated reconciliation with Afghan Taliban in 2008.

LONDON CONFERENCE AND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF TALIBAN AS CORE ACTOR OF AFGHANISTAN

In 2010, there was a London Conference, where ISI was successfully institutionalised a dialogue with Taliban (note that we refer to Afghan Taliban here). But this was also the time period when RAW told Afghan President Hamid Karzai that excluding non-Pashtuns in the Afghan government will only increase their resentment and will create a trouble for Karzai in the future. The anti-Karzai brigade kept growing. Karzai was informed that the Americans are plotting for his removal by taking help of alienated non-Pashtuns. The CIA and ISI began to carry out attacks in Afghanistan to put pressure on Karzai to accommodate non-Pashtuns. This compounded the problem for Karzai.

But, in 2011, in a surgical strike, the US killed Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. To show the world, this incident of Osama eventually strained the US–Pakistan ties forever. The US, to show the world, became sceptical of Pakistan for it harbouring a terrorist that the US wanted for a decade. The US created a global narrative that they were very upset with Pakistan. But, internally, the intelligence community of the US was happy as they demonstrated to the US public that Obama Administration and his 'tough' terrorism policy eliminated Osama. Problem for Karzai grew further with the US under Obama deciding to announce the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2012. The Obama administration announced this because Obama had made a poll promise back home that he would end the Afghan war and bring back the US soldiers home. Thus, Obama administration signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan to facilitate the troop withdrawal.

THE RISE OF 'GOOD' TALIBAN AND 'BAD' TALIBAN

Pakistan saw that this is the best time to integrate Taliban into Afghanistan. In 2012, Pakistan proposed to the US and the world that there are some 'good' and 'bad' elements of Taliban. Pakistan proposed that 'good' Taliban are those members who wish to integrate themselves into the Afghan government and are open for negotiations. The US bought this logic (as all this was scripted as per the deal) and accepted the nomenclature of 'good' Taliban and 'bad' Taliban. There is a reason why Pakistan proposed this division. Taliban operated in Afghanistan through a hierarchy. The senior leaders of Taliban engaged with Saudi and Pakistan and carried out diplomacy and political advocacy while the junior and middle layers of Taliban controlled the different provinces and yielded power there. The junior and middle layers of Taliban had created their own fiefdoms at the provincial level and micromanaged the opium trade and other local activities. In 2012, when the ISI proposed that Taliban would be integrated into Afghanistan politically, the ISI and CIA understood that the senior level of Taliban would only be accommodated and the junior and middle levels of Taliban would resist that because they cannot be politically accommodated. They would resist any change in the status quo and would also not favour the senior level to play a role that may affect their fiefdoms. The ISI and CIA knew that there would be resistance by many in Taliban hierarchy and such elements had to be eliminated. To prepare for this eventuality in advance, the ISI created this nomenclature where the senior Taliban would automatically fall into the 'Good' Taliban category and the opponents of political integration of Taliban would be put in 'Bad' Taliban category, who can be eventually eliminated later through this 'bad' justification. As the ISI and CIA began a dialogue with the 'Good' Taliban, the CIA in 2014, with support of Israeli Mossad, created Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) under the leadership of a trained Mossad operative named Elliot Shimon, who came in front of the world as Dr. Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. The creation of ISIS also gave an opportunity to the middle and junior levels of Taliban to join ISIS as they thought that this ISIS would give them arms and ammunition. They thought that they could use these arms and ammunition to resist the senior leaders of Taliban and threaten them by unleashing violence in the fiefdoms. They joined ISIS to safeguard their fiefdoms but their joining ISIS gave the US an opportunity to eliminate them eventually. Thus, in 2020, we were only left with the 'Good Taliban' and the 'Bad Taliban' was eliminated successfully and that is why ISIS too was wrapped up (in 2019 when the US showed to the world that Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi was eliminated). To show the world, India officially rejected this divergent nomenclature and stated that all terrorists are bad terrorists and there cannot be such artificial perceptual division. This was done officially, but covertly India had been engaging with Taliban (good Taliban) and was not very affected with this division. As the civil unrest in Afghanistan grew, in 2013, Karzai presented a wish list of military hardware from India. The RAW too asserted that India should arm Afghanistan and this should be done to control ISI's strategic depth in Afghanistan. The RAW presented a case for strong India and Afghanistan defence ties. A senior RAW official told the Indian Prime Minister that India should instil fear in the minds of Pakistan by arming Afghanistan. However, MEA asserted that a strong India in Afghanistan would instil a fear in Pakistan that India is trying to support Afghan revanchist designs. MEA said that once the US troops withdraw, there could be a possibility that these arms supplied by India can fall in wrong hands. Also, the MEA said that India has no law that permits transfer of lethal arms to foreign states. Thus, in the absence of a law, in 2015, India 'gifted' four MI-35 attack helicopters to Kabul. Today, India says that there are two concerns in deepening defence ties with Afghanistan. Firstly, the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is trained to use American weapons. If India gives arms, there will be interoperability issues. Secondly, the list of weapons from Afghanistan keep changing and this has confused the leadership in India.

THE FIVE STAGES OF EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S AFGHAN POLICY

India's Taliban policy has witnessed five stages of denial in 1996, anger in 1997, bargaining in 1998, depression in 1999 and finally acceptance from 2002. Initially, as we have analysed previously, there have been various factors that have prevented India to engage with Taliban. One of the biggest problems India faced with Taliban was epistemic limitation and knowledge about Taliban. This was also coupled with political conservatism in India. But India always covertly maintained a link with Taliban. In fact, in 2006 Fazlur Rehman, a senior Taliban leader visited India on a four-day state visit. He even had the meeting with the Indian Prime Minister and the RAW Chief. But since 2011, India has shed off its perception of looking at Taliban as a monolith controlled by Pakistan. India understands that Taliban is a very diverse organisation. Its main fight is against Western forces on the soil of Afghanistan and not India or Kashmir. India has also

understood that it is not possible to militarily defeat Taliban. India today believes that the Afghan government will depend upon external support for financial and military needs. So, India is of the opinion that Afghanistan should not be dependent upon Pakistan for the same, as that will affect Indian national interests. India has understood that there are various groups in Afghanistan, which also include Taliban, which are dependent upon Pakistan. Non-engagement with such groups is unviable now because this would only isolate them from India and make them gravitate towards Pakistan. India knows that because of its developmental diplomacy, which is even highly appreciated by Taliban, it wants to use this goodwill and broaden its engagement with Afghanistan and Taliban. Engagement with Taliban will only help in India to secure its core interests in the region. Even though India knows that the cost of reconciliation of Afghan government and Taliban is not going to be an easy task, it still favours engagement with Taliban because the cost of non-engagement is higher than the cost of engagement. Even though Taliban is entrenched in drugs, violence and extortions, they are still not at odds with India and we have repeated time and again in this chapter that Taliban have never targeted India or Kashmir. Since 2011, India has officially accepted that Afghan led reconciliation with Taliban will be supported by India.

INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TALIBAN 2.0

The Indian strategy is that it is trying to be in touch with all key stakeholders to bolster a wide range of coalition. One suggestion for India is to launch an India–Afghan Dialogue (on lines of India and Central Asia Dialogue) with various regional players as key stakeholders. It is important for India to engage with China and use China to convince Pakistan to loosen its grip on anti-India Jihad factions like Haqqani networks. If China in return demands a dilution of Indo-US military partnership, India should display open mindedness to such a grand bargain. More so, India can engage with Central Asia and deploy boots on the ground in Central Asia to ensure that ceasefire between the US and Taliban is respected. Iran also enjoys influence (despite Iranians being Shias and Taliban Sunnis) on Taliban (because both do not want foreign troops in Afghanistan, thus Iran bedfellowing Taliban) and is willing to allow India to step in to open a channel for talks. The Tajiks in Afghanistan are Persian speaking (close to Iran) and are in the Afghan bureaucracy, thus, being another asset for India to leverage. The good offices of Russia with Taliban are also used by India at the covert level to engage. India and China (RAW has set up a covert military base in Wakhan corridor, connecting Badakshan Province of Afghanistan and Xinjiang) along with Russia and Iran can evolve a model of regional concert cooperation for Afghanistan. The reality is that Taliban actively supports India's works in rural Afghanistan. To take the dialogue further, in 2018, India even allowed 'non-official' participation through its retired diplomats in a multilateral meeting in Russia. The next logical step for India will be to go for MAGA (Make Afghanistan Great Again) campaign. It is the Pakistani-sponsored Haqqani networks that target India in Afghanistan. Thus, India does not have an Afghan problem, but a Pakistan problem. Since 2021, when Taliban acquired power in Afghanistan, India has adopted the policy of engaging with Taliban but not endorsing the Taliban.

INDIA AND TALIBANI FACTION OF MULLAH ABDUL SALAM ROCKETI

In the present times, India knows that not all factions of Taliban are anti-India. There are certain factions of Taliban that are supported by Pakistan to target Indians in Afghanistan. There is a faction of Taliban in Afghanistan led by Mullah Abdul Salam Rocketi, who is pro-India. It is stated that Rocketi has a good knowledge of ISI and has deep penetration within the ISI. Through Rocketi, RAW knows that ISI has given responsibility to its officials like Major Nadeem Taj, Brigadier Sher Zamin and Captain Khan Zamin to target India in Afghanistan. The RAW often uses Rocketi to gather ground intelligence on ISI and their activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, RAW has embarked upon a new journey in Afghanistan where Taliban and RAW gather tactical intelligence on the ground together.

INDIA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HAQQANI NETWORKS

As of now, India engages with all of Taliban minus Haqqani networks. The Haqqani networks (created by the US in Afghanistan as part of Afghan Mujahedeen campaign in 1980 under the leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani) are good to be used by Pakistan. The common belief is that the Haqqani networks are a veritable arm of the ISI. It is true that ISI played a very important role in creating the Haqqani networks in 1980s during the Afghan Jihad. Sirrajuddin Haqqani (son of Jalaluddin Haqqani) leads the Haqqani networks and is also the number two in Taliban and they are present in the areas

of Durand line in South and East Afghanistan. They also enjoy a considerable hold over the local economy. However, the RAW has infiltrated inside the Haqqani networks. The Haqqani networks operate purely with a monetary motive and they do not have any ideology. The ISI uses them via money and gets them to target Indians in Afghanistan. Thus, if Haqqani networks take money from ISI, they are open to take money from others also. This is where Indian RAW is working today with Haqqani networks. With the Taliban majorly pro-India today, if Haqqani networks are financially neutralised, the ISI will lose the plot in Afghanistan completely in the future.

INDIA'S FUTURE STRATEGY FOR ENGAGING WITH TALIBAN

The Taliban has asked for India's help on how to integrate Taliban in Afghanistan and assistance on counterinsurgency. India has suggested that Taliban should first end violence and secondly should accept any negotiation under the Afghan constitution. Today, India has been talking to senior Taliban leaders that range from Tayyab Agha, Abdal Salam Zaeef and Muttawakil. India has been regularly inviting them to Delhi and having intense negotiations with them. The Taliban Chief, Maulvi Hebatullah Akhundzda, covertly visited Delhi for negotiations many times. The RAW is also talking to Taliban leaders like Agha Jan Mutasim, Abdul Ghani Baradar and Zabinullah Mujahid to see the possibility if they can help internally weaken Pakistan. Taliban is not anti-India and will not allow Pakistan to use Afghanistan to target India anywhere, from Kashmir to Afghanistan. But India continues to deepen ties with Taliban to wean them away from Pakistan. RAW was sceptical about India opening a dialogue with HEI and Hekmatyar as Pakistani ISI trained him. But since 2017 ceasefire, HEI is more pro-India than Pakistan. Today, India is able to break into Taliban effectively because of Pakistan. Pakistan has often shown their back to Taliban. In fact, the RAW officer says that whenever Taliban did not toe down to the line of ISI, the ISI used Haqqani networks to target Taliban. This has made Taliban more anti-Pakistan today and this is a positive point for RAW and India. At times, a proposal is made in the media that India should deploy military in Afghanistan. If Indian troops get involved in Afghanistan, India would be sucked into a vicious proxy war with huge financial and strategic costs. Pakistan will perceive that Indian troops in Afghanistan would be used for supporting revanchist designs in KP and Baluchistan, thus, the Afghan situation does not favour an Indian security intervention.

QUADRILATERAL COORDINATION GROUP IN AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA-TALIBAN DIPLOMACY

The US in January 2016 established the QCG (Quadrilateral Coordination Group), which had the US, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. The QCG established a roadmap where Pakistan was made a key player to bring Taliban on the table for talks with the US. But the hopes for peace were dashed when Mullah Mansoor (head of Taliban) did not relinquish violence and kept on insisting that the US leave Afghanistan. Frustrated with Mansoor, the US in May 2016, through a drone strike eliminated Mansoor. This led to Maulvi Hebatullah Akhundzda become the successor in Taliban. On insistence of Russian intelligence, in 2018, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (active in North and East Afghanistan) announced their decision to join Islamic State (ISIS). The IS logic was created by Russia (which asserted IS could become a threat to Russia) to open up its dialogue with Taliban directly. All this gave Taliban a new legitimacy, something that Pakistan always craved for. The US have tacitly understood that the only thing ISI wants is Taliban in Afghanistan at any cost. Pakistan prefers a controlled (through their control over Taliban) instability in Afghanistan that keeps the Taliban in power but also keeps it dependent upon the ISI. The US cannot take any harsh measures against Pakistan that range from designating it as a state sponsor of terrorism to cancelling the status of 'major non-NATO ally'. The US apparently remains committed to this unhappy marriage with Pakistan. Thus, all that the US wanted was an honourable exit from Afghanistan. Over a period of time, Taliban has also changed its stance. From being an armed militia that destroyed schools, courts and medical clinics, today it is supporting them. Taliban is also allowing them to be managed by government servants. It has adopted this strategy of co-opting development to display its governance skills, so that it can present itself as a credible player in the future of Afghanistan.

THE 'US-TALIBAN PACKAGE DEAL' AND 'TALK AND FIGHT' STRATEGY OF TALIBAN

It is in the backdrop of issues analysed above that the US in 2018 appointed Zalmay Khalizad as its chief negotiator and special representative with Taliban. Trump had thrown Afghanistan into an epic scrum by his logic that great nations do not fight endless wars. The ground situation in 2020 was that Taliban controlled 15% Afghan lands, the Afghan government held 56% while 39% was contested between Afghan government and Taliban. The US have followed a three-way negotiation strategy. First, they opened up the Doha track with the Taliban; a second was with Islamabad/Rawalpindi track and the third was with Kabul government to ensure that the Afghan government would accept the outcome of the deal. The dice was loaded because Taliban and Pakistan negotiated as a team with the US. Within six months of 2018, Taliban presented four objectives to the US and they were: a ceasefire, an intra-Afghan peace dialogue, cutting ties with terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, and finally, the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, the strategy of Taliban was that at one place it would continue to fight foreign troops and simultaneously talk to the US. This is called the 'talk and fight' approach. The Taliban and the US reached a deal in March 2020, which is pregnant with positivity. *Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is not recognised by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America* is the title of the 'deal'. The deal has five core components:

Troops withdrawal: The US will withdraw 8,600 troops in 135 days and the NATO or coalition troop numbers will also be brought down, proportionately and simultaneously. The US will withdraw 'all' troops will be out within 14 months where the word "all" would include "non-diplomatic civilian personnel" (which in reality are "intelligence" personnel of CIA). The US withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021 and Taliban established their presence.

Taliban commitment: The deal says that Taliban will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including Al-Qaeda, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. The pact is silent on anti-India groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed. Also, India, not being an US ally, is not covered under this pact for the time being.

Sanctions removal: The UN sanctions on Taliban leaders to be removed by three months, that is by 29th May 2020 and the US sanctions by 27th August 2020.

Prisoner release: The joint declaration says the US will facilitate "discussion with Taliban representatives on confidence building measures, to include determining the feasibility of releasing significant numbers of prisoners on both sides". While there are no numbers or deadlines in the joint declaration, the US-Taliban pact says up to 5,000 imprisoned Taliban and up to 1,000 prisoners from "the other side" held by Taliban "would be released" by 10th March 2020, which was the date when intra-Afghan negotiations started, in Oslo. However, the prisoner exchange witnessed a snag when on 10th March 2020, the Afghan government refused to release the prisoners. The Oslo talks were suspended due to the outbreak of COVID-19 and eventually occurred in 2021.

Ceasefire: The agreement states ceasefire will be simply "an item on the agenda" when intra-Afghan talks start and indicates actual ceasefire will come with the "completion" of an Afghan political agreement. Ideally, the intra-Afghan talks should have preceded the deal, but that did not happen, making the entire future complicated now.

PRIVATISATION OF WARS AND CONFLICT THEATRES

The US has in a way lost the game in Afghanistan. It is rightly said that Afghanistan for the US has become their next Vietnam. It is determined to carry out an honourable exit from Afghanistan. It is in this context, a debate has initiated of privatising the Afghan war. In the present context of hybrid wars, the roles of private armies have drastically increased. In the US, most of its retired defence personnel have floated private security companies, which have a private army ready to be deployed in a situation. In the US, the idea to privatise the war in Afghanistan is made by Erik Prince, a former US Navy seal and head of a private security firm called Frontier Resource Group. He has proposed that a private army of 6000, 90 private army planes along with 2000 troops of the US Special Forces on ground in Afghanistan can make a big difference on the ground operations, apart from a fraction cost to the treasury of the US (4 billion USD in contrast to 50 billion USD per annum at present). Prince asserts that with a right strategy on the ground, the private army can defeat

Taliban if they go violent. Prince also asserted that a small private army in Afghanistan could give the US a leverage to reduce its dependence on Pakistan and simultaneously put pressure on Pakistan if it continues to support extremism. There have been concerns raised about the outsourcing of the war that range from issues of accountability to human right abuses. Anyway, the concept of the US resorting to privatisation is not new because for many years thousands of 'contractors', also called 'non-governmental personnel' have been performing military duties from logistics to translation etc. The US Central Command (which has the responsibility to carry out wars in Middle East) has employed more than 50000 contractors. For that matter, even Russia has been using a private army in Syria presently. The above debate proves that the concept of private armies are now a part of modern battlefields, but whether Pakistan will allow the US the liberty to do this in Afghanistan is a question mark.

THE NARRATIVE OF TALIBAN AS A THREAT IN KASHMIR AND THREAT TO INDIA

There is a belief that after abrogation of Article 370, which was done unilaterally by India without consulting Kashmiri people, there is a lot of disenchantment against the Indian government in the valley. Pakistan feels that it can exploit a vast segment of people in tans-Pir Panjal region and alienated Kashmiri people against India. The consequence of the US–Taliban deal will be more psychological. The people in the valley may perceive the deal this way. They will feel that if Taliban could defeat a mighty superpower like the US, then defeating Indian forces in Kashmir will not be difficult too. The Kashmiri youth might pick up arms and ISI may fuel the violence to create Kashmir Militancy 2.0. However, one thing that even Pakistan's deep state will acknowledge is that the situation in J&K is not even remotely akin to what it was in 1989–90. At that juncture, Kashmir Valley had a single Indian division strength force, with a couple of independent brigades. India's 15 Corps was stretched in its responsibility from Demchok in Eastern Ladakh to the Pir Panjal, all along the LAC and LoC; a deployment which only changed after Kargil 1999. Indian Army's 15 Corps and Jammu and Kashmir Police (JKP) now have 30 years of experience handling intense hybrid war. In the rear in second and third tiers is deployed the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), India's finest military experiment. In addition there is the CRPF, which is far more confident and well-integrated with the RR. Pakistan could aim to employ four facets to make the situation simmer; mass infiltration, terror acts, people's agitation and influence operations through various means including social media and mosque power. Indian capability to limit infiltration received a boost since 2004 with the LoC fence and induction of modern surveillance technology. The effectiveness of successfully infiltrated terror groups is contingent upon the support of over ground workers and availability of finance networks. Surge in local recruitment is contingent upon success of the Foreign Terror (FT) groups of Afghanistan and the penetration of influence operations by Pakistan's ISI. The degree of success to counter Pakistan thus depends upon our capability to initiate a slew of development and outreach measures in the valley. The victory of Taliban with the US here is not just a victory of a puritanical religious outfit but an act of legitimisation of religious fundamentalism. The only saving grace here is that when India abrogated Article 370 in August 2019, Taliban issued a statement saying that there is no link between the issues of Kashmir and Afghanistan. This proves that Taliban has never supported the ISI-sponsored violence in Kashmir and in future will also not do the same. Thus, for India, the challenge is only to manage the situation of psychological alienation of the people in the valley.

THE POLICY OF STRATEGIC DEPTH OF PAKISTAN IN AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA'S TALIBAN COUNTERBALANCING

India's diplomatic energy in Afghanistan is invested primarily in enhancing its own interests in Afghanistan. To understand India's interest, it is important to understand the concept of strategic depth. Let us understand the concept of Strategic Depth through an example. Suppose that there are three hypothetical states—A, B and C. Strategic depth is a policy whereby state A may try to enhance its influence in state B to the extent that it emerges in a position to prevent the state C to exercise political influence in the state B. For instance, Pakistan has enhanced its presence in Afghanistan to ensure that there is a favourable regime in Afghanistan since a regime favourable to Pakistan in Afghanistan will allow Pakistan to limit the political influence of India in Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan pursues a policy of strategic depth against India in Afghanistan.

India's first interest is to ensure that Pakistan does not gain an edge within governing structures of Afghanistan. India feels that if Pakistan succeeds in installing Taliban in Afghanistan, it will be detrimental to the cause of the regional security of India because Taliban will not be able to prevent ISI to use the territory of Afghanistan to train terrorists for unleashing terrorism in the Kashmir valley. In the post-2001 period, India decided to deepen its engagement with Afghanistan by opening consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad. These consulates provided India the needed base in Afghanistan to carry out development diplomacy (explained this above). Pakistan alleges that India uses these consulates to contain Pakistan as these consulates have officers of Indian RAW and they have used these consulates to create a deep covert network to gather intelligence from across the border and create terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan also alleges that India aids Baluchistan rebels through these consulates.

INDIAN POLICY TO PREVENT OF SPILLOVER OF EXTREMISM TO KASHMIR

Pakistan even continues to use Jihad as a part of its grand strategy as it gives them the power to influence the region. India has been a victim of state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan and India engages with Afghanistan to ensure no spillover of extremism or Islamic radicalism happens to India. At present, the extremists fighting in Kashmir owe their patronage mostly to Pakistan's ISI and have drawn inspiration from the resistance offered by Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviets during the Cold War. The test for India will be that how it tries to convince Taliban to not let Afghan lands be used by ISI to train anti-India elements.

THE KEY DRIVERS OF INDIA'S TALIBAN POLICY

In final conclusion of India's policy on Afghanistan, we can say that firstly, there is no one approach adopted by India for Afghanistan because Afghanistan has been rightly called the 'graveyard of Empires'. Its approach to Afghanistan vacillates from a partisan approach to a conciliatory approach. The Partisans are those people in the Indian establishment who favour an anti-engagement strategy. It means that they assert that India should build ties with all those who factions in Afghanistan who are at odds with Pakistan. They say that by deepening ties with them, India can weaken Pakistani strategic depth. Conciliators are those people in the Indian establishment who favour that India should favour a policy where it speaks to all those factions which are in power in Afghanistan and with whom India enjoys a goodwill. They favour engage all axiom and assert that the India needs to be open to even the pro-Pakistan constituency in Afghanistan. India uses an effective mixture of conciliators and partisans to achieve the goal of a sovereign, stable and a united Afghanistan. To achieve this, Indian foreign policy in Afghanistan is driven by finding official, unofficial and covert friends in Afghanistan, who will be supportive of India's interests and further the national interests of India. If they do so, India can reciprocate with infrastructure, aid or a mix of politico-military and international support for Afghanistan. Thus, the partition of India, which caused a geographical disconnect of India to Central Asia, did indeed become India's weakness but, it also became the pillar of cardinal strength of India and Afghanistan.



4

CHAPTER

India's Relationship with Pakistan

THE BASIS OF THE RIVALRY OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

India and Pakistan, since their inception in 1947, have had sharp rivalries with each other. Peter T. Coleman rightly pointed out that 95% of the most serious disputes in the world can be resolved, but India and Pakistan come under the irresolvable 5%. The conflict between the two has vacillated from a clash of national identities to territorial disputes. In the 21st century, the two have become lethal nuclear rivals of each other. The relations have always been locked in a vicious cycle. They begin with much optimism and fanfare but soon get engulfed by uncertainties, generating complications that lead to the suspension of dialogue, only for the cycle to continue again with a fresh round of optimism the next time. Though the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by both countries has prevented a major conflict, small-scale conflicts such as Kargil crisis of 1999, localised attacks such as Pulwama attack of 2019 and subsequent Balakot strike of 2019 did take place. General Monty Palit has rightly stated that, over a certain period of time, the Indo-Pak relations have become, in a sense, a sort of communal riot disguised in armour. Krishna Kumar aptly states that the two sides have an iron curtain that prevents them from building a pool of common knowledge about each other. Today, the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan believes that Pakistan has to emerge as the forerunner of an idea of Islamist awakening, and such an awakening would also absorb Indian Muslims and thereby India will become a part of Pakistan. The Indian RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) on the other hand believes that Pakistan as an independent state is an unacceptable entity and a civilisational challenge to the existence of India and they advocate the idea of 'Akhand Bharat', which as an idea includes India's boundary up till Central Asia. Since its inception, Pakistan has sought to build a link between its religious identity and its geostrategic location. For Jinnah, Islamic Pakistanis, being followers of monotheistic Islam, were naturally more allied to the monotheistic Christians than Hindus. Using the religious angle, he favoured a deeper alliance with the US. Jinnah articulated that only monotheistic people could resist the godless communist Russia in the world. Jinnah asserted that Hindus and Indians could not be trusted in the fight against communism because the Hindu Indians were more sympathetic towards Soviets. Jinnah tried to market Pakistan as a Muslim Israel to America, which shared the same values and a belief in no god but god. The Pakistani establishment has a feeling that India has never accepted the idea of allowing Pakistan to exist as a state and they believe that India wants to militarily crush Pakistan. Pakistan uses an analogy with Israel to explain India's position with respect to itself. Pakistan feels that communities who perceived an impending threat of persecution by a majority state, as they constituted a minority, created both Pakistan and Israel. Both remained under threat from neighbours. Pakistan feels that after the Partition, the Hindus wanted to take revenge by attacking a minority-constituted Pakistan. Pakistan further maintains that to meet this threat, both countries (Pakistan and Israel) used a common strategic policy of building up of alliances with the West as a security guarantee. However, Pakistan alleges that neither Israel nor Pakistan got adequate support from the West for their security (Pakistan uses 1971 crises as an explanation), which compelled them to go nuclear for their own security and survival. In Pakistan, the army had dominated its national security and foreign policy discourse since the 1950s and the army has an upper hand in dictating diplomacy with India. Both sides feel that fear, hatred and a sense of persecution are the key drivers of the conflict. The conflict not only revolves around the disparity in size between India and Pakistan but Kashmir, water sharing and the Siachen Glacier issue also constitute the three core geostrategic

issues affecting the two. The Pakistani army feels that the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) has entrenched itself deeply in conflicts internal to Pakistan and has unleashed an inner leviathan in Pakistan to destabilise it from within.

KASHMIR ISSUE IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS

During the British times, Kashmir was one of the princely states under British suzerainty. In 1946, the memorandum of the Cabinet Mission to India defined the status of such princely states. As per the Cabinet Mission plan, once the British paramount ceases, the crown would no longer hold paramount power and such power would be transferred to the states of India and Pakistan. There will be an end to political arrangements between the states, crown and British India. The princely state will fill the void by establishing a relationship with India, Pakistan or would remain independent. Two instruments, namely, Mountbatten proposed Instrument of Accession and a Standstill Agreement. Jinnah interpreted that, as per Cabinet Mission Plan, the situation post-lapse of paramountcy would be such that princely states would gain independent status of being sovereign in nature. Congress, through a resolution on 15th June 1947, held that on lapse of paramountcy, the will of the people of concerned princely states would be required to ascertain their choices, as lapse of paramountcy did not tantamount to the independence of a state. With this interpretation, the Congress raised objections when the Maharaja of Junagadh began to negotiate an accession with Pakistan. India insisted its interpretation in case of Junagadh. A referendum on Junagadh happened and its population voted in favour of India.

THE GAMES OF HARI SINGH AND PAKISTANI MAXIMALIST OPTION OF TRIBAL RAIDS

Kashmir was a princely state and it posed some difficulty because it was a Muslim majority state ruled by a Hindu monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh. Initially, Hari Singh was reluctant to join either India or Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan launched a campaign by sending its troops disguised as tribesmen to forcefully annex the state of Kashmir. A revolt against the rule of Hari Singh was fomented by Pakistan. Hari Singh had his own fears. He never wanted to accede to Pakistan, as he feared that a Muslim state of Pakistan would soon integrate the Muslims of Kashmir thereby relegating him to a minority status. He also had similar concerns for India, as he thought that if he acceded to India, a socialist Jawaharlal Nehru would strip him of the privileges he enjoyed. In September 1947, there was a communal trouble in Poonch province in the state. Simultaneously, Pakistani tribesmen had started pouring in and had unleashed a campaign of carnage in other areas reaching up till Srinagar.

THE FIRST INDIA AND PAKISTAN WAR


On 24th October 1947, Hari Singh requested arms and troop support from India to stop the Pakistani-sponsored menace. As Hari Singh had not acceded either to India or Pakistan, troops from India could not be sent. Mountbatten asserted that the accession should be determined by a plebiscite after the tribesmen have been driven out of Kashmir. Nehru accepted the views of Mountbatten. Mountbatten contended that, as India has not signed a formal accession treaty with Kashmir, if it sends troops to Kashmir, Pakistan would do the same and this may lead to a war. It was decided by Nehru to inform Hari Singh that only if Hari Singh acceded to India would there be any troop commitment. Nehru, however, clarified that such an accession is conditioned and once law and order is restored, the will of the Kashmiri people about their future would hold sacrosanct. Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession and sent a letter to Nehru to that effect. In the letter Hari Singh stated that Kashmir had signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan. As per the agreement, Pakistan provided postal and telegraph services in the state. Hari Singh also complained that Pakistan had put a lot of pressure on him and one of the pressure tactics was the tribal raid. He wrote that in this emergency, instead of allowing Pakistan to destroy his state, he preferred concluding an instrument of accession with India. The Indian government accepted the accession and decided to provide military help to Kashmir. Pakistan immediately declared that the accession was an act of fraud and it summarily rejected the accession. The challenging of the legality of the accession by Pakistan was an unsound political move. The Indian troops were able to stop the onslaught by Pakistani forces but by then, one-third of Kashmir had fallen into the hands of the invaders.

THE KASHMIR ISSUE IN UNITED NATIONS AND INDIAN DIPLOMACY

Nehru, heeding the advice of Mountbatten, referred the case of Kashmir to the United Nation in 1948. Mountbatten urged Nehru that an international agency such as the UN can ensure impartiality in the plebiscite. Once law and order would be restored, there would be a plebiscite under the observation of the UN. The UN subsequently established a UN Commission for India and Pakistan with power to exercise mediatory influence. In January 1948, the Security Council adopted Resolution 39, establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute. As the UNCIP came to the subcontinent, there arose disagreements over de-militarisation in Kashmir. The UNCIP was instructed to work jointly with the two states and create a condition conducive for a plebiscite. In April 1948, by its Resolution 47, the Council decided to enlarge the membership of UNCIP and to recommend various measures including the use of observers to create conditions for peace. At the recommendation of UNCIP, the Secretary-General appointed the Military Adviser to support the Commission on military aspects and provided for a group of military observers to assist him. The first team of unarmed military observers, which eventually formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), arrived in the mission area in January 1949 to supervise, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and to assist the Military Adviser to UNCIP. The tasks of the observers, as defined by the Military Adviser, were to accompany the local authorities in their investigations, gather as much information as possible, and report as completely, accurately and impartially as possible. To immediately halt the hostilities due to the invasion of the tribesmen, the UNCIP, through negotiations, helped India and Pakistan sign an agreement in 1949 in Karachi.

THE KARACHI AGREEMENT AND CEASEFIRE LINE

As per the Karachi Agreement, a ceasefire line was drawn as a temporary arrangement to divide the line between Kashmiri territory left with India and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), which they called Azad Kashmir. The Karachi Agreement specified that UNCIP would station observers where it deemed necessary, and that local commanders on each side would verify the ceasefire line mutually on the ground with the assistance of the UN military observers. Disagreements were to be referred to the UNCIP Military Adviser, whose decision would be final. The Pakistani army decided to take over the operational control of the PoK and stationed its troops in the region. India alleged that this troop presence of Pakistan was one of the reasons why a condition conducive for a plebiscite had not been created. The ceasefire line officially came into effect from 1st January 1949. India alleged that the stalemate over Kashmir could not end and a plebiscite could not happen, as Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from the PoK, which was a necessary condition for restoration of peace leading to a future plebiscite.



The UNCIP yet again tried under McNaughton's leadership to create a condition for plebiscite by advocating demilitarisation in 1950. However, the UNCIP failed and the UNSC terminated the UNCIP in 1950 and appointed Sir Owen Dixon as the UN Representative to the Security Council. Owen Dixon again proposed the idea of a plebiscite after demilitarisation. On 30 March 1951, following the termination of UNCIP, the Security Council, by its Resolution 91 decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir. India, by 1960, began to assert that it would not accept international mediation and would resort to a bilateral dialogue with Pakistan over

Kashmir but continue to support plebiscite. India advocated a shift of treating the Kashmir problem as a world question to treating it as a domestic issue.

AGREEMENT ON BOUNDARY BETWEEN CHINESE XINJIANG AND THE CONTIGUOUS AREAS, THE DEFENCE OF WHICH IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF PAKISTAN (1963)

In 1962, India had a border conflict with China. After its defeat in the conflict, it decided to upgrade its military with assistance from the USA, Russia and the UK. After the 1962 conflict, the Pakistanis 'gifted' parts of Ladakh and Aksai Chin (called 5180 square kilometre Shaksgam Valley) to Chinese in 1963 by an agreement called "Agreement on Boundary Between Chinese Xinjiang and the contiguous areas, the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan 1963". For China, these territories they got from Pakistan as a gift were never a part of Jammu and Kashmir, but part of Tibet and Xinjiang under the British rule. *(In the recent times, Chinese have tried to show that even the Hunza region was in union with Xinjiang till 1947-48 and this is because the Hunza ruler Jamal Khan had been negotiating with officials of Xinjiang before he eventually acceded to Pakistan. This does not mean that Chinese have given up their claims for Hunza, though they have just allowed Pakistan to keep it for the time being, but in future, the CPEC enters Pakistan through Hunza, the larger Chinese economic influence in Gilgit-Baltistan will compel them to restart their claims).*


THE 1965 WAR AND TASHKENT AGREEMENT

The British and Americans too used this opportunity to induce bilateral dialogue between the two states. The US sent its Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to persuade Nehru to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. From 1962 to 1963, though there was dialogue between the two sides, nothing favourable was achieved. As the talks between the two could not yield any results, it motivated Pakistan to launch yet another offensive in 1965. In 1965, Pakistan launched an offensive based on certain assumptions. Firstly, Pakistan perceived that the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict has proven that Indian Army is very weak and can be defeated easily. Secondly, they perceived that Lal Bahadur Shastri, who succeeded Nehru as the Indian Prime Minister after his death in 1964, is a weak Prime Minister and does not enjoy any international support. Pakistan believed that with the US fully on the side of Pakistan, they could attack India and snatch away Kashmir. In 1965, when Pakistan attacked India, Indian forces gave a befitting response to Pakistan. This happened as Pakistan had miscalculated the fact that India had initiated military modernisation. The Indian response in 1965 led to the miserable defeat of Pakistan. The USA did not want to be involved in the resolution of conflict between the two, as the previous US attempt had not yielded any result. This allowed the USSR to broker peace after the 1965 conflict through the Tashkent Agreement as it saw the bleak US interest as an opportunity to expand its Asian influence. The Tashkent Agreement stated that the Indian and Pakistani forces would pull back to their pre-conflict positions (pre-August 1965 lines), no later than 25 February 1966. Further, the nations would not interfere in each other's internal affairs, economic and diplomatic relations would be restored, there would be an orderly transfer of prisoners of war, and the two leaders would work towards improving bilateral relations. The Tashkent Agreement led to maintenance of status quo by the two sides. After 1965, India was amply frustrated with Pakistan for their repeated territorial aggression.

THE 1971 WAR, SIMLA AGREEMENT AND CEASEFIRE LINE TO LINE OF CONTROL

Indira Gandhi authorised the creation of a lethal covert spy agency called Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 1968 and instructed them to teach a lesson to Pakistan for their territorial aggression. In December 1970, Pakistani held a general election. As per the result, the Awami League (led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehaman) won the election in East Pakistan while Pakistan People's Party (PPP) swept the polls in West Pakistan. The PPP and Awami League began negotiating a power sharing agreement but by March 1971, the two reached a more severe deadlock. The Awami League protestors, on failure to reach a power sharing agreement, initiated a massive protest to seek autonomy. The Pakistani army began to suppress the Awami League supporters in Dacca city from March 1971. As the suppression continued, the supporters of the Awami

League began to leave their country and started a migration to the Indian state of West Bengal. As this refugee influx began, India took up the issue diplomatically. As the matter was being negotiated diplomatically, India's RAW began to design a plan to invade East Pakistan and break it away from the control of West Pakistan. The RAW began to train and support the Mukti Bahini movement. The Mukti Bahini movement was a liberation force trained for covert capabilities. Witnessing renewed unrest, on 6th December 1971, Pakistani Air Force launched pre-emptive strikes on Indian air bases in North India. India perceived the attacks on its air bases as attack on the sovereignty of India and decided to militarily retaliate. The Indian forces entered deep inside East Pakistan and captured around 90,000 Prisoners of War (POWs). India subsequently supported Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and succeeded in seceding East Pakistan from the West. Bangladesh was finally born out of the war. After the 1971 war, in 1972, the two sides decided to sign Simla Agreement. Under the Simla Agreement of 1972, as mentioned above, the ceasefire line was now renamed as LoC and thereby the tenure of UNMOGIP to maintain peace on the ceasefire line came to an end. The Simla agreement of 1972 gave India an opportunity to put the conversion of the Kashmir issue from an international to a bilateral issue on paper. In 1972, under the Simla Agreement, Pakistan agreed to resolve Kashmir bilaterally without any third-party intervention. Though India gained at this point in 1972, however, critics point out that India lost an opportunity in 1972 to make the LoC as an international border.



The Simla Agreement of 1972 could not solve all the problems and proved unable to stabilise Kashmir.

After East Pakistan seceded, the US and China began to use Pakistan to create troubles for India. The CIA of the USA, along with Pakistani ISI, began to create unrest in Punjab by supporting terrorism in the form of the Khalistan movement in 1980s. In 1984, the Indian RAW came to know that Pakistan had purchased specialised clothing for very low temperatures for its army from a supplier in London.

OPERATION MEGHDOOT, OPERATION BRASSTACKS, OPERATION SLEDGEHAMMER AND FLYING HORSE

Under the Karachi Agreement, the demarcation in the North at point NJ9842 was not clear. The two sides had no disagreement in the glacier area, as the terrain was uninhabitable. In 1984, Pakistan undertook expeditions in the region near NJ9842 in an area called the Siachen Glacier. The RAW alerted the Indian army and during there one of the operations, the army found a Pakistani expedition team in a place near Siachen. India too launched an expedition in the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan eventually tried to occupy the glacier. In 1984, Indian army, under Operation Meghdoot, thwarted Pakistan's efforts and successfully occupied the Siachen Glacier. India considers Siachen strategically crucial. The Indian army, since then, has favoured a policy of status quo on Siachen while it is the only issue where Pakistan seeks an agreement. The strategic significance of Siachen for India is control of the Karakoram region that Pakistan and China have expanded into, under the pretext of developing a Karakoram highway. India feels that its presence in Siachen can keep the China-Pakistan activities under check. The roots of the Siachen occupation for India, thus, are not embedded in topography but the higher geopolitics of the region. General K. Sundarji led Indian army at that time. To intimidate Pakistan for their role in Khalistan terrorism, Sundarji chose the state of Rajasthan to launch a massive military exercise codenamed as Operation Brasstacks in 1987. The sheer magnitude of the exercise, involving around 1,50,000 soldiers, generated anxieties in Pakistan. The Pakistanis too responded with their own military exercises, codenamed as Operation Sledgehammer and Flying Horse.

THE OPERATION TOPAC EXECUTED IN KASHMIR


As the situation became tensed, the Soviet and the US diplomats and officials of CIA and KGB swung into action and began to work with RAW and ISI officials to reduce tensions. As the crises de-escalated, in an interview to Kuldeep Nayar, Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan resorted to nuclear signalling by arguing that Pakistan was on the way to have a nuclear weapon. Rajiv Gandhi authorised the nuclear scientists of India to begin work on Indian nuclear bomb. As the crisis defused, General Zia died in a plane crash in 1988 and subsequently, under the US pressure, the Pakistani army decided to go for elections, with Benazir Bhutto assuming power. Bhutto began to initiate a new round of dialogues with Rajiv Gandhi but as the military in Pakistan began to create unrest in Kashmir from 1989, the newly launched peace process was jeopardised. In 1987, Kashmir held elections. After the death of Sheikh Abdullah, Farooq Abdullah, his son, decided to form an alliance with the Congress for the elections. In the 1980s, various social and religious organisations that wanted to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully formed Muslim United Front (MUF). The MUF too wanted to use the 1987 elections to put forth Kashmiri grievances peacefully at the legislative forum. Farooq Abdullah won the elections. The MUF alleged that the elections were rigged, after which the MUF candidate Mohammad Yusuf Shah was imprisoned. This led to mass protests in the valley. The 1987 elections and the suppression of MUF had given Pakistan a fertile ground to fuel unrest in the valley. After the elections of 1987, when MUF cadres reached Pakistan for support, the ISI began to train them with arms and ammunition. A Pakistani militant outfit leader Syed Salahuddin too fuelled the protestors through his group, known as the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), which had been originally founded by Muhammad Ahsan Dar in 1989.

THE CREATION OF COMPETITIVE TANZEEM INDUSTRY AND EXODUS OF KASHMIRI PANDITS

The HM group mobilised Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq, Majid Wani, Javed Ahmed Mir and Yasin Malik and formed the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). As the JKLF received support and training from Pakistan, in 1989, they attacked a Hindu Kashmiri Pandit, Tika Lal Taploo. The assassination of Taploo created fear amongst the Kashmiri Pandits. The HM too vocally began to assert that Kashmiri Pandits immediately leave the valley, and this led to the exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits in 1989. Kashmir, which had been home to Sufi Islam and Hinduism, who had always coexisted peacefully, witnessed communal crisis. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was created by Hafiz Saeed in 1989.

AHL-I-HADITH, WAHABISM IN KASHMIR VALLEY AND OPERATION CHANAKYA

The LeT is ideologically linked to the Ahl-i-Hadith interpretations of Islam. Since 1990s, the ISI of Pakistan launched a campaign that sought to infiltrate Kashmir with the Ahl-i-Hadith ideology. The Ahl-i-Hadith interpretation is interlinked with the Wahabism school of Islam, which is one of the most orthodox and stringent forms of Islam practised in the world. Since 1990s, attempts have thus been made to Wahabise the Kashmiri society, which has always practised a softer, Sufi ideology-oriented Islam. Through a dedicated department known as the Joint Intelligence North (JIN), the ISI began to provide support to separatists and terrorist groups to encourage infiltration into Kashmir. They carry out clandestine activities in the Kashmir region. In 1990s, to counter the ISI campaign, RAW stepped in and launched Operation Chanakya. The basic idea of Operation Chanakya was to neutralise ISI groups using Indian counter-insurgency groups. The RAW began to form 'political cells' in Kashmir to counter the separatists. In South Kashmir, Kuka Parray alias Jamsheed Sheraji, in association with RAW formed, the pro-India counter-insurgency outfit called Ikwan-ul-Musalmeen. The Ikwan group neutralised Pakistani groups in South Kashmir. Jamsheed was a member of state assembly of Kashmir. The RAW also created the Muslim Mujahideen to neutralise Pakistani groups in Kashmir. In 1993, 26 social and religious organisations united to form the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The APHC began to raise the call for the independence of Kashmir. The USA too had given tacit support to APHC leaders in India and the CIA financially backed it. As violence against the Hindus unfolded in the valley in 1990, the central government decided to appoint Jagmohan Malhotra as the new governor of Kashmir. By 1996, HM and JKLF were severely weakened.



JIHAD UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA

The test of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 led to a new dimension of conflict. We have already explained nuclear dimension separately. To defuse rising tensions, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, initiated a dialogue by visiting Lahore in February 1999. Vajpayee launched new bus diplomacy between Amritsar and Lahore. During his meeting with Nawaz Sharif, Vajpayee launched a series of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).



The visit of Vajpayee to Lahore was a watershed event. Vajpayee also visited Minar-e-Pakistan where he publicly asserted that a stable Pakistan is in India's interest. This was the most important statement ever by an Indian head of the state on Pakistani soil, as Vajpayee endorsed the idea of the existence of Pakistan, which had been a long-standing concern for Pakistan. The Minar-e-Pakistan was chosen as a venue to announce this because it was the same place where the Lahore Declaration was passed to establish Pakistan in 1940. Vajpayee appointed a journalist, R. K. Mishra, as an interlocutor for the dialogues on the Kashmir crisis. Nawaz responded by appointing Pakistani diplomat Niaz Naik. For the first time, India decided to bypass official diplomatic channels for talks on Kashmir as Vajpayee, by appointing R. K. Mishra, injected new blood into the negotiations.

THE KARGIL CONFLICT 1999 AND DOCTRINE OF NUCLEAR PROVOCATION

As the dialogue was brought back on track, it got abruptly suspended as from May 1999, the Pakistani army intruded into Kargil and launched an offensive. India and Pakistan had an agreement in 1994, which stated that the two sides would mutually retreat from Kargil and Drass sectors of the LoC in December every year and would re-occupy the posts in March. Pakistan tried to provoke India after the 1998 nuclear tests and in December 1998, they refused to withdraw from the LoC.


even while the Indian side withdrew. In March 1999, when Indian troops went back to LoC, they found that Pakistan had occupied the peaks on Indian side of the LoC (a breach of Simla Agreement). Despite negotiations to convince Pakistan to withdraw from the occupied peaks, they refused. The Northern Light Infantry (NLI), armed with surface-to-air missiles was the Pakistani force that penetrated inside the LoC and occupied Indian-favoured posts that were vacant. Pakistan occupied the vacant Indian posts and occupied Batalik, Turtuk and Dras in Kargil. In May 1999, the Indian Air force (IAF) launched Operation Safed Sagar, which was a sustained air strike meant to support the ground troops and was aimed to flush out regular and irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from vacated Indian positions in the Kargil sector along the line of control. This air strike came as a big blow to Pakistan as it was never a part of the planned calculations. The innovative airstrikes by India also caused an extremely detrimental psychological impact on Pakistan who found extremely difficult to retaliate. The IAF used innovative bombing mechanisms to cause landslides and avalanches. A massive strike by IAF on a logistical camp in Muntho Dhaho in Batalik sector caused havoc for Pakistan, as it was the sole supply depot for the forces of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment (NLI). By the end of July 1999, the intruders were completely driven out from the posts. Pakistan, alarmed by the Indian response, immediately sought to seek partial de-escalation and an end to air and ground strikes from Indian. In the course of conflict, diplomatically, China favoured a neutral stance, but the ground reality was different. During the crisis, Sharif went to the US and met Clinton on 4th July 1999 in the belief that the US support would help control the crisis. However, Sharif was surprised and shocked to his core when Clinton asserted that the conflict had been initiated by Pakistan and that they had no right to violate the sanctity of the LoC. Pakistan was defeated in Kargil and now wanted an opportunity to seek revenge for Kargil.

THE IC-814 HIJACKING, ATTACK ON INDIAN PARLIAMENT, JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD AND OPERATION PARAKRAM

The Indo-Pak relationship took a severe plunge in December 1999 when IC-814 was hijacked and taken to Kandahar. The IC-814 was a routine flight from Kathmandu to Lucknow. The negotiations led to the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Ahmed Zarg and Ahmed Umar Syed. This was followed by attacks by terrorists on Amaranath Yatris in 2000. Despite these issues, Musharraf was yet again invited for a dialogue in 2001. The talks again did not occasion in any material success as Musharraf wanted to accomplish some tangible progress on the Kashmir dispute in a single meeting. On 13th December 2001, while the Parliament was in session, terrorists of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) stormed the Parliament complex in New Delhi and began to fire indiscriminately. The Indian security officials swung into action and eliminated the terrorists. After the Parliament attack, there were calls for strong military action on Pakistan. The Indian government, however, resorted to coercive diplomacy. India broke off existing diplomatic ties with Pakistan and recalled its High Commissioner. India closed its airspace for civilian aircrafts of Pakistan while sending Indian jets at forward positions. The army was asked for a timeline for a possible strike on Pakistan. The Indian army stated that any substantial operation against Pakistan would require a minimum of three weeks. To create a deterrent to Pakistan, the Indian government authorised troop mobilisation under Operation Parakram in 2002. In the meantime, Musharraf went public and announced a host of measures to ensure that none of the terror groups use Pakistani soil to wage terrorist attacks against any state. Such announcements in public made it more difficult for India to launch a military offensive. As the ISI received a setback, they initiated a new campaign of violence with a new tactic from 2002.


THE FIDAYEEN PHASE OF TERRORISM AND INDIA AND PAKISTAN CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT 2003

The ISI resorted to a new *fidayeen* phase of the campaign. The idea was to attack army camps, zero down on targets and terrorise the Kashmiri population. The logic behind ISI-sponsored *fidayeen* attacks were to cause a psychological blow to the Indian forces, Indian people, and the Indian state. The ISI used Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad for the campaign. Because of enormous pressure on Pakistan from the US, Musharraf finally declared a unilateral ceasefire with India along with LoC in 2003 and the two sides signed the India and Pakistan Ceasefire Agreement 2003 under which both sides decided to maintain tranquillity at the LoC and undertake no cross-border firing at the LoC. In 2003, Vajpayee visited Srinagar and announced fresh dialogues with Pakistan called the Composite Dialogues from 2004.



THE COLD START DOCTRINE OF INDIA AND RISE OF SUB-CONVENTIONAL DOCTRINE

The Indian army, on the other hand, after Kargil, began to search for a new doctrine. This led India to toy with the idea of the Cold Start doctrine in 2004, as a doctrine for limited war. Under the Cold Start doctrine, it has been decided to break the large 'strike corps' into division-sized integrated battle groups, which, with thorough speed, will resort to rapid mobilisation. Such mobilisation will resort to swift manoeuvre over Pakistan and capture a limited strip of land through air, ground and naval action. Such captured territory is to be used as a bargaining chip with Pakistan. In 2004, the Vajpayee government was replaced with the government of Manmohan Singh. Manmohan Singh decided to carry forward the idea of Composite Dialogue. Manmohan Singh stressed the idea of negotiating with Pakistan, as he strongly believed that India would not be able to position itself as a global player if it remained mired in conflict with Pakistan. The diplomatic ties were re-established, and a process of normalisation began. It decided to reduce troop presence in Kashmir and decided to help in establishing a channel for negotiations with Kashmiri separatists. Satinder Lambah led the back-channel diplomacy launched by India. It resulted in start of Srinagar–Musaffarabad bus service. Musharraf paid a one-day visit to India and attended an Indo-Pak cricket match. However, a crisis erupted again as terrorists struck the Srinagar–Musaffarabad bus service. The negotiations continued in 2006 and Manmohan Singh even offered a new Treaty of Peace, Security and Friendship to Pakistan. However, Pakistan responded to the offer of the treaty by asserting that Kashmir remained their central question. The peace process was derailed in July 2006, when LeT cadres orchestrated the blasts in local trains in Mumbai. The peace process moved at an extremely slow pace after the blasts. In September 2006, the two sides established a Joint Mechanism for Investigation and Countering Terrorism. In December 2006, Musharraf announced a four-step package approach for the Kashmir problem.



In February 2007, the Samjhauta Express was bombed. As any Pakistani group did not take the responsibility of this bombings, the talks continued. The Mumbai blasts (26/11) in 2008 altogether halted the peace process.


THE AMARNATH VIOLENCE, MACHIL ENCOUNTER AND STONE-PELTING PHASE OF UPRISING IN KASHMIR

In 2008, the Indian government, along with the government of Kashmir, decided to undertake a land transfer of 99 acres to the Sri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB). Such a land transfer immediately assumed a communal dimension and Hindu–Muslim violence broke out. After intense and heated debates, the government decided to stall the transfer to the SASB. However, the political parties had already begun to believe that Islam was under threat in Kashmir and violence

unfolded. In 2010, the Indian army carried out an encounter of terrorists in the Machil Sector in the district of Kupwara. Investigation found that instead of militants, the army had killed civilians living in Rafiabad area and had done a fake encounter. A month later, in June 2010, during a police crackdown, the police killed some innocents in the Srinagar area. This led to massive protests. The protestors began to pelt stones at the security forces. The protestors demanded the Indian troops to 'quit Kashmir'. The ISI saw an opportunity to revive their support to the protestors in the valley. The RAW found evidence that the ISI had begun to use social media platforms to mobilise the Kashmiri youth against India. The Indian government announced measures to curtail tensions. Apart from an all-party meeting, the government decided to appoint interlocutors to Kashmir. The army, too, brought the perpetrators of Machil fake encounter to task. As the situation turned to normalcy, again sparks erupted. In 2013, the government hanged Afzal Guru. His hanging for his role in the Parliament attack caused a massive unrest in the valley.

MODI DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY OF DENIAL


In 2014, Modi government came to power and Modi tried to break the ice with Pakistan, but terrorist attacks in Pathankot, Pampore, Uri, Kupwada and Pulwama in 2019 have again led to the suspension of the composite dialogue.



In 2015, the PDP decided to form a government in Kashmir in alliance with the BJP. The people of the valley did not favour such an alliance. This angered the youth and certain sections of the youth again found solace in extremism.


BURHAN WANI AND HYBRID TERRORISM IN KASHMIR

Burhan Wani was a classic example as he joined the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). The HM, adequately supported by the ISI, aggressively used the social media for radicalisation and indoctrination. The HM made him the commander of South Kashmir. His youthful age and sincerity found immense resonance amongst alienated Kashmiri youth. On 8th July 2016, the Indian armed forces killed Wani in an encounter. His death led to an upsurge in the valley. Lakhs of people attended his funeral. The ISI and HM, through social media, instigated the youth to resort to stone pelting against the Indian forces. Prem Shankar Jha has called the 2016 unrest in the valley as a Kashmiri intifada. This radical suicidal stone pelting, in the face of pellet guns and other armed forces ammunition, is an outcome of Pakistan-sponsored radical Wahabi indoctrination amongst the youth. The ISI of Pakistan, according to RAW, has earmarked 1000 crores to be given to groups in Kashmir to create stone-pelting led unrest.





The RAW has found that Pakistani strategy is to instigate Kashmiri youth to obstruct forces and pelt stones at them, which will inevitably lead to forces using fire upon youth. The more youth are killed, the more it would alienate the Kashmiri

population further from India. Such alienation will provide the ISI to activate HM and other groups to radicalise youth by preaching Wahabism. The radicalised Wahabi youth would resort to Jihad to create more unrest in the valley. However, an understanding of deeper dynamics of protestors and stone pelters point out different factors for the uprising. Apart from the anger against the security forces, the protestors were also frustrated due to lack of employment as there were no jobs for the youth, with instances of violence arbitrarily perpetrated by security personnel alienating Kashmiri youth further. A lot of suggestions have been put forward for resolving the crises. The most important, however, is that the government should address the alienation of the Kashmiri youth and bring them into the mainstream society. There should be immediate job creation and political mobilisation of the youth and efforts should be taken to connect the youth to the political processes in the country. Taking advantage of the void created by the failure of institutional mechanisms by the state and the central government's side, Pakistan is back in the valley with a vengeance.



In 2019, the Union Government abrogated Article 370. Since 2019, the Union government has clarified that talks and terrorism cannot go together. The government has stated that till the time Pakistan does not stop sponsoring terror, India would not resume a dialogue and the talks remain suspended till 2020. Though both states have nuclear weapons and have ruled out a possibility of a fully-fledged nuclear war, they have resorted to continuing a sub-conventional war by using the ISI and the RAW. Only a few options remain in bringing about normalisation. One is that both sides resort to a 'do-nothing' approach. India has largely followed the idea of 'masterly inactivity' under Modi.





HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF ARTICLE 370

India may be a very ancient civilisation, but the modern-day India and Pakistan are political creations of the British, created through political agreement called the Partition Plan of 3rd June 1947, which was announced by the British for partitioning the subcontinent. The political agreement above was crystallised in law and the British Parliament amended the Government of India Act of 1935 and later enacted the Indian Independence Act of 1947. On the 15th August 1947, Jammu and Kashmir was a sovereign princely state under Hari Singh and was not part of India or Pakistan. Then, in 1947, a strategy was employed by the British and Pakistan called the tribal invasion to get Jammu and Kashmir to accede to Pakistan, which eventually boomeranged because the ruler, Hari Singh, acceded to India on 26th October 1947. With the accession of Kashmir, entire state of Kashmir became an integral part of India. The Accession Instrument was a model template that was given by India to all the princely states to accede to Union of India. It enabled the Union of India to exercise control over external affairs, communications, defence and ancillary matters of the princely states. The princely states eventually executed supplementary instruments to the Instrument of Accession to cede further powers to the Union of India, which eventually enabled them to adopt the future Constitution of India. The princely states executed instruments of merger and merged their territories to the Union of India, but the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir refused to do so. The Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir sent four representatives to the Constituent Assembly of India. They stated that Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir wants to limit the accession of the state to the terms Kashmir of the accession. This means that the four representatives stated that the Kashmir would be giving only external affairs, communications and defence to the Union of India. The four also stated that if India wishes to talk about matters other than the ones mentioned above in the Instrument of Accession, then they need the consent of the state of Kashmir. This position of the four representatives was reflected in Article 370, which was drafted by the Indian Constituent Assembly. The provision of Article 370 stated that the President of India could apply powers of the Indian Constitution to the state in respect of matters mentioned in the Instrument of Accession after consulting the state of Kashmir and on matters outside the Instrument of Accession, only with the consent of the state. Article 370 stated that the state Constituent Assembly would frame the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The state Constituent Assembly would further define the constitutional relationship of the state of Kashmir with India. But, as the state Constituent Assembly was yet to be set up and the constitutional relationship was yet to be decided. Dr. Ambedkar decided to keep the provisions of Article 370 under Part XXI of the Indian Constitution as "Temporary Transitional and Special Provisions". In 1951, the State Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was set up as an

elected body. The chairperson of state Constituent Assembly defined the constitutional relationship of Kashmir as being an autonomous republic within the Union of India. After Article 370, a need was felt for a new agreement, which came as the Delhi Agreement of 1952. There was a need for this agreement because there had to be a transition from monarchy (of Hari Singh) to a form of government, which would be decided by the state Constituent Assembly. In 1952, a Delhi Agreement was signed between Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of the country, and Sheikh Abdullah, Premier of Jammu and Kashmir, which envisaged the creation of a group of persons called "Permanent Residents" who were to be entitled to "special rights and privileges" in matters such as employment in the state government and acquisition of immovable property. The Delhi Agreement was ratified by the state Constituent Assembly in 1952 and then the Indian Parliament ratified it in the same year. Article 35A was an offshoot of the Delhi Agreement and it was included in the Constitution through a Presidential Order of May 1954 [called *The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954*] and the provision was apparently based on the principle of safeguarding the interests of "sons of the soil". Article 35A did not figure in the text of the Constitution of India, but figured only in the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. While the 1954 Presidential Order constituted a founding legal document for Jammu and Kashmir, Article 35A protected the exclusive laws, such as the bar on outsiders buying property and women marrying non-Kashmiris losing their property rights of the State. The Constituent Assembly of Kashmir adopted a Constitution for Kashmir on 17th November 1956. The Constitution declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India.

SHEIKH ABDULLAH'S TREACHERY IN KASHMIR

It is important to note that the abrogation of the 'Article 370' and those 'Special Provisions' had no meaning at all when they were abrogated. When Article 370 was introduced, it was introduced only at the insistence of Sheikh Abdullah, who wanted to keep a possibility open to seek independence for Kashmir. His aim was to seek independence for the entire state, even from the non-Muslim people and from non-Kashmiri regions. His administration tried his level best to keep the Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists in Kashmir as second-class citizens. The logic of Sheikh Abdullah was that Kashmir is a Muslim-majority state. The majority of the Muslims are Kashmiris and they want independence. He wanted complete centralisation of power in his hands (by asserting 'azadi') because he wanted to seek a revenge that how could a Hindu-minority ruler yielded power on Muslims in the state. In 1952, Sheikh Abdullah had greeted Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at Lal Chowk in Srinagar, with a couplet from the Sufi poet, Amir Khusro: "*Mun tu shudam tu mun shudi, mun tun shudam tu jaan shudi; Taakas na guyad baad azeen, mun deegaram tu deegari* (I have become you, and you me, I am the body, you soul; So, that no one can say hereafter, that you are someone, and me someone else.)" This couplet captures why he wanted to use his friendship with Nehru to seek the concessions he had in his mind, which he succeeded, as we have explained previously in the 1952 New Delhi Agreement. However, his ambitions were cut short during the regime of Nehru itself when he was imprisoned in 1953, as Nehru believed that Sheikh Abdullah was displaying secessionist tendencies. After Nehru, his successors virtually brought all autonomy of Kashmir to zero by amending Article 370 time and again. The successors of Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Mir Qasim ensured that Union government could spread their tentacles by amending Article 370. What was eventually left after 44 such amendments to Article 370 was just a myth of Kashmiri autonomy. Article 370 was now a symbol without any real content of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy and special status. The parties in Kashmir to mollify the Muslims of Kashmir under the current called 'Kashmiri sentiment' often used this myth. The real issue was Article 35A which did not allow the people of Jammu and Ladakh to settle in Kashmir, even though the Kashmiri people could freely reside in Jammu and Ladakh. This is what the abrogation seeks to rectify. Historically, there is an argument that Article 370 was brought in a very notorious background. Article 370 was being negotiated in the Indian Constituent Assembly as Article 306A. On 27th May 1949, a discussion took place in the Indian Constituent Assembly to nominate members from Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Constituent Assembly. As per the rules at that time, if a Princely state was to send four members to the Indian Constituent Assembly, then out of the four members, two were to be nominated by the ruler of the Princely State and the other two would be from the provincial legislatures (Prajha Sabha) in the Princely States that were in existence prior to Indian independence. This rule was religiously followed for all other princely states except Jammu and Kashmir. The reason was because Nehru stated that Praja Sabha elections that happened in Jammu and Kashmir in 1946 were fraudulent elections and they have no legal validity to send nominations to Indian Constituent Assembly. Nehru even asserted that Hari Singh would also not nominate any members.

Nehru advanced an idea that all four members from Jammu and Kashmir would be nominated in consultation with Sheikh Abdullah only. Ironically, Sheikh Abdullah had not only boycotted the Praja Sabha elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 1946 but, while the rest of the country was busy fighting the British, Sheikh Abdullah had launched Quit Kashmir agitation against Hari Singh. Surprisingly, this was the man in whom Nehru had reposed his trust. Abdullah eventually got the four members nominated, which included Abdullah himself and Mirza Afzal Baig, Maulana Masoodi and Moti Ram Baigra. Through this discriminatory provision, the political parties of the state kept the myth of 'special status to Kashmir' alive and robbed the people of the state of any development and putting an end to this propaganda was the need of the hour.

ACQUIRE, INTERNATIONALISE AND CRY

We have already explained that the state of Kashmir acceded unconditionally to India in three areas and ancillary matter and India stated that they accept this accession provisionally and asserted that they would let the people of the state decide the future of the accession. But this is where the issue began. After the tribal invasion by Pakistan, India took the matter to the United Nations. India urged the world community to comment on the happenings of the state. India complained to the United Nations of Pakistani aggression and eventually committed to a plebiscite in Kashmir. India is the only country on earth which went to the United Nations and asserted that there was aggression in our territory and come back from the United Nations by promising to conduct a plebiscite to see whether territory under externally sponsored aggression part of our territory is even or not. Thus, it was India, which made Kashmir a disputed territory in front of the international community. Despite our repeated assertions that Kashmir is an integral part of India, if we look at the situation of Kashmir outside the borders of India, it is till date marked as a disputed territory by countries in the maps they have. All this happened because Indian government itself casted a doubt on the title to the state by accepting the accession provisionally and then internationalising the same. Surprisingly later India began to follow a policy of territorial status quo by asserting that Kashmir is a bilateral issue and that the United Nations has nothing to do with the Kashmir dispute. What we ironically forget is that each time we assert that Kashmir is a bilateral issue, we end up in conferring a standing on Pakistan other than that of an aggressor. This clearly proves that the 'Kashmir issue' is not an issue of Article 370 but the real Kashmir issue is about getting back the territory of Kashmir not with us, the PoK. The real Kashmir issue is also about getting back the Kashmiri citizens back into the mainstream of the society. The real Kashmir issue is about getting rid of the 'disputed territory' tag on Kashmir and this is what the abrogation of Article 370 initiates to do.

POLITICAL CONSENSUS TO REVOKE ARTICLE 370

Politically speaking, Dr. Ambedkar himself was not in favour of limited powers to the Union on Kashmir and he even called the proposal as a treacherous thing against the national interests of India. On 27th November 1963, Nehru pointed out in the parliament that Article 370 is only a temporary provision and is a part of the constitution as long as it remains so. In 1964, a Private Members Bill in the Parliament got near-unanimous support seeking the abrogation of Article 370. In fact, a non-official resolution to seek the revocation of the article was moved by Prakash Vir Shastri in the Lok Sabha and it had the support of Ram Manohar Lohiya and K. Hanumanthaiya. K. Hanumanthaiya, the Congress stalwart, went on to say that Article 370 in no way fulfills the dream of national integration. The fact that Home Minister of Nehru, Gulzari Lal Nanda stated that Article 370 is nothing more than a shell emptied of its contents proves that this dysfunctional provision had limited utility.

BREAKING THE INVISIBLE BERLIN WALL OF ARTICLE 370

Political royalty over the last few decades have ensured that Kashmiri democracy lived up to Iqbal's warning that "*Jamhuriyat ik tarz-e-hukumat hai ki jis mein bandon ko gina karte hain taula nahin karte*" (democracy is a system where people are counted but not weighed). This wall of Article 370, which existed as an invisible Berlin Wall was made tyrannical and diabolical by separatists and local politics. The abrogation of Article 370 is the first step towards the fall of this invisible Berlin Wall. Zubin Mehta had rightly stated that all those people who scream about Kashmir being an armed camp are in fact responsible for keeping it that way.

FAILURE OF GUPKAR MODEL

Since 1952, Kashmir became a victim to Gupkar model. In Srinagar, there is a street named Gupkar road. It houses not only the political, business and security elite of the valley, but the haunted guesthouses that had become the interrogation centres. Gupkar road was the Union Government's approach to Kashmir. In Gupkar road what had unleashed in the last 70 years was a network of patronage and power that had been gamed by friends and adversaries of the valley. The Gupkar model had incentivised bad politics and rent seeking bureaucracy. Shorn of its ideological fervour, it was imperative for the Union government to bring a new plan of directly reaching out to the people of Kashmir without the mediation of separatists and mainstream politicians of the valley who had been demanding more autonomy as the only solutions. This is what Modi government wanted to achieve.

ISLAMIC CALIPHATE IN KASHMIR

Since 2016, when Burhan Wani, the Hizbul commander was shot down, there was a new security threat in the valley. The Internet space was widely used by the extremist groups to carry out large-scale radicalisation. Surprisingly, this radicalisation was not for Azadi or merger with Pakistan but was a call for a Caliphate in Kashmir. The Kashmiri youth were being indoctrinated with the Islamic State videos, which tried to convince the youth that Azadi was overwhelmed by Jihadi. The political space in the valley was drying up because the mainstream parties still held on to the idea that engagement with the separatists is the only solution, despite the separatist model of engagement having outlived its utility. Thus, there was a space to break from the past and bring a new wave of engagement, which abrogation of Article 370 strived to seek.

GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE OF TALIBAN

The move to abrogate Article 370 was also based on immediate geopolitics in the region. In Afghanistan, the Americans have concluded a deal with Taliban (explained in India and Afghanistan chapter). Even though India has a deep relationship with Taliban and knows that Taliban will never target or attack India or Kashmir; but India had a fear that Taliban may not be in a position to prevent ISI of Pakistan to use Afghanistan under Taliban to train jihadi elements for the valley, thereby necessitating the abrogation and ramp up security. Rising unilateralism in global politics, decline in multilateral arrangements and immediate geopolitics drove Indian moves.

DONALD TRUMP'S MEDIATION FACTOR

The American President Donald Trump, non-professional managing global affairs, made statements that India wanted the US to mediate between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. The irony is that the Indian Prime Minister mentioned to Trump that he could help to reduce tensions in the subcontinent, which was perceived by Trump as Indian Prime Minister asserting the need for him to act as a mediator between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. The fact is that when Trump starts speaking, it is a freewheeling fact-free stream of consciousness performance where each of his sentences leads to something more fantastical until it all ends in a mind-numbing spaghetti soup.

DISCRIMINATION ANGLE IN KASHMIR

There was a widespread allegation that Articles 370 and 35A were discriminatory to women of the valley. This was so because if Kashmiri women married outside the state, she would be deprived of the permanent residency rights and would end up losing property and employment rights. In 2002, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court gave a judgment where it upheld the rights to the Kashmiri women but deprived the rights to their children. This would not be the case anymore post-abrogation. Article 35A also prevented outsiders to purchase land, property, set up manufacturing industries or take up government jobs. All these led to shortages of qualified doctors, professional educational institutions and arrested industrial growth of the state. The Dalits in the state were denied reservation and permanent residency certificates. To keep the Scheduled Castes away from political power, the state had decided not to increase political seats in the legislature

till 2031. The fundamental rights of PoK refugees, Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, West Pakistan refugees, Valmiki members, communities displaced by firing from LoC, people of Ladakh and descendants of Gorkha soldiers were denied.

PREVENTION OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION THEORY

The provisions of Right to Information, Right to Education and Comptroller and Auditor General of India did not apply to Kashmir. The root causes of youth angst and alienation of people of the valley are deep-rooted corruption embedded in the administrative structures of the state. Corruption is not addressed at the fringes but has to be tackled at the core of the rotten system and this is what probably Article 370 aims to address.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS FOR EK DESH EK VIDHAN EK SAMVIDHAN

The Union Home Minister introduced two statutory resolutions on 5th August 2019. The first was to recommend that the President issue a notification rendering Article 370 inoperative, and the second was to accept the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill. The passage of the former resolution enabled the President to declare that Article 370 is inoperative. The bill, that is now an act, has converted Jammu and Kashmir into a Union Territory with a legislature, and Ladakh region as another Union Territory, but without a legislature. It is on 5th August 2019 that the Indian President Ram Nath Kovind issued a presidential order under Article 370(1) of the Constitution, which enabled the President to specify the matters that are applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. As it could be issued only with the Jammu and Kashmir government's concurrence, the notification used the words "with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir". This meant that the Governor of Kashmir, who was administering the State under President's Rule after the fall of the state government since 2018, has given his concurrence on behalf of the State government. The Order of the President also superseded the 1954 Presidential Order. This effectively means that all the provisions that formed the basis of a separate "Constitution" for Jammu and Kashmir stood abrogated. The Order declared that all the provisions of the Constitution of India would now apply to Jammu and Kashmir. However, some special measures were still needed for the scrapping of Article 370. This is why a few separate clauses were added to Article 367 of the Constitution, which contained "Interpretations". The provisions of Article 367 contain guidance on how to read or interpret some provisions of the Constitution. The new clauses now added say that all references to the 'Sadar-i-Riyasat' earlier, acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers will now be construed as references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir and all references to the State government now shall mean "the Governor". The reference to the "Constituent Assembly" present in Article 370(3) has been amended and now it is read as "Legislative Assembly of the State". Article 370(3) is the provision that stated that the President could declare that Article 370 is no more operative only on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly. But as of 5th August 2019, since there was no Constituent Assembly, it means that there was no body to "recommend" the demise of Article 370 and this is why the State Assembly had to play that role because the government had made use of the fact that Jammu and Kashmir is under President's Rule.

THE INTEGRITY CRITIQUE TO ABROGATION

We have seen wide level of criticism of the decision to abrogate Article 370. The critics argue that BJP has asserted that abrogation of Article 370 was a step towards integration of India but they say that BJP conflated 'integrity' with 'integration'. The Indian effort was to preserve the integrity of the nation. Integrity was a quality to be honoured and an attack on the integrity of the nation was an attack on its honour and was not to be tolerated. Kashmir was an integral part of India. An integer was a whole and India was an integer and fractions were illegal. Fractions caused fractures in the integer and were thus not integral. When truth and integrity conflicted it was integrity that was to be given precedence. Integration may involve forced homogenisation but integrity is moral disposition towards truth and honesty.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRITICISM TO ABROGATION

The logic here is that there are serious legal infirmities in the manner in which the abrogation has been carried out. The critics argue that Article 370 is a kind of royalty and was the only article of the Indian Constitution that had the privilege of choosing the mechanism of its own review. Though the matter is already in the Supreme Court, but the question to

ponder is that can the will of an extinct Constituent Assembly prevail over the will of the Indian Parliament, as the Indian Parliament had successfully passed the changes?

THE DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENT TO ABROGATION

The criticism is based on a democratic argument that the will of the people of Kashmir was not ascertained before the abrogation. Both the houses of the Indian parliament have passed the changes brought by the Union of India and the changes have received the assent of the President of India also. In no way does the democratic argument hold true anymore. However, the question to ponder is that can the purported wishes of the valley override the wishes of the people of India (represented in the Parliament)? If so, then it is nothing short of an extraordinary claim of democratic entitlement. Democracy is firstly a system of electoral power. In 2019 general elections, the BJP received 229 million votes and the party during the election had committed to abrogate Article 370. Having received the electoral majority, it does fulfil the democratic criteria.

THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT TO ABROGATION

The criticism revolves around the historical argument. It asserts that even if the articles are modified, the constitutional guarantees given by Nehru to Kashmir at the time of its accession remain valid and should continue to be honoured. It is very hard to believe the idea that Nehru offered any blank cheque to Kashmir with no expiry date. He designed Article 370 to ensure assimilation of Kashmir to the 'idea of India'.

THE POLITICAL ETHICS ARGUMENT TO ABROGATION

The criticism is that the abrogation has led to harsh security measures and a complete lockdown in the valley. This argument is based on the logic of morality and civil liberties of the people. This argument says that democracy is a system of political ethics, which states that in a democracy, those affected by a decision are given a chance to speak up even if they are destined to lose by the decision. They also assert that the Kashmiri people were not allowed to speak and their leaders were arrested and Kashmir witnessed emergency-type situation. Considering that the changes brought about were far reaching and historic, there was a possibility of large-scale unprecedented violence. The question to ponder is that is trying to prevent mass violence immoral or a duty of a responsible government?

THE BILATERALISM FAILURE THESIS

The criticism is regarding India's policy that India has always asserted that Kashmir is a bilateral dispute (basing it on understanding achieved with Pakistan in the 1971 Simla Agreement) but India cannot have a duality in its policy of maintaining that it is a bilateral issue to resolve and yet rejecting bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. This criticism remains valid for the time being but the abrogation has an impact on Pakistan policy. Now, in the future diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, Kashmir will no longer be the 'unresolved agenda' or 'unresolved issue'. This means that any resumption of dialogue with Pakistan is no longer based on 'past parameters'.

INTERNAL COLONIALISM CHALLENGE

The criticism is that the government will now try to study the records of policies of Israel and China on restive areas. The government will deliberately promote migration of people from other states to Kashmir and such a policy reeks of internal colonialism.

INDIA WANTS TO BE CHINA AND NOT BE CHINA

There is a criticism that asserts the manner in which Article 370 was abrogated, shrouded in secrecy, with no democratic consultations, arrests, crackdowns and shutdown of communications is a strategy that India has apparently borrowed from Chinese. Even though India has had a schizophrenic relationship with China, but this divergence seems to be patching up. Today, India wants to be China and not be China. It wants to be recognised for its six-lanes highways and would love

to be called a manufacturing powerhouse but would also want to be praised for yoga and political swiftness. Both have a common problem of how to tackle with their restive ethno-nationalist populations demanding independence and higher autonomy (for China, it is Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet and for India it is Kashmir and the Northeast). Same way, both, thorough display of aggressive nationalism, in the recent times have declared the border regions as integral to the country and refuse to accept the presence of any dispute in the region (with China now claiming that Tibet has been a part of Chinese territory for 700 years) and the periphery being labelled as lands crucial for national security. The dissenters are labelled as “splittists” in China and “separatists” in India. In China, the regime of Xi Jinping has created propaganda that these regions of Tibet and Xinjiang have always been given special privileges and special sops. They have always misused those special sops for ulterior motives, rent seeking and corruption. They have prevented the application of national laws and have prevented the Han Chinese to settle down in these areas, thereby depriving the nationalist masses of their due rights. We do not need to draw a parallel on Kashmir narrative of the BJP here, as the things are crystal clear. It has been argued that both India and China are ‘postcolonial informal empires’, whose anti-imperialist rhetoric disguises their imperialistic attempts to “consolidate and discipline their borderlands.” But what used to distinguish India from the more common charges of colonialism faced by China was the fact that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had been provided guarantees under Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution, along with a strong foundation to build a system of local governance. The ban on non-locals buying land, and permanently settling in the State, also prevented demographic engineering like the large-scale Han migration into Tibet and Xinjiang. Independent India's crowning achievement till date had been the development of institutional mechanisms for negotiating large-scale diversity and accommodating frequent, aggressive disagreements. This is an achievement that deserves as much awe and respect as China's economic miracle since 1978. It might be less shiny and more chaotic, but it is, in its own way, quite spectacular. Debate and contestation are not a discardable option for India but an existential necessity. Historically, India has been a civilisational rather than territorial entity, more metaphysical than geographic. It is a nation held together not by language, religion or geography, but by an idea. Multiplicity is foundational to this idea. It is what has allowed India to persist and flourish as a political unit, despite the once widespread belief in the West that an independent India would inevitably Balkanise. The abrogation of Article 370 by the Indian government may well help cover up some of the cracks that its relatively liberal history was unable to weld. It may also fail to do so and lead to complete rupture. But the risk of India forsaking its own sources of strength of pluralism and debate and to emerge as a second rate copy of its muscular, nationalist neighbour to the north is clear.

PAKISTAN'S MUSLIM UMMAH SUPPORT TACTIC

First, it sought the support of Muslim Ummah (namely the Gulf states led by Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) to condemn the step of Indian. The Ummah pledged support for a bilateral solution than one against India. This has happened due Indian economic diplomacy. Thus, Pakistan got deprived of the Ummah option.

PAKISTAN'S WAR AGAINST INDIA TACTIC

Second, Pakistan initiated rhetoric of an attack on India and even threatened to wage a full-fledged nuclear war. This option was ruled out as despite all efforts of Pakistan to seek military parity with India, it had understood and internalised that conventional military war with India was not an option anymore. It also realised the futility of the nuclear rhetoric as no country in the world even responded to such rhetorical show of Pakistan.

PAKISTAN'S EATING FLESH OF AMERICA STRATEGY

Third, Pakistan pressurises the US knowing that the Americans were seeking support of Pakistan to move out of the mess in Afghanistan. Pakistan tried to assert to the US that bloodletting in Kashmir and peace in Afghanistan cannot go hand in hand. But, the US dismissed the political rhetoric because Pakistan was asking for something that was of no interest to the US. It is important to understand that the US focuses only on its national interests. Kashmir issue has never been a national interest of the US and this is the reason why they have never spent diplomatic or military capital to seek any solution or ‘assist’ in solving Kashmir. If Kashmir ever becomes a national interest of the US, then US will invest all its might to ‘assist’ in resolving the issue. But, that does not seem to be an option ever in the future.

REVIVAL OF JIHAD THEORY

The fourth option for Pakistan was to revive the jihad. It was possible as an option but very difficult to execute. The reason was that in the recent times, the Indian security forces have brought about a massive radical shift in their approach to tackling terrorism. Till now, if the Indian forces tried to seize the weapons of the terrorists, now they have adopted the American model. The Americans have always tackled the financing of the terrorists. Thus, India has adopted the strategy to economically blacklist Pakistan at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This economic diplomatic isolation of Pakistan makes it very difficult for them to sustain a jihad, especially at a level they did in 1990s.

FINANCIALLY VIABLE HYBRID TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS NARRATIVE

In the recent times, the strategy of Pakistan in Kashmir is that it has focused on carrying out targeted individual acts of violence. This is a financially viable low cost-terrorism approach. By individual acts of violence, we mean to say that since the abrogation of Article 370, the ISI of Pakistan has used the strategy of targeting the minorities in Kashmir. There are two minorities, the first are the Kashmiri Pandits (as not all of them left Kashmir in 1989) and the second are the Sikhs. The ISI deliberately adopted this strategy since 5th August 2019 and by targeting the minorities, the ISI tried to convey four things. Firstly, such attacks keep the ISI in the limelight and give an indication that nothing in the valley has changed and Pakistan still retains control over the security space of the valley. Secondly, this strategy enables ISI to propagate that return of normalcy in the valley is a distant dream. Thirdly, such a strategy also ensures that economic activity in the valley does not pick up while Pakistan gets immunity from the charge of unleashing high terror. Fourthly, such kind of a restrained terror activity allows Pakistan the space to make a case on violation of human rights in Kashmir. The abrogation of Article 370 and the subsequent security tightening in the valley has provided the security forces with a 'tactical pause'. This has happened because the terrorist infiltration and activities have drastically declined in comparison to the past. This tactical pause is being used by India to develop strategies for neutralising the larger ecosystem of state sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan.

PAKISTAN AND UNITED NATIONS ON ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370

After the abrogation of Article 370, Pakistani ISI designed an approach to internationalise the issue. The last time Kashmir was raised in the UNSC was in 1971 and after that, in 2019 and 2020. The ISI got support of Turkey, Malaysia and China. China being a permanent member of the UNSC and an ally of Pakistan assisted Pakistan to launch an apoplectic tirade against India at the UN General Assembly. Pakistan is nothing but a colonial outpost of China that is aimed at checkmating India. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan wrestled with India at the UNGA meeting in 2019 to raise the matter of 'human rights' violation by India in Kashmir. He went on to assert that the condition in Kashmir was such that the citizens of the valley were threatened with genocide and there is a need for Pakistan's deterrent to cover them. This statement was embedded in his habitual resort to nuclear rattling and showed the international community the gap between a sensible nuclear power and the actual behaviour of Pakistan. This policy of human rights violation is raised by Pakistan at all other international forums and Pakistan is also getting positive support of China in internationalisation of this narrative. China has supported resolutions against India in the UN Security Council asserting that India's abrogation of Article 370 has altered the dynamics of the dispute and the abrogation is an illegal move. No doubt, Chinese are working at the behest of Pakistan even while majority of the other countries in the world believe that the 5th August decision of India was a step in their domestic affair over which the world has no interest. The duplicity of Pakistan in their narrative at the UN became more visible when Alice Wells, the US State Department Representative for South Asia, asserted that Pakistan was more concerned about the Muslims of Kashmir, who are far better off than Uyghur Muslims of China. He also stated that the fact that Pakistan preferred to remain mum on suppression of Uyghur Muslims demonstrated that Pakistan had no concern for the human rights of real sufferers but was more interested in hypocritical rhetoric over 'bilateral matters'. Pakistan also raised the issue at the United Nations that India's decision to abrogate Article 370 would endanger peace and security in the region. The peace and security in the region would not be endangered by an internal Indian decision but would be if Pakistan uses Jihadi elements to create mayhem in the valley. The international community today very well knows the track record of Pakistan in orchestrating violence in Kashmir.

CHINESE STRATEGY AT UNITED NATIONS

China has long played the Kashmir card against India. For example, in 2010, it started the practice of issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from J&K and denied a visa to the Indian army's Northern Command chief for a bilateral defence dialogue on grounds that he commanded "a disputed area called J&K". It also officially shortened the length of the border it shares with India by purging the line separating Indian J&K from Chinese-held J&K. Although J&K is divided among three countries, only India was maintaining special powers and privileges for its portion. China shields Pakistan's proxy war by terror against India, even though it has locked up more than a million Muslims in the name of cleansing their minds of extremist thoughts. In fact, like Pakistan, China wages asymmetric warfare against India. This is in the form of a "salami slicing" strategy of furtive, incremental territorial encroachments in Ladakh and elsewhere. Turning Ladakh into a Union territory will advance India's effort to counter China's hostile manoeuvrings, including increasing military forays and incursions. The J&K constitutional change also compartmentalises India's territorial disputes with Pakistan and China centred in that region, although India today faces Chinese troops on both flanks of its portion of J&K because of Chinese military presence in the Pakistan-occupied areas. China had raised criticisms over Indian decision to abrogate Article 370 because China considers itself to be a party in claiming Ladakh. India has categorically asserted that Ladakh was and would always be a part of India. India has also conveyed to Chinese that the abrogation of Article 370 was not about India making any territorial claims but was about promoting better governance and socio-economic development of the entire region.

BRITAIN AND CLOSED-DOOR MEETINGS OF UNSC AND PAKISTAN TILTING

In October 2019, a closed-door meeting of the UNSC was organised by China and Britain, supported by Pakistan, to discuss the Kashmir issue. The meeting resulted in no formal outcome or a formal statement. In fact, 14 out of the 15 members at the UNSC in the meeting stated that Indian decision to abrogate the article was an internal matter. This was no doubt a victory of India's diplomacy, but India should be careful to watch the changing international dynamics because economic pressures, demographic changes and parochial politics have now emerged as a new diplomatic currency. These factors explain why British supported the resolution to have this discussion. India, however, has never raised the rhetoric over Brexit and has always called the Brexit an internal issue of Britain. However, to tackle British tilt to Pakistan, owing to rising Pakistani Muslim diaspora in London, India has multiple options that range from raising Brexit to that of British occupation of Ireland and in extremity, preventing the British to access Indian markets in the post-Brexit period.

INDIA'S STRATEGY AT THE UN ON ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370

Despite Malaysia, Turkey, Britain and China, no other country in the world has been supportive of Pakistan's policy on Kashmir. This clearly proves that it is a diplomatic victory for India that most of the states in the world have branded the abrogation as "an internal affair of India". All this has been only possible because of India's growing economic heft that offer unlimited business opportunities to the world. India must continue the policy of aggressive economic growth and stay away from protectionist headwinds and insular mindsets because policies that undermine economic growth can also undermine diplomatic heft.

MEDIATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ON KASHMIR AND INDIAN POLICY

India happens to refuse the logic for mediation on Kashmir. There are reasons why India displays this behaviour. Indian establishment follows a traditional logic, third-party mediation in Jammu and Kashmir might not be a useful idea simply because third parties typically come with their own agenda. Second, it might do more harm than good in Kashmir. More so, past instances of third-party mediation have had mixed results. At this juncture it is important to note that the reason why India has favoured the idea that it seeks no mediation in Kashmir is because of a belief that mediation favours the weaker parties by levelling the playing field and with a strong conventional and non-conventional prowess, India sees no significant gain in bringing a third party into the dispute. Here, let us make a conceptual distinction between conflict

resolution and crisis management. While both involve some amount of mediation, the former is focused on a specific issue, like Kashmir in this case, and seeks to address and resolve the root causes of the conflict. The latter involves mediation during an ongoing crisis with a potential for escalation. Crisis mediation unlike conflict resolution does not seek to resolve the political or root causes of a conflict. India has traditionally been averse to mediation in the form of conflict resolution while accepting more than once third-party mediation during crisis events. Kargil is an example when India accepted third-party mediation by the Clinton administration in the US. This was also evident during the post-Pulwama military standoff in 2019. While both Kargil and the February 2019 Pulwama standoff were directly linked to Kashmir, mediation by the third party did not seek to address anything beyond the immediate diffusion of tensions. Then there are other instances where third-party crisis mediation took place even though they had no direct links to Kashmir such as the post-26/11 terror attacks. For sure, crisis management is different from conflict resolution. And yet even when the focus is on crisis management, the larger conflict, which has given rise to the crisis comes into focus and become part of the conversations between the mediator and the conflicting parties. Thus, India accepts crisis management, and not conflict resolution in the context of Kashmir because it is not easy to separate the two either during a crisis or when the conflict is crisis prone. Put differently, given that crisis, at least in this context, is the function of a pre-existing conflict, crisis management by third parties and the attendant focus on the broader conflict is not easy to avoid. More so, while India is loath to having third-party discussions on Kashmir, especially on the human rights situation, it actively seeks third-party attention on terror emanating from Pakistan as well as the latter's sponsorship of violence in the Valley. While this might be a desirable distinction to India's mind, it is not easy to get a third party to focus on one part of the problem and ignore the other. What further ensures third-party involvement in Kashmir is the lack of a conflict resolution process between India and Pakistan. By not resolving conflicts between themselves, India and Pakistan are effectively outsourcing crisis management, and thereby conflict resolution, albeit in a limited manner, to third parties.

WHY CHINA WANTS KASHMIR?

China aims to become the world's leading microchip manufacturer. Microchip manufacturing needs two raw materials, sand and freshwater. It is interesting to know that a 30-cm silicon wafer needs 10,000 litres of fresh water. While China's Taklamakan Desert provides a lot of sand, its own water resources are already under pressure. Here is where Kashmir comes in for China. The Shaksgam valley, which is a part of the old Gilgit Agency, which came under Pakistani control in 1947, when they illegally snatched it away from India, has 242 glaciers and is the world's most glaciated region. In 1963, Pakistan transferred the Shaksgam valley to China (Pakistan deliberately 'gifted' 5180 kilometre square territory to the Chinese in 1963 to further humiliate India after its defeat in the 1962 conflict with China when they transferred the land as a part of 1963 China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement) to facilitate the construction of the Karakorum Highway. China's annexation of Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir from India since 1947 has provided it with a convenient route to the water-rich valley. This quest for water by China, explains the tightening of Sino-Pakistan ties through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Among other projects, this includes the construction of five dams, constituting the North Indus River Cascade that China has undertaken to construct in Pakistan and PoK, thus ensuring its water requirements for the microchip manufacture project.

WHY PAKISTAN WANTS KASHMIR?

Pakistan has tried to fight a sub-conventional proxy war in Kashmir for decades. It has sponsored terrorism in the valley as a part of the strategy but has not gained anything out of the endeavour. It still continues to raise the boogey of Kashmir because it is perceived to be an ideal distraction from an arduous task of governing Pakistan's restive population. The fact that the country has gone to IMF every few years to seek a bailout economic passage proves that it has nothing worthwhile to offer for development of Kashmir, which it seeks as an 'unfinished business of partition'. Pakistan has no affinity for the Muslims of Kashmir. It has no interest in their welfare. Pakistan solely wants Kashmir for its water. The water of rivers from Kashmir is used by Punjabis of Pakistan to do agriculture. The rich feudal Punjabi Pakistani agrarian class dominates the Pakistani politics, bureaucracy and armed forces. This is the reason why all the three agencies of the state work in tandem to keep up the Kashmir narrative. For Pakistan, the reason for Kashmir is water, nothing else. The ISI has

used militant organisations such as Lashkar and Jaish to bring about a shift in their tactics. The Pakistan-based militant organisations have often initiated mass protests in Pakistan alleging that India is resorting to water terrorism. Most of these mass protests happen in the Punjab part of Pakistan where agrarian economy demands water. A new wave of anti-India sentiment had been generated by Pakistani terrorist organisation. The fact that Hafeez Saeed and Masood Azhar also belong to Pakistan Punjab help ISI establishes affinity with local population. Water-related issues between the two states would always generate emotionalism, as there is no regional level institution today that can capably solve the problem.

RICARDO HAUSMANN THESIS ON KASHMIR QUESTION

Professor Ricardo Hausmann at Harvard's Centre for International Development suggested that the only predictor of sustained economic success is economic complexity, and development was like a game of scrabble; the more letters you have, not only can you make more words, but you can make longer words. The government provides vowels. So, development is about creating new letters and vowels. Hausmann believes that new letters in the private sector come from migration, diaspora, venture capital, inbound investment, skills, studying overseas, business travel. Professor James Robinson suggested that inclusive economic systems need vowels from inclusive political systems that distribute political power broadly rather than concentrate, monopolies or hoard it. On the basis of these thoughts, it is imperative for the government to facilitate cross LoC trade. Such trade has the potential of offering business opportunities to Kashmiri citizens and will promote business and employment in the valley because Deng Xiaoping rightly said that development is the hard truth. The Srinagar airport should develop capabilities that would enable Kashmir to export its products to the world, as this will have a positive diplomatic repercussion as well. Similarly, the government should positively speed up rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits back in the valley.

CURZON'S INSIGHT AND INDIA'S NEW KASHMIR POLICY

In 1907, Lord Curzon had given Romanes Lecture at the Oxford University. These lectures continue to offer insight into the contemporary problems of colonial frontiers. In those lectures, Curzon stated that a precondition for national development was to have a stable frontier. He asserted that frontiers are razor edges on which hang suspended the modern issues of war, peace, life and death of nations. He was convinced that the problems of frontiers may never disappear from the politics of the world but could be managed through tools of political accommodation and scientific demarcations. The abrogation of Article 370 is all about rectifying the unfinished colonial mess by extending effective territorial sovereignty over lands that India has claimed historically. By confronting the Pakistani terrorism and reorganising the political status of the valley, the government has established a new foreign policy template and the key to its success now depends upon two factors. The first is political reconciliation in the valley and this is crucial because BJP may have carried out the decision because it may have had the numbers in the Parliament. But, democracy is not about parliamentary majority, but much more than that. Lech Walesa rightly stated that it is hardly possible to build anything if frustration, bitterness and a mood of helplessness prevail. The second is persuading the army of Pakistan to accept that their interests are also served better by accepting a stable, peaceful and a legitimate frontier with India.

POPULISM THEORY AND ARTICLE 370

In his treatise "What is Populism?" Princeton professor Jan-Werner Müller asserts how populist regimes frequently frame their actions as representing the will of the "real people", a group they exclusively represent. By extension and example, those who dissent are deemed to be not "Real Poles" (prawdziwi Polacy) in Poland or "Real Hungarians" in Hungary. In the same vain was the retort by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to his opponents in 2020 "We are the people. Who are you?" In populist moves worldwide, such actions are "authorised by the people", and therefore no blame accrue to the government if anything goes wrong. By contrast, Müller says that democratic accountability would actually mean that the burden is on the government to justify just how it uses its political judgment to ensure desired outcomes. The "Modi's vivendi" on Kashmir was aimed at his domestic base and it mirrors the prevailing trend of populism worldwide

and this is why one of his Cabinet Ministers stated that till the abrogation of Article 370, Kashmir witnessed Kautilya and now will witness the post-Kalinga Asoka.

FROM CENTRALITY TO PERIPHERY MODEL OF PAKISTAN


Pakistan has always kept the centrality of Kashmir in its bilateral talks with India and has seen shifts from being a “developmental state” in 1960s to a “security state” in 1980’s to a “jihadi state” since 2001. They began the rhetoric of Kashmir with “unfinished agenda of Partition”, then “Kashmir banega Pakistan”, then “Pakistan’s jugular” to “core issue with India”. The obsession of Pakistan with Kashmir is so entrenched in their psyche that it is visible from a book written by Z. A. Bhutto called “The myth of independence”. Bhutto states in the book that till the time a Muslim majority province remains a part of India, the sole reason for existence of Pakistan would remain incomplete; thus, Pakistan should continue to support her struggle. Bhutto went on to say that if Pakistan ever fails to get back Kashmir, it will imply that idea of Pakistan would collapse.

MAXIMALIST FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS

As Donald Trump rightly said, “Leverage, don’t make a deal without it”, this now seems to be the dictum guiding the maximalist foreign policy option adopted by India. India’s new position on Pakistan is that if a dialogue happens with Pakistan, when it stops sponsoring terrorism, then it will happen only on PoK. No doubt it will take a long time for Pakistan to understand that Kashmir is no more a bilateral issue. From the Pakistani viewpoint, accepting the abnormal as the new normal would require a massive shift in the psyche of Pakistan. Pakistani army would no longer be able to claim the supremacy on foreign policy anymore and would also not be able to garner majority of the resources in name of a fictional Kashmir issue. With India isolating Pakistan economically at the FATF and Kashmir issue no longer a bilateral issue; Pakistan would not require the jihadi elements and the jihadi sanctuary it had nurtured. The jihadi sanctuary would eventually dissolve and the dissolution will enable the Pakistani society to reclaim the space it had lost to the jihadis. By diverting the scarce resources from sponsoring terrorism in future, it would do well to use the resources for its own development and peace with India. All this is easier said than done, as it requires serious quality of leadership to understand the gravity of the situation. It also requires hard choices be made by an exceptionally thought provoking leadership (short in supply at the moment in Pakistan) in the army to jettison its leverage over foreign and security policy of terrorism, for their own welfare and existence. Otherwise, time is not far when the state of Pakistan would march to its own abyss and Pakistan would eventually collapse on its own weight.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN TRADE AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

A study by Nisha Taneja and Eugenia Baroncelli has found that India and Pakistan collectively constitute 90% of the GDP of the region and peace between the two states could yield a 405% rise in trade at the bilateral level. It is important to note here is that both states have a collusion of interests on items of international trade, signifying the possibility of a tacit cooperation in existence between the two states. Instead of using this to leverage South Asian integration, ironically, the South Asian states have explored the global markets of North America, Europe and China. The intraregional trade in South Asia is so low today that, at times, it is described as inverse regionalism. Weak trade facilitation mechanisms, protectionism, lack of transit facilities and mutual suspicion are major factors in deterring trade practices. Though there is a call for the expansion of bilateral Indo-Pak trade, some Pakistani firms do fear that Indian firms could dominate Pakistan if free trade is facilitated. However, many in Pakistan do believe that the opening up of trade between the two states could lead to greater material gains for both. The two states together have a great potential to emerge as a net exporter of ferrochrome to the world. Indian companies have the potential to export trucks, tires to Pakistan as the same commodity is imported by Pakistan from third countries via Dubai.



Despite the obstructive behaviour of Pakistan to allow trade to materialise, the two sides have a tremendous potential for bilateral trade. In 1996, India gave MFN status to Pakistan, which it reciprocated in 2012 only. The bilateral trade is around 2.5 billion USD despite a potential of 20 billion USD. It is imperative for the two to explore cooperation in trade and establish a regional value chain in the globalised and integrated world. Some experts have suggested that the two can explore product-specific regional value chains in sectors such as textiles, sports goods and surgical instruments. For instance, in Surat (Gujarat) and Tiruppur (Tamil Nadu), there is production of raw materials of textiles that can be linked to production centres in Lahore and Faisalabad. Similarly, in India, there is a huge demand of Pakistani salwaar-kameez and wedding attire, which can be explored as a sector. Similarly, Pakistan is gradually emerging as a global supplier of sports goods. Sialkot in Pakistan is a manufacturing hub for sports goods from football to cycling gloves. The footballs manufactured here have been used in the FIFA world cup also. However, the manufactures of these products in Sialkot need high-quality raw materials and semi-finished products, which at present they import from Thailand. This is where India can step in. India has high-quality latex, rubber and football bladders, which it can directly provide to Sialkot. Again, Sialkot is known for its expertise in surgical instruments and is a global supplier to the US and major powers in Europe. India is a major importer of surgical instruments. At present, it imports them from developed states of the world at very high prices. A direct import from Sialkot is economically and logistically conducive for India. For instance, India can enhance the supply of stainless steel to Pakistan, which in turn will be a ready raw material available to manufacturers in Sialkot. Sialkot enjoys a historical edge because till 1947, Jalandhar and Sialkot were integrated manufacturing hubs. After the partition, the skilled labour moved to Sialkot. The hope of the trade is that it will help to create a constituency of peace, which will enable Pakistan to relinquish terror and join the economic race. But, the ISI finds no merit in the argument of trade with India and is keen to skilfully use its geographical position to harm India. After the Pulwama attack in 2019, India has also hiked the duties for bilateral trade and withdrawn the MFN status with Pakistan. Thus, the politics has again taken over economics in the bilateral ties.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN INDUS WATER TREATY

Before Partition, the water of Indus River the Indus system was jointly used by India and Pakistan. After 1947, the two sides concluded an Inter-Dominion Accord where it was decided that on annual payments from Pakistan, India would release enough water to Pakistan. It was decided in the Inter-Dominion Accord that the two sides in future would negotiate a permanent solution. In 1951, the former chairman of Tennessee Valley Authority, David Lilienthal visited the region and recommended joint operation and development of Indus basin. On the basis of the idea propounded by Lilienthal, the then chairman of World Bank Eugene Black convinced India and Pakistan to negotiate a settlement for water sharing. The meetings began from 1954 and finally concluded in 1960 with Indus Water Treaty (IWT) signed between Nehru and Ayub Khan. The Indus basin has three eastern-flowing rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) and three western-flowing rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab). As per the IWT, 1960, India got control over the Eastern rivers while Pakistan got control of the Western rivers. India, however, as per the IWT was allowed to use the water from the Western rivers for the purpose of consumption with restricted use of the river water for storage. On the Western rivers, except for specific cases, India was not to build storage and irrigation systems on the rivers. In the IWT, if there were to be a disagreement between India and Pakistan, there was a provision to seek mediation and arbitration. As per Article XII of the IWT, a modification is permissible when both parties agree for the need of the same. To make sure that neither of the parties is violating any of the provisions of the IWT, the treaty provides for a Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) where there would be one

commissioner appointed by India and one by Pakistan. Whenever one party initiates a project, it has to share the information with the other party. If there is ever a dispute, first there are to be bilateral talks. If talks fail, the aggrieved party can seek third-party (neutral party) intervention.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN WULLAR BARRAGE OR THE TULBUL NAVIGATION PROJECT

One of the major disputes is about the Wullar barrage or the Tulbul Navigation Project on Jhelum River in Kashmir. The dispute goes back to 1984. India wanted to establish a barrage at the mouth of the Wullar Lake on Jhelum River. That the project entailed the creation of a 439 feet long and 40 feet wide barrage which would store 0.30 million acres feet of water which would make the river navigable during summer season. Pakistan had taken the matter to Indus Water Commission (since 1986) as it alleged that the Wullar barrage violated the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and the creation of the barrage would be used by India as a geostrategic weapon to restrict water supplies to Pakistan. India uses the term Tulbul Navigation Project while Pakistan uses the term Wullar barrage to refer to the project. Since 1986, there have been negotiations between the two sides to resolve the dispute, but it still persists.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN BAGHLIAR DAM ISSUE

In 2005, Pakistan again objected to India's 450 megawatt Baglihar Dam constructed on the Chenab River. Pakistan invoked provisions of the Indus Water Treaty and sought arbitration from the World Bank. A neutral expert was appointed for arbitration. The verdict was announced in 2011 in favour of India.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN KISHANGANGA HYDROELECTRIC PLANT ISSUE

Jhelum is a west-flowing river, one of its tributaries is Kishanganga. The Kishanganga in Pakistan is called Neelum River. India authorised the National Hydropower Corporation to establish a dam named Gurez on the Kishanganga River. To generate electricity, the National Hydropower Corporation envisaged the creation of a 20-kilometre-long tunnel to divert water. The water through the tunnel could be diverted through the tunnel to generate 300+ megawatt electricity at Kishanganga Hydroelectric Plant (KHEP) in Bonar Nallah. Pakistan objected to the KHEP project alleging that the diversion of the water will reduce the availability of water Pakistan requires for the Neelum–Jhelum hydropower plant and thereby also reduces the original share of river water due to Pakistan under the IWT by 15%. Thus, in 2010, Pakistan approached the International Court of Arbitration (ICA). The ICA gave a final decision in December 2013. As per the ICA, Pakistan will need at least 9 cubic metre per second water flow in the river which shall be maintained by India and India would be able to, after ensuring 9 cubic metre per second flow in the river, go ahead with KHEP project. Pakistan had also raised four design-related issues at the ICA, but out of the four, only one was settled while the rest could not settle at the bilateral level between the two. In June 2013, India initiated a new 850-hydropower station to be constructed as the Ratle plant on the Chenab River. Pakistan raised objection to the Ratle plant and took up the issue for arbitration by the court of arbitration at the World Bank. Pakistan, on 19th August 2013, requested the World Bank to constitute a court of arbitration. India, as per the IWT, had to respond to the request on 19th October 2013. On 4th October 2013, India requested that a neutral expert be appointed. If state requests a neutral expert be appointed, then such a request has to be accepted immediately. The World Bank, however, chose to sit on India's request. On 19th October 2013, when the Pakistani request matured, the World Bank advocated both the setting up of a court of arbitration and appointment of a neutral expert. India objected to the proposal, observing that it would complicate the process. India threatened that it may not participate in the court of arbitration as it had requested for a neutral expert's appointment, which had to be accepted immediately, but it was not. The World Bank exercised a pause to the two processes and urged the two states to find an alternative resolution mechanism. The matter was taken up at the level of the Permanent Indus Commission. After the Uri attack in September 2016, India decided not to hold the PIC meetings with Pakistan till it stopped funding terrorists. However, in March 2017, the suspension was lifted and the meetings were resumed.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND THE ISSUE OF KULBHUSHAN JADHAV

Kulbhushan Jadhav was a retired Indian Navy officer. He was involved in marine trade when members of Jaish Ul-Adl group saw Jadhav near the Iranian border. Jadhav was kidnapped and traded by Jaish Ul-Adl group, linked to the Jundullah, to the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan for a monetary transaction. Jaish Ul-Adl group is a Sunni militant group and has been floated by Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan. They operate in Baluchistan region and have been created to prevent any Iranian influence on Baluchistan. The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan rewarded Jaish Ul-Adl group with some arms subsequently. The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan uses the group as a front organisation to gather intelligence on Iranian activities and feeds them to American Central Intelligence Agency. The group has some junior-level officers of Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan and Pakistan army working for them too. Jadhav was charged for espionage as an agent of India's RAW and sentenced to death on 10th April 2017. Since his custody, twenty-six times India demanded consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav under the Vienna Convention (1963), all of which were rejected by Pakistan. Thus, on 26th April 2017, India decided to move the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The first priority of India was to save him from death sentence. On 18th May 2017, the ICJ passed an interim order ordering Pakistan not to execute Kulbhushan Jadhav. The order of the ICJ relied upon powers from its cases of Ukraine versus Russia (2017) and Article 41 of the statute. The case of India is based on Article 36(1) of the statute of the ICJ. India has asserted that Pakistan is bound by the Vienna Convention to provide consular access and not by the India-Pakistan Consular Agreement of 2008, where Pakistan has tried to carve out its own space of limiting the applicability to spies. India has also asserted that the death sentence be annulled as Kulbhushan Jadhav has not been provided any fair trial. The ICJ has no powers to comment upon the death penalty awarded by a sovereign state. But, the ICJ examined the fair trial that paved way for the death penalty. Indian argument was that the military courts in Pakistan have powers for awarding death penalty. They derive these powers under the Army Act 1952 and Official Secret Act 1923. India has stated that these military courts perform as executive courts under a military command and operate without any elementary rights or public hearing for the accused. India has stated that Kulbhushan Jadhav has been facing a media trial in Pakistan, which is based on the narrative created by the Pakistan army that he was caught for espionage, sabotage and treason. India says that this kind of trial is akin to the trial of the gladiators in Rome, who too were awarded death penalty based upon the roaring of the crowds. The real aim of Pakistan is to use Kulbhushan Jadhav to create a frenzy that India is interfering in Baluchistan. It wants to feed a narrative in the society that India is behind destabilisation of Pakistan. This will help them to sustain and reinforce anti-India narrative. The treatment of Kulbhushan Jadhav and his entire case is a clear example of misdirected diplomacy of Pakistan. Such diplomatic adventurism is not based on the principles of justice but egregious untruths. In a recent hearing on the matter in 2019, the Indian Joint Secretaries in the MEA did not shake hands with the Attorney General of Pakistan, Anwar Mansoor Khan. They rather greeted him with folded hands, a sign of new diplomatic triumph of India. In the hearing, India again reiterated that Pakistan has amended its laws related to the military courts. These laws now allow civilians to be tried by the military courts. The ICJ rejected Pakistan's objections to the admissibility of the application of India with a 15-1 votes. The only dissenting judge of the ICJ was ad hoc Judge Jilani, who is from Pakistan. India got major victories in the ICJ ruling on three counts. First, the ICJ suspended the death penalty awarded to Kulbhushan Jadhav by the Pakistani military court. Secondly, the ICJ ruled that Pakistan would have to review the entire process of trial and conviction of Kulbhushan Jadhav. It directed Pakistan to take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Mr. Jadhav is not executed pending the final decision in the present proceedings. The court considers that a continued stay of execution constitutes an indispensable condition for the effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Jadhav. Thirdly, the ICJ noted that Pakistan breached the obligation incumbent upon it under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on consular relations. This means that Pakistan has now to provide India consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav. Though India succeeded in securing a stay on the death sentence of Kulbhushan Jadhav, its argument to annul the military court verdict was not accepted. The Indian side also sought a direction to Pakistan for providing a safe passage for Kulbhushan Jadhav to return home. The ICJ ruled, it is not the conviction and sentence of Mr. Jadhav which are to be regarded as a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN GURUDWARA DIPLOMACY

The Kartarpur Gurudwara holds immense religious significance for the Sikh community. The Gurudwara is in Narowal district of Pakistan, just across Gurdaspur district in Punjab, India. It is located on the bank of river Ravi. Guru Nanak lived in the Gurudwara for 18 years before his death at the same place in 1539. The two countries in 2018 decided to establish a Kartarpur Gurudwara corridor that will facilitate pilgrims to visit the historic Gurudwara without a visa and return the same day. As per the plan, the Kartarpur Gurudwara corridor was opened in 2019 to commemorate the 550th birth anniversary of Guru Nanak. The two sides decided to keep the corridor open from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. everyday. There is a consensus on point of crossings, identity documents, security procedures and bilateral guarantees by both sides. Had the Kartarpur Gurudwara corridor been established when the ties were good, it would have been a confidence building measure, which could have helped the strengthening of the relationship. But, as the Kartarpur Gurudwara corridor was opened at a time of a sour relationship between the two sides, it should not be conflated with the larger Indo-Pak relation and should be seen as a separate initiative, which emerges, as a sore thumb when the relationship is going down. So, here there are no India and Pakistan relations at work, but rather Pakistan's own strategic and tactical objectives at work as from the Pakistan side, it is the ISI, which is managing the project. There are various reasons for the announcement of the corridor in 2018. First, Pakistan for long is witnessing growing isolation. The proposal of the corridor with India was one of the attempts to break this isolation. Secondly, in India, in the rural areas of Punjab, there has been a long pending demand for the corridor as the rural folks have strong panthic leanings. Thirdly, the corridor is a low octane attempt by Pakistan to initiate a dialogue with India, which has been insisting that terror and dialogue cannot go together. Pakistan aims to base the corridor on the example of France and Germany, both of whom had an acrimonious past and eventually buried their differences to seek an economic union. But what Pakistan forgets is that Germany renounced the use of militarist ultra-nationalist groups is what compelled France to come forward. Some feel that the establishment of the corridor can be as momentous as the fall of the Berlin wall. In this event, Pakistan is unwilling to forgo the use of terrorism as a sub-conventional option against India. There is a belief that Pakistan could position the corridor as a 'gift' to the Sikhs. This will allow Pakistan to continue to foment terrorism in India and then hold the Kartarpur Gurudwara corridor a hostage to 'good behaviour' of India in reciprocity. The ISI-army complex planned the corridor with ulterior motives because they want India to confront the Hobson's choice. According to the senior officer of RAW, in 1980, the ISI assassinated the guru of the Nirankari sect and subsequently the other Nirankaris in Punjab. The Nirankaris are at odds with the mainstream Sikh population. This is so as they believe in a living guru, which the mainstream Sikhs do not believe as for them the living guru is the guru Granth Sahib. The 1980 assassination was used by the ISI to unleash the Punjab militancy. In 2018, the ISI attacked the Nirankari worshippers in Amritsar thorough a grenade attack on the Nirankari Bhawan. Thus, as per a senior officer of RAW, the event of Kartarpur Gurudwara corridor groundbreaking ceremony and the attack on the Nirankari Bhawan have to be seen in totality. It suggests that ISI is planning to revive its old strategy and open a 'second' front in Punjab. It wants to open up the corridor and use the Sikhs pilgrims for radical indoctrination, which will revive the Khalistani militancy. The ISI has established a slow attritional policy of reviving separatism thorough recruitment, indoctrination and radicalisation method. The Khalistani groups operating in Pakistan are the diaspora and they have been stationed all across the corridor (they are also being trained by the ISI at Muridke, Shakargarh and Narowal in the Punjab province of Pakistan). They have been trained by the ISI to keep a watch on potential recruits from amongst the visitors and establish contacts with them. Once the contacts are established with the pilgrims, they can be subsequently used for carrying out propaganda of the revival of separatism. Therefore, the senior officer of RAW says that India has to thwart the attempts of Pakistan to revive the militancy. The senior officer of RAW says that caution is important because the 'Pakistani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee' is controlled by the army of Pakistan and its first chief was the brainchild of 1993 Mumbai blasts—Lieutenant General Javed Nasir of ISI. The officer of RAW also told the author of the book that one reason why Pakistan wanted to seek the corridor is because it wanted to cool off its "eastern front" (read as the border with India) because the things are going out of control for Pakistan on their 'western front' (read as the border with Afghanistan) as Pakistan Taliban and Al-Qaeda have been repeatedly attacking Pakistani army at the Dūrand Line. The pilgrim fees of 20 USD and the charities by the Sikhs in the Gurudwara during the visit will be siphoned off by however, in some ways, the Kartarpur Agreement resembles the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), which too was negotiated in an inflamed backdrop of Kashmir. It is hoped that the Kartarpur Agreement too would eventually withstand the repeated shocks witnessed in the bilateral relationship and would eventually become a template for India and Pakistan to initiate a wider process of constructive engagement. For

that to happen. Pakistan must eschew the knack of asking for engagement and then sabotaging the same if the ties sour in the future. This means that Pakistan should delink the corridor from political developments and not terminate the corridor in case of any exigency. Even when the recent political past of the two states divide, the history has still united the two.

KHALISTAN REFERENDUM AND REVIVAL TENDENCIES OF KHALISTAN MOVEMENT 2.0

The campaign of Khalistan Referendum 2020 was a brainchild of ISI of Pakistan. The man behind this was Lt. Col Shahid Mehmood Malhi. In ISI, he is known as Chaudhary Sahib. He is a part of Lahore detachment of ISI based in Lahore for Punjab-specific activities. He was born in Wapda, Lahore, Pakistan. Shahid Mehmood Malhi has service number PA 35043 in the Pakistani army. On 13th October 1995, he was commissioned into the Pakistani army in the 25th regiment of the Baloch regiment. On 10th August 2012, he joined the ISI and the same day he was promoted to the rank of Lt. Col in the army and appointed as the station officer of the Lahore detachment. The Khalistan plan is called by the ISI as Operation Express. Major Danish of the ISI of Pakistan, on a covert mission, posted, as an undercover diplomat in Pakistani mission to London, was involved in orchestrating the Khalistan protest in London in 2018. He is constantly tailed by RAW in London. The attempt of RAW is to retaliate to Pakistan for Khalistan. The strategy of RAW is called engineered subversion and hybrid war. There are three areas RAW counters Pakistan at the hybrid war level by engineering deep subversive strategy. The RAW reminds Pakistan that any aggressive act of Pakistan against Indian side can lead to vivisection of three areas—Pashun region, Sindh region and Baluchistan, as prospective steps to an Akhand Bharat.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY AND JIHAD UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA

In 1998, the two tested their nuclear weapons. A new combustible mixture has emerged due to the nuclear option. Let us have a look at the optimistic view. In India, Sumit Ganguly propounds this view. He opines that the leaders of India and Pakistan are interested in their national survival. Both leaders realise that either party has adequate capabilities to inflict harm on its adversaries. Thus, if there were a crisis, both sides would strive to exercise caution with an intention to ensure that crises are not escalated to the nuclear level. This, as per the deductive logic propounded by Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Waltz, would lead to the prevention of escalation of conflict to a nuclear level and would bring about stability. Ganguly adds further details to his argument. He observes that the Partition has had a profound impact on both India and Pakistan. Pakistani leadership continues to feel, despite losses inflicted upon them in 1965 and 1971, that Kashmir is an unfinished agenda. Though, since 1971, the South Asian region has not witnessed a war it has witnessed limited conflicts in 1999 and Pakistani-sponsored ethno-religious insurgency in Kashmir. It is well accepted that the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 has played an important role in preventing escalation of conflicts, including the Kargil intrusion, into a full-fledged war. Despite further escalation of tensions during 2006 Mumbai attacks, then the 26/11 attacks and the localised attacks in 2016 and 2017 from Pathankot, Pampore, Uri, Kupwara and Pulwama, both sides have exhibited restraint and have not violated thresholds, despite the nuclear rhetoric of Pakistan. Ganguly asserts that Pakistan may resort to a proxy war but knows its limitation. Pakistan knows that if it initiates any conventional conflict with India, India too would resort to retaliation and this could push both towards a nuclear war. India, however, has followed a mixture of resolve and restraint. It has given Pakistan substantial responses to Pakistani provocation. Yet the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan would remain a robust tool to avert full-scale wars in future.

There is also a pessimistic view advanced by S. Paul Kapur. Firstly, the pessimists agree with the optimists on the fact that if players have nuclear weapons; they would behave strategically and strive for international stability. Instead of challenging the optimistic school on this account, the pessimists argue that organisations that are given the responsibility to manage nuclear weapons could go rogue and indulge in destabilising strategies. For pessimists, organisational pathologies would short circuit the adoption of stabilising strategies. Paul Kapur adds further that if a state acquires nuclear weapon, it may create incentives for a state to create destabilisation. He observes that there could be a possibility that there is a weak state in the scenario, say, which is not satisfied with the territorial boundaries with a neighbouring strong state. The neighbouring strong state is a status quo power with stronger military while the weaker state may position itself as a revisionist state. The weaker state may want to alter the boundaries to seek a boundary favourable to itself but knows that

if it resorts to a conventional conflict against the strong state, the strong state would inflict heavy damage in retaliation and thereby, the weak state prefers to live with undesirable boundaries. Kapur asserts that acquisition of nuclear weapons will change the scenario. Let us say that the weaker state acquires nuclear weapons. Now, through them, the weaker state has tried to overcome strong state's conventional military might with actuation of nuclear arsenal. Now let us assume that the strong state threatens the weaker one with a military catastrophe. The weaker state, to mitigate the threat by the stronger state, could launch a nuclear strike. On first strike by the weaker state, the stronger state could resort to massive and unacceptable retaliation. But, the stronger state, in such a scenario, would not prefer to launch a full-scale attack or resort to a conventional war against a weak for the fear of nuclear escalation. The strong state may resort to strategic restraint and at times, if needed, resolve to a limited extent with no possibility of crossing the nuclear threshold. If the weaker state develops the understanding that the stronger state would exercise strategic restraint, then, it may embolden the weaker state to resort to tactics to attempt to alter boundaries because it would know that the stronger state would not employ its full military power in its response to the opponent. More importantly, the weaker state may try to indulge in destabilising behaviour due to availability of diplomatic incentives for itself. The weaker state may provoke the adversary. Such provocation will push the stronger state to respond, which could push the conflict towards nuclear escalation. As the tensions rise, the international community would intervene. Such intervention to defuse crises could lead to a territorial settlement that may prove profitable for the weaker state. The weaker state would eventually, through international intervention, seek to get a territorial settlement that it may not have been in a position to get bilaterally with the stronger state. Thus, the weaker state could also deliberately resort to provoking the stronger state to push crisis towards nuclear escalation. If the provocation by the weaker state increases, there could be retribution by the stronger state. If the weaker state, after provocation, say happens to alter the boundaries by capturing some territory, it could invite a strong action from the adversary. The stronger state may not only inflict tremendous harm through a conventional military attack but may try to breach the nuclear threshold. The conventional military attack by the stronger state could be stronger than what the weaker state could anticipate. There could be a possibility that the response by the stronger state could weaken the weaker state's nuclear controls. To prevent such a possible fear, the weaker state could hand over its nuclear launching authority to the armed forces (a shift in organisation managing the arsenal or shift in the organisational pathologies) with a hope that if the stronger state retaliates, the nuclear command does not lose the ability to respond. Thus, apart from just the organisational pathologies, the insulation from full-scale retaliation and possibility of international intervention can also lead to destabilising behaviour. Therefore, a dissatisfied state with a weaker military could acquire nuclear weapons to cause destabilisation. This is a situation of strategic pessimism, which advocates that having nuclear weapons will not always lead to rational calculations but, at times, can create incentives to cause destabilisation and escalation.

Now, let us apply the two views in the context of the nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan. Though, India and Pakistan tested their weapons in 1998, but the idea of acquiring such weapons goes back to the 1970s. After India defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, in 1974, it demonstrated its capabilities through a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion or PNE. The Pakistani defeat in 1971 war and subsequent Indian PNE brought about a major shift in Pakistani strategic thinking and it began working on the development of its own nuclear weapon. The development, in a covert manner, continued by both states in 1980s. By the end of 1980s, the two had capabilities to develop their weapons at a short notice. If we apply strategic pessimism here, then some more factors can help us understand Pakistan's bid for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Pakistan was not happy with the partition in 1947. It wanted to alter the boundaries with India in Kashmir, as analysed in the chapter. After Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession with India in 1947, Pakistan tried to alter the boundaries through 1947–48 wars and 1965 war. With the Pakistani territory of East Pakistan also lost in the form of an independent state (Bangladesh) in 1971, Pakistan realised that it would not be able to fight a war with India over Kashmir ever again. But, Pakistan did not give up the cause of Kashmir fully. It decided to challenge territorial boundaries in Kashmir after it acquired capabilities that could alter the strategic situation. This compelled Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons. As the acquisition of weapons was going on, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and subsequent mujahedeen campaign by the US gave Pakistan a new idea on how to resort to a proxy model to alter the status quo in Kashmir. As the Cold War ended in 1989, bolstered with arms, training and knowledge from the mujahedeen campaign, coupled with a capability to produce a nuclear weapon at a short notice, Pakistan unleashed proxy insurgency in Kashmir in 1989. Pakistan began to realise that it could use the nuclear option if India resorted to a conventional attack upon Pakistan due to provocation in Kashmir. Pakistani strategic elite clearly knows that it can continue to support terrorism in Kashmir as the acquisition of nuclear capabilities has neutralised the Indian option of conventional conflict with Pakistan. Therefore, as the Pakistani

side began to support terrorists in Kashmir, the Indian side immediately enhanced its security presence in Kashmir to suppress the terrorists. The Pakistani side responded by enhancing their presence along the international border. Indian side responded by deploying armoured units from the international border till the LoC. As the crises escalated, Pakistan feared a full-scale attack from India while India feared an attack on Kashmir. To defuse the crisis, the US government sent its Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates to the region. The Gates Mission succeeded in defusing the crises by warning Pakistan that in case of an attack from India, it would be defeated. As the crisis de-escalated, both sides announced normalcy again.

One view that explains why the two sides did not go for a war in 1990s is the view by Sumit Ganguly. According to him, despite massive infiltration by Pakistan in Kashmir, India exercised caution because it was aware of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. In 1965, when Pakistan had undertaken infiltration, Indian troops had crossed over the ceasefire line and destroyed the assembly points used by the infiltrators in Pakistan. In 1990s, when this massive infiltration happened again, the Indian side enhanced force presence at the LoC but did not undertake any forceful measures. The Indian officials at that time offer a different perspective. They argue that India never wanted to escalate the 1990 crisis into a war, as India did not perceive the situation at that time volatile enough to occasion a full-fledged war. The then Indian Foreign Secretary S. K. Singh stated clearly that assuming that the 1990s crisis could lead to war is a mere conjecture.


Again, in 1998, Pakistani army men carried out an intrusion in Kargil. They crossed over the LoC and entered into the Indian side. When the Indian side observed these intrusions, in 1999, Indian forces carried out an intense air and ground offensive and drove out the intruders. As the Indian side had suppressed the terrorism in Kashmir by 1996, the international attention on Kashmir too began to decline. Pakistan wanted to make an incursion in the region again without harming vital its security interests of India. The prime intention of making an intrusion in Kargil was to slice off a part of the National Highway 1-A as doing so would make it difficult for India to supply logistics to the Indian troops in the Siachen Glacier. India launched an offensive to dislodge intruders but ensured that neither the ground troops nor its air force crosses the LoC India exercised tremendous restraint. Pakistan thought that its nuclear capabilities would prevent an Indian conventional response and also the international attention in case of crisis between two nuclear-armed players would be beneficial to Pakistan.

The optimists argue that the nuclear weapons in the context of Kargil prevented escalation. However, the Indian officials argue differently. Indian Army Chief during Kargil conflicts, V. P. Malik, asserts that India did not cross over the LoC as it wanted international support and had cared for the world's opinion. Even G. Parthasarathy asserts that India did not cross the LoC to ensure that the world would accept that Kargil had happened because of Pakistani provocation. Indian response was rooted in self-defence. V. P. Malik further states that as the political leaders wanted the forces to eject the intruders, they exercised fluidity and flexibility by granting the forces the authorisation to cross over the LoC if need be. He asserts that there was no nuclear threat in the picture and if the tactical operation did not go well, India could have crossed the LoC. Even Brajesh Mishra asserted that if army would have requested the need to cross over the LoC and the political leadership would have accepted the request if circumstances had necessitated thus. According to the official view, crossing the LoC would not have triggered any nuclear backlash from Pakistan. As the crises of Kargil ended, new situations erupted and now the Indo-Pakistan conflict was at an all-new level. India demanded that Pakistan hand over terrorists responsible for attacks on India, failing which India would strike Pakistan and snatch their territories. In January 2002, Pakistan declared LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed illegal and banned their activities. Musharraf asserted that Pakistani territory would not be used against India by terrorists. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, visited India to assure India of serious steps taken by Pakistan to dismantle terrorist infrastructures. India, in the wake of visit of Colin Powell, decided not to strike but did not remove its forces from the borders. In May 2002, Pakistan ambushed Indian troops in Kuluchak in Jammu. India decided to attack Pakistan from Rajasthan across the LoC and seize territory and destroy Pakistani forces. Consequently, Musharraf assured the world that Pakistan would permanently end infiltration. The USA Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, visited India and assured India once again of Musharraf's pledge. India began to withdraw the plan and decided to end Operation Parakram. Why did India not resort to attacking Pakistan despite escalation of conflicts in 2001–2002? One view is that the nuclear weapons prevented any serious conflict escalation and India exercised restraint. The other view is that Indian officials did not feel the need to attack Pakistan, as they believed that Operation Parakram had delivered the desired results. Indian officials observe that there was no point attacking Pakistan because they received assurances from the US that Pakistan would dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. They further clarify that their goal was

to ensure that terrorism does not emanate from Pakistan and Operation Parakram and the USA assurances achieved this goal. Since the standoff, the two sides have not witnessed any form of major crises escalation. India's use of coercive diplomacy has sent a strong message to Pakistan. Nuclear weapons have played a considerable role in crises prevention strategy. Despite Pakistani provocations in the form of 2006 Mumbai train attacks, 26/11 Mumbai attack, localised attacks in Pathankot (2016), Pampore (2016), Uri (2016), Kupwara (2017), Krishna Ghati (2017) and Pulwama (2019); India has resorted to a strategy of diplomatic isolating Pakistan and on provocation, has followed a mixture of resolve and restraint (explained below separately). Our discussion in the preceding section has proven that the Pakistani nuclear weapons are India-specific. The potential motivation for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons began with its perceived asymmetry with India in conventional warfare. The response of the USA in not fully supporting Pakistan outright in the 1965 and 1971 wars aggravated Pakistan's fear that the US would not be able to function as a long-term security guarantor. The secession of East Pakistan in 1971 made Pakistan perceive India as an existential threat. It therefore decided that acquisition of nuclear weapon would provide it with a tool to face India equally. For Pakistan, the nuclear weapons are not just a response to conventional superiority of India but also a tool to ensure the stability and survivability of Pakistan. Though India advocates a No First Use (NFU) policy, Pakistan has stated that it does not have any confidence on India's NFU and they have, therefore, not accepted the NFU as a viable policy.



Pakistan's idea of strategic deterrence is based upon the logic of developing conventional capabilities first. Pakistan believes that developing conventional capabilities will help them ward off a conventional attack from India. On the basis of this logic, Pakistan has sought to buy the F-16 fighter jets from the US. This is driven by the logic that Pakistan should not allow India to exploit any Pakistani fault lines—from sub-conventional to conventional to nuclear level—as this may endanger the security of Pakistan. Pakistan further believes that if India ever resorts to a full-scale conventional attack, Pakistan would resist the same through conventional preparedness, but, if the survivability of Pakistan is under a threat, then it may exercise a nuclear option.



The four conditions are not officially mentioned by Pakistan. In fact, they believe that the essence of deterrence is ambiguity and some amount of uncertainty will create dissonance amongst Indians about the extent they can they push Pakistan. Pakistan deliberately favours stability–instability paradox as a central element of their security competition with India. The stability–instability paradox is an international relations theory regarding the effect of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. To aggravate matters further, Pakistan strives for developing a large nuclear stockpile. Pakistan believes that the Indo-USA nuclear deal, the NSG waiver for India and a potential NSG membership for India will allow India to buy uranium globally and use its own uranium for its weapons programme, which might contribute yet again to an existential threat to Pakistan. This has compelled Pakistan to explore the idea of developing an offensive deterrence posture.

Nuclear weapons by Pakistan have allowed them an umbrella to facilitate a proxy war in Kashmir. Pakistan has also developed an understanding that because of its nuclear weapons, it can continue to resort to a proxy war, and if conflict

escalates, international intervention will pressurise India not to wage a war against Pakistan. Such international intervention legitimises the Pakistani idea of inflicting a low-intensity conflict on India. Pakistan also knows that even if the US and others may become critical about Pakistan, no power would abandon a freelancing nuclear power like Pakistan for the fear of a nuclear conflict in Asia and the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorists or other rogue states. Thus, today, it is not a nuclear capable Pakistan that deters India, but an ambiguity that allows Pakistan to indulge in the risk-seeking behaviour of supporting terrorists and proxies. The nuclear weapons offer a shield to Pakistan's adventurism and offer them immunity in the long run. Pakistan uses terrorism as a rational strategy as it is designed to generate security and survivability for Pakistan. This kind of militancy has been nurtured by Pakistan to hide its domestic, economic and political weaknesses and the state uses it as a tool of asymmetric warfare (through non-state actors) to confront India. Nuclear weapons, its augmentation of conventional forces and use of militant proxies today form a combined grand strategy of Pakistan. Therefore, jihad today forms a core of grand strategy of Pakistan.

PAKISTAN'S SEVEN-CARD STRATEGY TO POSITION ITSELF AN INTERNATIONAL INSURGENT

A basic analysis of strategic calculus of Pakistan tells us that maintaining a controlled degree of hostility with India is an essential component of the Pakistani army and its grand strategy. Such a hostile relationship with India enables the army of Pakistan to create an ecosystem to allow safe existence of state-sponsored terror groups. These groups also provide a cheaper alternative to conventional war and help bleed India. The Pakistan has always played its seven cards to position itself as an international insurgent:

1. Kashmir card (low-intensity war)
2. Afghanistan card (strategic depth against India)
3. Muslim Ummah card (preventing India in the OIC)
4. Russia card (encouraging it to open talks with Taliban and positioning itself as a new market for defence)
5. China card (the sweeter than honey partnership)
6. Terrorism card (bleeding India by a thousand cuts) and
7. Nuclear card (nuclear rhetoric for low-cost proxy war)

INDIAN DOCTRINE OF STRATEGIC PATIENCE FOR PAKISTAN

India and Pakistan fought direct bilateral wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971. The 1971 war was a trigger point for Pakistan to establish a nuclear weapon. Pakistan in 1971 realised that its allies China and the US did nothing to prevent India from slicing off Pakistan in 1971. However, the 1974 'PNE' by India only affirmed the fear of Pakistan that India might use a nuke to hit them in future. Throughout 1970s, Pakistan worked hard to acquire a nuclear weapon and announced the completion of its atomic mission in 1987. By this time, India too acquired its arsenal, though officially announced it in 1998 only.

There were optimists who thought that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will enable the two behaves responsibly. But, Pakistan has used the nuclear umbrella to unleash a low-intensity war through state-sponsored terrorism. Since 1998, Pakistan began to assert that it would use a nuclear weapon if India attacks Pakistan at the conventional level. They believed that the nuclear rhetoric has shattered the conventional military superiority of India and given it an opportunity for a low-cost low-intensity war through Lashker-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad to target military and civilian installations of India. The response of nuclear rhetoric of Pakistan by India was the doctrine of 'strategic patience', where it was stated that the LoC is sacrosanct and cannot be breached at any cost. This doctrine was implemented by India in 1999 during Kargil crisis. The forces were instructed not to breach the LoC. The UPA government from 2004 to 2014 also believed that there are going to be no political gains for any military confrontation with Pakistan. It believed that any military confrontation with Pakistan is neither going to solve political disputes nor going to end cross-border terrorism. Thus, post-1998, India began to follow nuclear restraint and asserted the 'sanctity of the LoC'.

INDIAN DOCTRINE OF OFFENSIVE DEFENCE FOR PAKISTAN

There is a change in the strategy for managing Pakistan today. The ISI is using the Lashkar-e-Taiba to counter ISIS and Pakistan Taliban in Pakistan. Thus, it has used Jaish-e-Mohammad as a principle vehicle against India. The JeM today diverts the members of Pakistan Taliban and uses them to fight in India. In 2014, with the coming of the NDA government, a new interpretation for Pakistan was born. The new approach had two elements. The first was that India would need to strengthen its deterrent capabilities to tackle any threat of Pakistan. The second was that India would have to devise an approach to break the nuclear buff of Pakistan. Both these points were based on the premise that there is no need for acceptance of a myth that the LoC is sacrosanct. The logic for this was that if Pakistan is resorting to cross-border terrorism, it means that Pakistan does not respect the LoC.

The new doctrine aims to explore where the nuclear brink is rather than just resorting to mere speculation that it exists in breaching the LoC.

So, under the new doctrine, the idea is to give Pakistan a befitting response in a graded manner to see where nuclear brink is located. As part of the graded strategy applied, in 2016 Indian forces first targeted the launch pads of terrorists across the LoC.

This did not provoke nuclear rhetoric of Pakistan. This affirmed to the strategic community that an operation along the LoC on terror camps could be one option that can be explored again. In 2019, the Balakot air strike (non-military preemptive strike based on credible ground intelligence of possible terror strike by JeM) was deep inside Pakistan (which Pakistan branded as eco-terrorism by India as it destroyed the pine trees). This strike again did not yield a nuclear rhetoric by Pakistan. The two strikes have affirmed that if India is attacked through a non-state actor, it will not shy away to go to the spot of the origin of offence (be it across LoC or inside Pakistan) and hit Pakistan hard.

However, quite unfortunately, Pakistan through Pulwama attack in 2019 has again presented itself as a master of terrorism. The Indian response to Pulwama in the Balakot air strikes has added to the muscular image of Modi. This easily ensured his electoral victory within India in 2019 general elections. This is what precisely Pakistan wanted. Because, if Modi became the Prime Minister again, Pakistan started to use the 'Hindu India' tag to position itself as a voice of suppression of Indian Muslims at the hands of Hindu government. This has allowed Pakistan to easily mobilise Indian Muslims and continue to give Pakistan the needed source to recruit Indian Muslims for its jihad against India. This strategy of Pakistan was visible in the protests that Pakistan was able to mobilise all over India (from Kerala to Shaheen Bagh) over the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019.

PAKISTANI BIO-WEAPON WAR AGAINST INDIA

In 1345, Jani Baig was a Mongol General whose army was fighting to capture the Citadel at Cafa (present day Feodosia) when his army soldiers were infected with bubonic plague. Unable to overrun the Citadel at Cafa, he began to cut down the bodies of his soldiers (infected with bubonic plague) and began to load them on catapults and lobbed them into the city. This apocryphal incident is often known as the world's first bio-weapon attack. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, Pakistan has started following General Baig's strategy. Pakistan has started pushing COVID-19-infected terrorists across the border into India and trying to play a bio-weapons war with India.

FOUR-POINT STRATEGY OF INDIA TO TACKLE PAKISTAN

India has adopted a 4-point strategy to tackle Pakistan:

1. *Military component:* India has demonstrated that it can swiftly retaliate to any such misadventures of Pakistan via surgical strike operations.
2. *Diplomatic component:* A new element in Indian diplomatic strategy is to constantly isolate Pakistan. The objective here is to demonstrate to the entire world that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism. This in the long run will ensure that the foreign states gradually disassociate to engage with Pakistan. Such strategy will make it difficult for Pakistani diaspora to seek jobs and reside in foreign states, thus affecting the state remittances. This will economically weaken Pakistan and make it tough for Pakistan to sustain the Jihad factory. Diplomatically, India

should use its good foreign relations with major powers to block the bank accounts of Pakistani army officials in Europe. These will economically breakdown the financing of the Pakistani army. The Financial Action Task Force has put Pakistan in the grey list in 2019. This is because of failure of Pakistan to curb terror financing. It will hurt the economy and international standing of Pakistan.

3. *Political component:* It is important to understand that any Jihad in a foreign state can only be sustained by taking advantage of a political vacuum. In Kashmir, there is intense alienation of people. The people of the society are disconnected from the grass root politics and do not have any mechanism to vent out their political grievances. This creates dissonance in the society and allows ISI to use local support as oxygen for radicalisation. Thus, within the political framework of the Indian Constitution, it is imperative to connect the masses to the mainstream politics and cut the supply of oxygen to ISI. The abrogation of Article 370 strives for this.
4. *Covert component:* The RAW is capable of demonstrating success in covert activity on the deep state of Pakistan (army and ISI). The RAW has been carrying out deep subversion and sabotage internally in Pakistan. Such kinds of covert operations are carried out round the year in Pakistan. They have deeply internally bled Pakistan every day to make life difficult for the common citizens. The RAW is creating an Indian version of 'counter non-state actors' to cause deep subversion in Pakistan in 2020.

FUTURE OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Firstly, the frequent changes in the geopolitics of the region leave a lasting impact on the bilateral ties of India and Pakistan. It is important to understand that the Western powers are no more interested in isolating Pakistan beyond a limit, even though it may be a diplomatic strategy for India. The world today feels that Pakistan is taking steps to improve their socio-economic architecture. This is the reason why Chinese, Americans and Russians continue to do business with Pakistan and have even prevented blacklisting of Pakistan at the FATF (where it remains in the grey-list while Iran and North Korea being the only two in blacklist). Secondly, the Western powers, led by the US, also do not wish to antagonise Pakistan beyond an extent because they wish to counter the growing Russian and Chinese clout in Eurasia, for which Pakistan may be crucial. Thirdly, the international community has understood that since 26/11, there has been no terror strike on Indian soil and most of the attacks in Kashmir during the Modi government's time have been 'locally staged' by the two parties. This does weaken Indian case on isolating Pakistan diplomatically. Pakistan has successfully ensured that the US exits from Afghanistan and power eventually flows in the hands of Taliban. There is a growing pressure within Pakistan to dismantle their terror networks and Pakistan has around 30,000 terrorists in their territory. To show the world of concrete action against the terrorist of Pakistani soil, Pakistan will try to offload them to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and eventually train them in the territory of Afghanistan to unleash a proxy war against India. It will be imperative for India to ensure Taliban does not allow ISI to use Afghanistan to wage a proxy war against India. In this backdrop, there is a need for some creating rethinking on India's Pakistan policy now.



5

CHAPTER

India's Relationship with Bangladesh

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INDIA AND BANGLADESH RELATIONS

Bangladesh is closely linked to India through its shared culture and ethnicity with West Bengal. The language, a slightly varied dialect of Bengali, acts as a bridge between East India, North East India and Bangladesh. The piece of land where Bangladesh exists has undergone three partitions. It began in October 1905, when the British, as per their 'divide-and-rule' policy, divided the Bengal Presidency on Hindu-Muslim lines. The Muslims, in majority in the state, landed in the area that later became East Pakistan. Because of massive mobilisation and political protests that eventually came to be known as the 'Banga Bhanga Andolan', the territory was reunited on 12th December 1911. However, as far as the national movement was concerned, the seeds for partition were already sown by the initial decision of the British to divide the region along religious lines. The Muslim League, which was established on 30th December 1906 in Dhaka, later demanded that the area be under East Pakistan during the Partition of India in 1947. As the partition took place in 1947, it led to the formation of East Pakistan with large-scale riots preceding the event in Calcutta and Noakhali. The territory again witnessed a split in 1971 to become Bangladesh. The factors that led to divisions of East Pakistan in 1971 emerged in the period after 1947. East Pakistan always had inadequate representation; it got access to fewer resources and, despite the popularity of the Bengali language, Urdu was imposed as the administrative language. This led to confrontation between the government and the masses and violence erupted in East Pakistan. In 1970, when elections took place, the Awami League won the elections. The regime in West Pakistan refused to recognise the mandate of the election and unleashed

The 50th Anniversary of India and Bangladesh Relations

In 2021, the two sides celebrated the 50th anniversary of their bilateral relationship. The two sides appreciated that the relations acquired considerable depths that today there exist more than fifty institutional mechanisms on issues ranging from peaceful use of nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, big data to youth developments through Swarna Jayanti Scholarships.

violence, disallowing Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, who had legally won the election in East Pakistan, to take power. The subsequent planning of a pre-emptive attack on India by Pakistan forced India to militarily retaliate and support the formation of independent Bangladesh as a new nation. The confrontation between India and Pakistan finally led to emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971. In 1972, India and Bangladesh signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which became the foundation of the modern India-Bangladesh relations. Today, in Bangladesh, there are two key parties. Awami League, headed by Sheikh Hasina, is a party, which has stood up for secular ideals and is favourable towards India while Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is headed by Begum Khaleda Zia, is a party that favours Bengali nationalism and is not favourably inclined towards India. Since 2009, the relations between the two have focused on the three C's of Cooperation, Coordination and Consolidation and in a neighbourhood full of distrust and cynicism; the Bangladesh and India ties have emerged as a template of optimism which is pregnant with trust and hope. The numbers of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh in India have declined from 3.7 million in 2001 to 2.7 million in 2011 and are likely to be lesser in 2021 census. Thus, it is imperative for the government in India to ensure that the National Register of Citizens (NRC) exercise in India does not emerge as an irritant.

INDIA AND BANGLADESH DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

At the defence level, India prefers Bangladesh as a defence market, though, in recent times, Bangladesh has preferred to receive arms imports and defence equipment from the US, Russia and China. China had provided submarines to Bangladesh in 2019. A unique point for India's advantage is that Bangladesh is a leading contributor to the UN Peace Keeping Mission (UNPKM). This allays India's fears as the dominant theory is that the more Bangladesh participates in UNPKM, the lesser would be the idle availability of its armed forces to control polity and hence, the lesser would be the chance of Bangladesh becoming an active threat like Pakistan. India firmly supports Bangladesh to evolve fully as a democracy on the lines of Turkey and Indonesia. Both nations have regularly undertaken joint exercises at the army and navy level.

In 2013, the two nations also signed an Extradition Treaty. Shiekh Hasina paid a state visit to India in April 2017. The two nations signed India–Bangladesh Defence Cooperation Agreement to Combat Terrorism. The agreement would enhance cooperation in prevention of human and drug trafficking and illegal narcotics traded across the border. The two sides have also concluded a Defence Cooperation Framework and to promote strategic studies, a pact has been concluded between the Defence Services Staff College, Tamil Nadu and the National Defence College, Dhaka. The two have an Agreement on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Outer Space. In 2015, during the visit of Indian Prime Minister to Bangladesh, Agreement on Coastal Shipping was signed. The agreement enables merchant vessels of India to use Chattogram port, Chittagong port and Mangla port to ship goods to Bangladesh and this would boost cooperation on regional waters and promote blue economy. The vulnerability of Bangladesh as a centre of terror is not new. Since 9/11, the vulnerability of Bangladesh to terror attacks has increased manifold. Bangladesh is a secular republic. The Islamic NGOs of foreign nations have been promoting Wahhabism in Bangladesh. Pakistan has links with many such NGOs in Bangladesh, which it uses to target India. Since 1990, in Bangladesh, religion as a card in politics has been largely used to garner power. There is growing Al-Qaeda and ISIS presence in Bangladesh. The political compulsion to act against terror is a constraint for the present government as the opposition uses it as a tool against radical organised religion and ends up creating a possibility of a severe backlash. In Bangladesh, there has been a systematic attempt to target rationalists, atheists and bloggers. For India, it is worrisome as ISIS is at its very doorstep.

INDIA AND BANGLADESH COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Bangladesh had been an agrarian economy but today has emerged as a South Asian dynamo. It has a strong demand for goods and India has emerged as an important trade partner in this context. It has also benefitted from the ongoing US–China trade war and has enhanced its exports in the global value chains. India provides duty-free and quota-free access for Bangladeshi exports to India. The trade is tilted in favour of India. India also gives line of credits and loans to Bangladesh and provides developmental aid. Tata is establishing a three billion USD steel plant in Bangladesh and there are other Indian firms in power generation, linking of power grids, telecom and transport, which are setting up presence in Bangladesh. However, India's steps to integrate Bangladeshi economy with India may be perceived with some suspicious by Bangladesh. It has also steadfastly refused India transit to North East, which, in reality, might have proved beneficial for both. In 2020, India had signed Bangladesh–India Professional Skill Development Agreement to undertake skill development for the people of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Armed Forces Contingent at Republic Day in India

In the 2022 Republic Day celebrations in India, a contingent of soldiers from army, navy and air force of Bangladesh participated and Bangladesh became the third foreign-friendly country to have their contingent in India after France in 2016 and UAE in 2017. This event showcases the recognition of contribution of India to the creation of Bangladesh and the depth in defence ties.

Hefazat-e-Islami


The Hefazat is emerging as a new space in Bangladesh where the Jamat-e-Islami existed earlier. These are the same people who are perpetually anti-India and rooted in revivalist Islamic tendencies. They are even unhappy with rising progress made by Bangladesh in aspects such as textiles and growth and intend that Bangladesh must focus on revival of Islamic practices than accepting a liberal order.

Border Haats between India and Bangladesh

The first border haat was inaugurated in 2011, in the West Garo Hills district of the Indian state of Meghalaya while the other three border haats are at Balat (India)–Dolora (Bangladesh) in 2012; Srinagar (India)–Chhagalnaiya (Bangladesh); and Kamalasagar (India)–Kasba (Bangladesh) in 2015.

INDIA AND BANGLADESH LAND BOUNDARY AGREEMENT

When India became independent, Sir Radcliffe demarcated the boundary between India and Pakistan as well as India and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). While dividing the territory in East Pakistan, Radcliffe did not pay attention to small patches of land called 'enclaves'. These enclaves were, in the pre-independence era, called Chitmahals and the Raja of Cooch Behar used them and Maharaja of Rangpur as stakes in the game of chess. After independence, Radcliffe drew a line to divide the territory. Efforts were made by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1958 to divide the territories through an agreement with Feroz Khan Noon called Nehru–Noon agreement. As per the agreement, India got the enclave of Dahagram and Angarpota while half of Berubari enclave was to be given to East Pakistan. The origin of the Berubari territory also goes back to the time of Radcliffe. Radcliffe tried to demarcate the boundary on the basis of *thanas* but he accidentally omitted the Berubari number-12 *thana*. As the Berubari number-12 *thana* was within the Jalpaigudi *thana*, half of it was given to East Pakistan as they laid claims over it. To give effect to the Nehru–Noon agreement 1958, an amendment under Article 368 of Indian Constitution was made under the 9th Amendment Act of 1960. When Bangladesh was created in 1971, Indira Gandhi decided to resolve the pending disputes with Mujibur Rehman. In 1974, a Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) was designed (also called Indira–Mujib Pact) which clarified the need to exchange 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in India. In these enclaves, citizens were living with no available rights and facilities. On 16th May 1974, the agreement was signed but was not ratified by India and thereby the exchange under the LBA could not proceed successfully. According to the LBA, Bangladesh was to get Dahagram and Angarpota while India would get the other half of Berubari. Dahagram and Angarpota were to be connected through a corridor called Tin Bigha and India was to lease out the Tin Bigha corridor to Bangladesh in perpetuity. Because of strong internal resistance, the Indian government was finally only able to grant Bangladesh access to the corridor in 1992, and that too, for a limited number of hours per day. Full access to the corridor was finally granted in 2011. In 2006, the Hasina government in Bangladesh assumed power and in 2007 established a consultative mechanism in the area demarcated in the LBA. The people in the consultative mechanism asserted that they would not leave their areas. The rights of the people inhabiting the region of the LBA now came in stark incongruence to the precepts of the LBA, which advocated territorial relocations. In 2010, Hasina visited India and in 2011, a protocol to the LBA was agreed to. As per the protocol, it was decided that status quo was to be maintained in the regions and the wishes of the people would be respected. Thus in 2011, the procedural acceptance was completed on ground and the national exchange was agreed to. Since there was to be no cession of territory, the Indian Parliament ratified the bill in May 2016 and the entire process got completed by June 2016.



INDIA AND BANGLADESH MARITIME ISSUE

In 1970, the region of Bay of Bengal witnessed the Bhola cyclone. Because of the intensity of the cyclone, an offshore sandbar island called New Moore Island got created in 1970. Since then it became a disputed island between the two states because even though the island was uninhabited, the island had proven oil and gas reserves. India and Bangladesh have followed the Thalweg Doctrine, which is based on 'mid-channel flow' as per which the middle of Haribhanga River is taken as a boundary of the two states. The problem here was that the island was in the Sundarban Delta and kept on shifting its position due to deposition of silt and as a result of that, the two parties could not resolve the location dispute as per the Thalweg Doctrine. The failure to achieve success on negotiations related to New Moore Island in 2009 led Bangladesh to approach the Permanent Court of Arbitration under UNCLOS. The UNCLOS, under Annex-7 of the Convention for Delimitation of Maritime Boundary between India and Bangladesh, handed over the case to a five-member arbitration

tribunal. The tribunal gave an award on 7th July 2014 and upheld Indian sovereignty over the New Moore islands and enabled India to have access to Haribhanga River. Bangladesh has been granted an additional access to 19,000 square kilometres Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). India shall continue to hold rights over its continental shelf but Bangladesh is allowed an outlet to the extended continental shelf. Bangladesh also now gets access to open sea and shall no more be a sea-locked nation due to overlap of EEZ.

THE HYDRO-DIPLOMACY FACTOR IN INDIA–BANGLADESH RELATIONS AND TEESTA RIVER ISSUE

Of the 57 transboundary rivers, Bangladesh shares 54 of them with India. Teesta is the 4th largest river in Bangladesh (after Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna). The flood plain of Teesta is 2750 square kilometres. In 1972, a Joint River Commission was established to share resources of 54 rivers. However, till now the only success is on an agreement related to Ganga River signed in 1996 for 30 years for water sharing. A key irritant is the issue related to the river Teesta. This river originates from Khangtse Glacier in Charamullake in Sikkim and drains in the Bay of Bengal. In 1983, both nations agreed an ad-hoc agreement where India received 39% of Teesta water while 36% was allocated to Bangladesh. Around 25% water was unallocated. In 2011, an agreement to establish a Joint Hydro Observation Station was evolved which proposed an interim agreement for the next 15 years under which India was to get 42.5% of the Teesta water while Bangladesh was to get 37.5% of water flow during the dry season. The key problem relates to a barrage at Gajoldoba in India and another at Dalia in Bangladesh. Using the barrages, both nations draw water for irrigation. India diverts water through the Teesta–Mahananda irrigation canal to meet the growing urban requirements of Siliguri and Jalpaiguri. Bangladesh complains that this water diverted by India is used for irrigating paddy fields in the region. The problem arises due to the severe shortage of water in the dry months. Bangladesh has been consistently demanding 50% share of the water because it says that in the absence of the stipulated flow it demands, its paddy crops and fishing are affected, thereby affecting critical livelihoods. The agreement has not been adopted due to opposition of the Chief Minister of West Bengal. The issue remains unresolved up to 2020 because in Indian Constitution, water is a state subject and the federal structure of our governance has created an institutional void at the basin level, by bridling the central government from taking an integrated approach to water governance that can lead to a cooperative outcome. A solution often proposed by hydrological experts is establishing a link canal between Manas–Ganga–Teesta and Sankosh but the issue remains. Today, due to divergent views of centre and states, the Teesta has emerged as a classic case of 'conflictual federalism'.

Climate Change Threats between India and Bangladesh

The analysis of water sharing in this section tells us how availability of fresh water has emerged as a serious threat for existence of populations. Because of rising population density and land pressures, the ecology of Sundarbans is witnessing decline and a joint conservation strategy is imperative. The climate-induced displacements are likely to emerge as new threats for the region and a joint collaboration for tackling marine pollution, river pollution and development-induced threats can be of help. In this backdrop, SAARC and BIMSTEC can emerge as core pillars.

A Joint River Commission in 1978 was established to explore possibility of a dam on Barak River. Because of regular flooding of Barak, a dam was proposed at junction of Mizoram, Assam and Manipur. It was decided to use water for irrigation also. Bangladesh says that the dam will affect water supply downstream and affect flow of water in summers. A 1500 MW dam is proposed where Manipur being the host state will get 15% free electricity.

INDIA AND BANGLADESH HYDROCARBON PARTNERSHIP

In 1997, the Bangladeshi firm Mahana Holdings proposed the idea of supplying gas from Sittwe fields in South Myanmar to India via Bangladesh. In 2005, Bangladesh, Myanmar and India reached an agreement that Myanmar would be supplying around 90 tonnes cubic feet gas. However, the Khaleda Zia government backed out of the agreement, citing as its reason, the fact, that India does not allow Bangladesh access to hydropower from Bhutan and Nepal. As the project got stuck, Myanmar signed a deal with China to supply gas to China from Kyaukpyu port to Ruili city in Yunnan province. Since 2015, with the coming back of Sheikh Hasina to power, the negotiations have begun anew. In 2017, the two sides concluded

India and Bangladesh Hydrocarbon Partnership. In 2020, Bangladesh decided to supply gas to Tripura. In 2020, India, Bangladesh and Bhutan started engaging on establishing a Regional Trilateral Energy Sharing Arrangement. India is also purchasing LPG from Bangladesh now.



CHINA FACTOR IN INDIA-BANGLADESH TIES

Bangladesh is an active partner of Chinese BRI and has also received substantial support at the defence level. They have been recipients of a submarine from China in 2019. India may not be very comfortable to see growing strategic and economic collaboration of China and Bangladesh. But, India has to accept this as part of evolving regional strategic calculus, which is enabled by economic, trade and fiscal clout of China. India also should understand that Bangladesh is forging an economic partnership with China, which is purely to address its developmental aspirations and in no way is Bangladesh trying to use China as a hedge in its engagement with India. In this backdrop, it is crucial for India to chart out its own course on deepening its ties with Bangladesh.

FUTURE AREAS OF COOPERATION FOR INDIA AND BANGLADESH

1. Resolution of Teesta issue and concluding frameworks on Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla, Feni and Dudkhumar rivers.
2. India can learn from Bangladesh how it has emerged a leader in export of readymade garments by integrating itself to the global value chains. The export dynamism is indeed a lesson for India ahead.
3. There has been a decline in cattle trafficking owing to stronger patrolling by both sides. However, there is occasional firing done by the border guarding forces. It is important for both sides to respect the international rules of engagement, which entail military action to be proportionate to provocation.



6

CHAPTER

India's Relationship with Myanmar

LOCATING MYANMAR IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY THOUGHT

International Relations (IR) is an ever-evolving discipline that focuses on global, regional and sub-regional issues. The most basic segment in the discipline of IR remains the study and analysis of neighbours because not only are the neighbours linked socially, economically and historically but also strategically. The relationship with neighbourhood has to be seen in the light of regional security and well-being of people. In this context, the study of Myanmar's relationship with India makes a pertinent case study because at the root lies a shared geographical congruity, linkages of civilisation, cultural interactions and shared political experiences. The commonality of strategic, political and developmental perspectives of India and Myanmar have made the relations linked with a common destiny. In recognition of the historical legacy and status of Myanmar as an immediate neighbour of India, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has created the Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Myanmar division and the division is directly supervised by the Foreign Secretary himself. The above discussion amply makes it clear that Myanmar is important to India and the religion and ethnicity are considered the core binders of the two states. The most important connecting link between India and Myanmar (previously known as Burma) is Buddhism. In the ancient times, Gautama Buddha sent the two monks, Tapussa and Bhallika, with eight strands of his own hair to promote Buddhism in the Myanmar region. Tapussa and Bhallika built a pagoda in Shwedagon, which is now known as the Shwedagon Zedi Daw. Ashoka, during his reign, also sent missionaries to Burma. The people of Burma, since the ancient times, have been majorly Kshatriyas and their origins can be traced back to India, in the Gangetic valley. The 17th century Pyu dynasty used Indian titles like Hari Vikramaditya and Surya Vikramaditya. In modern times, the British had exiled Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal Emperor of India, to Yangon in Myanmar and the Konbaung King of Myanmar to Ratnagiri. A collective philosophical, spiritual, cultural and commercial interaction between the two states continues to persist and respect for India as a rising power and a growing economy is accepted by Myanmar.

INDIA'S STRATEGIC PERCEPTION OF MYANMAR

Indian foreign policy has evolved a perspective to view Myanmar and its significance for India. India asserts that Myanmar is a land bridge to ASEAN states. India looks at Myanmar as a state that can assist in controlling secessionism in India's northeast. This is because the Chinese have established many listening posts in Myanmar and have allowed the Pakistanis to supply arms to Myanmar. India looks at Myanmar as a state which is rich in natural gas and oil and thereby crucial for our energy security. India also believes that engagement with Myanmar can help us in balancing Chinese in the region. Lastly, for India, Myanmar is a gateway to the Southeast Asia and thereby land connectivity is the dominant paradigm to engage. These views represent the truisms of India and Myanmar relations today.

What is ASEAN?

ASEAN is an economic grouping of ten states of Southeast Asia, formed in 1967, that aspire to strengthen economic cooperation, keeping political differences and controversies aside.

THE SOCIO-CULTURAL PORTRAIT OF MYANMAR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA

Is Myanmar a Buddhist Society?

Myanmar is perceived as a Buddhist society and this assertion is correct and flawed both. While there does exist a strong Buddhist majority, Myanmar also has a powerful minority that displays allegiance to different religions. In a holistic way, Myanmar is a complex society which has multiple ethnic dimensions.

groups, other than Bamar, constitute 32% of the population and a power to reckon with, when we view it from the prism of accepted democratic norms.

Myanmar has five neighbours and the shores being washed by Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal. The location of the nation helps in understanding the socio-cultural character of Myanmar. The immediate neighbours of Myanmar include India, China, Bangladesh, Thailand and Laos. A unique feature of Myanmar is that it is able to effectively balance its two large-friendly neighbours, India and China. Let us delve as how is it possible. A basic study of history tells us that people who inhabit Myanmar today have come from China, India and Thailand. The Chinese moved southwards from Tibet and Yunnan and glued along Mizos and Kachin groups from India to migrate towards the fertile plains washed by the Irrawaddy River. Over the ages, Myanmar showed a remarkable genius of absorbing and synthesising influences and developed a unique style of its own. It is this feature of the national psyche that explains the dual inclinations of Myanmar to be friendly with India and China and yet assert independence in dealing with the two. Myanmar is a country with 145 national races and eight main ethnic groups that Bamar (68% population), Shan, Kachin, Chin, Karen, Kayah, Mon and Rakhine. The rest of the

MYANMAR'S FLIRTATION WITH DEMOCRACY AND IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA

Why is Myanmar unable to become Completely Democratic?

A very special feature of the Burmese people is that they conceal their feelings and views. They express their views in a limited sense, more limited to the foreigners, until they trust them. Over the ages, it has become a culture of the people to think first and then speak or sometimes think more and speak less. This factor also explains why military rule has been more dominant in Myanmar because the people of Myanmar often lived in a fear that if they express their views, they might be reported to the authorities and that may cause bodily harm to them.

The position of Myanmar is rightly known as hemmed in like a tender gourd amongst the cacti. In 1951, India and Burma established diplomatic relations through a Treaty of Friendship but the foundation of the Indo-Myanmar relations was laid down by the visit of Rajiv Gandhi in 1987. After the victory of Ne Win in Burma in 1948, he undertook aggressive nationalisation, which led to lot of discrimination to the Indian diaspora present in Burma. The Indian diaspora in Burma had British origins. Burma was an erstwhile British colony that gained independence in 1948 and the British had taken a large number of Indians belonging to Chettiar community to work in Burma as plantation workers. In 1988, Ne Win's resignation led to a referendum on whether or not multi-party democracy needed to be adopted in Myanmar. In 1988, the '8888 revolt' started in Burma. (It began on 8-8-1988 and is hence called 8888.) Aung San Suu Kyi led the revolt. Suu Kyi fought for democracy and won the election in Myanmar, but the military junta rejected the polls and launched massive crackdown on the activists. General Saw Haung took control of Myanmar and established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLOC). In 1990, SLOC announced elections. However, as per the SLOC, the election was to be held only for the purpose of redrafting the Constitution of the Myanmar. In the elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 392 of 485 seats and the National Unity Party (backed by the army) won the rest. The NLD demanded immediate transfer of power on the basis of popular vote. This led to a confrontation based on the political values of democracy and autocracy. India has always been a supporter of NLD whereas China was a supporter of SLOC. Subsequently, Aung San Suu Kyi, the founder of NLD, was put under house arrest. The military-backed party was called Union Solidarity and Development Party, or USDP. During this period, because India had always focused on engaging with democratic forces, India was now suddenly isolated when Tatmadaw, the military regime of Myanmar, acquired power. The Chinese and Pakistanis were courting

the military regime in Myanmar and Chinese were showing more interests in junta because the military had supported the Chinese in the suppression in 1989 in Tiananmen Square. While India was struggling to articulate a policy at a time when Chinese and Pakistanis were endangering Indian security in Myanmar; the problem was aggravated further when in the

same time period, India struggled to even find an ambassador for Myanmar. India's inability to find a suitable ambassador was because India wanted a very seasoned officer to manage the complex challenges. However, the delay for appointing an ambassador was seen by the Tatmadaw negatively and they thought that India sides with democratic forces and is reluctant to accept the Tatmadaw in Myanmar. This perception was not true because India's dilemma, as explained, was to find a seasoned officer. In fact, the then External Affairs Minister I. K. Gujral even went to assert that considering the importance of Myanmar, if India is unable to find a diplomat, then probably a politician might be eventually sent to Myanmar as the ambassador. The difference in perceptions over the ambassadorship only strained India's relationship with Tatmadaw and India only got more isolated for its failure to act swiftly. Post-1992, Myanmar decided to head towards an open economy and joined ASEAN as a member and ended martial law. Since 1993, Indo-Myanmar relations have prospered as there were economic complementarities.

THE TATMADAW IN MYANMAR AND THE FOUR POLES OF POWER IN MYANMAR

Since the independence of Myanmar, the army, political parties and ethnic groups constitute the arm of the triangle which maintains a complex and the changing relationship with each other. While the three arms have differences and tensions with each other, none has political weight and power to be equal with each other. There are some who argue that there is a fourth element that exercises influence and that includes the exiled refugees and activists of Myanmar that live in India, Norway, the US and the UK and they too have close links with two poles, namely, political parties and ethnic groups but are hostile to the third pole, the army. In the political triangle explained here, the Tatmadaw or the army constitutes the base of the power pyramid because the army claims the credit for making significant contributions to seek independence of Myanmar. It is important to understand that the military in Myanmar has its own conception of its significance in the country. The Tatmadaw argues that they have got independence for Myanmar, ceaselessly safeguarded the unity and territorial integrity of their country and have played a role of guide for the well-being of the people. In effect, their argument, though never explicitly asserted, is that power stems from the military and not the people.

General Aung San

He is the most loved military man in Myanmar and he enjoys respect and aura in the hearts of the people. Even Suu Kyi, his daughter, often invokes his name in speeches, though with the motive of communicating the intent that even though she maybe a proponent of democracy, but she loves military as an institution and would love to work with them in an apolitical manner hoping that someday they would return to the barracks.


INDIA'S CORE STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN MYANMAR



MYANMAR AS THE LYNCHPIN OF INDIA'S ACT EAST POLICY

As India, at the end of the Cold War, announced its Look East Policy, the significance of Myanmar increased. From the Indian Foreign policy makers' point of view, Myanmar is a near neighbour whom India considers to be well within its area of interest. Myanmar is the most crucial state for India's Act East Policy. Under the Act East Policy, India has realised the economic potential of boosting up connectivity with Myanmar, as it will be a gateway to the markets of South East Asia. The importance of Myanmar in the Indian foreign policy can be judged from the fact that India announced the Act East Policy in the territory of Myanmar in 2014 (at the backdrop of the 12th India-ASEAN Summit). Under the Act East Policy India has decided to leverage the geographical proximity and strengthen security relations. The connectivity with Myanmar

can be a gateway to South East Asia, as envisaged under the India–Myanmar–Thailand Highway. In 2014, India–Myanmar signed a pact on border cooperation and intelligence sharing. India is also connecting with Myanmar to leverage Buddhism through the Buddhist circuit where India intends to use Buddhism's cultural heritage to promote tourism and create job.



THE ROHINGYA ISSUE IN MYANMAR

Since the 19th Century, people from various parts of India migrated to Myanmar. Over a period of time, they became prosperous and asserted their economic strength in the society. The local people of Myanmar were not happy and felt insecure. From 1920s to 1940s, there were violent revolts. During Ne Win's time, the non-Buddhist people were also targeted. Many of them left Myanmar during Ne Win's time. From Bengal, the Britishers took a lot of Muslims to Burma from 1823 onwards when the British occupied the Rakhine state of Myanmar. After the independence of Burma in 1948, these Muslims stayed back in Burma. Many of them are settled in South West Burma, which is known as the Rakhine area. The Rakhine area is in Arakan Yoma Mountains. From 'Rakhine' a word has originated for these Muslims in Myanmar's language and the word is Rohangs. These Muslims are therefore called Rohingyas (the people of Rakhine). In 1982 Citizenship law, a constitutional order, of Myanmar was passed by the government and the Rohingyas were not recognised as an official ethnic group and since then have become stateless in Myanmar. In the 1990s, a 969 movement began in Myanmar. The movement was a brainchild of Kyaw Lwin. Under the 969 movement the government used Lwin's ideas to win over people by preaching the good practices of Buddhism. In the 2000s, another movement called the 786 movement began. The origin of the 786 concept is in Arabic Abjad numerical system and is inspired from the opening passage of Quran. In Myanmar, 786 usually demarcate an area as belonging to Muslims. Normally, Muslims outside their homes and shops write 786. The Arabic meaning of 786 is Bismillah Al Rehman Al Rahim (in the name of god, most gracious and most merciful). The Buddhists of Myanmar began to misinterpret the 786 movement and they began to think the movement is aimed to dominate 21st century ($7 + 8 + 6 = 21$) as the Islamic century. The 9/11 attacks in 2001 cemented this fear amongst the Buddhists that Islam is going to dominate the 21st century. The insecurity of the Buddhists began to grow. The Buddhist insecurity manifested as riots in 2011 in the Sittwe–Rakhine region and the brain behind this ethnic violence was Ashin Wirathu. The rise of the radical and rightist Ashin Wirathu has brought out the face of radical Buddhism. This has led to the mass exodus of Rohingyas to Indonesia and Thailand in 2015.

THE ROHINGYAS AND OPERATION PIN CODE OF ISI OF PAKISTAN

According to RAW, ISI of Pakistan has created the cadres of the Harakah-al-Yaqin (HaY) group and uses it to create unrest in the region as part of their Operation Pin Code. RAW has found that ISI used the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and HaY to mastermind the attacks on military posts in the Rakhine state. The leader of ARSA is Hafiz Tohar who is an asset of the ISI. Tohar has created Aqa Mul Mujahedeen (AMM), which has been trained by the Lashkar group. As the HaY and ARSA unleash violence, Myanmar army retaliates by carrying out counter operations. These counter operations by the army of Myanmar lead to exodus of the Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh and India, which the ISI, through their information war portrays to the world as a humanitarian crisis. There are around 10 lakh Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and around 40,000 in India. These illegal immigrants, living majorly in Kashmir, are susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups of ISI and thus constitute a security threat to India. The influx of Rohingya Muslims to India also disturbs the demographic pattern and social, political and cultural stability of the society. The Rohingya problem, described by the UN, is a classical textbook case of ethnic cleansing. The Rohingya crisis is a symptom of modern-day Myanmar where at heart of the crisis is the inability of the majority Buddhist state to accept a multi-religious society. Firstly, the Rohingya Muslims end up at a disadvantage because of deep conflict in Myanmar with respect to the civil–military divide and military positioning itself as the protector of the nation. Secondly, because of them being Muslims, the majority Bamar–

Buddhist community refuses to accept the Rohingya primacy in Rakhine area. Thirdly, the ultra-nationalists Buddhists have resorted to fuel Islamophobia against the Rohingya Muslims, which has caused their further alienation in the society.

INDIA'S ROHINGYA POLICY

India's response to Rohingya crisis has evolved over three distinct phases. In the first phase of India's policy, in 2012, when violent conflicts began in Rakhine area between the Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, India asserted that it is an 'internal' problem of Myanmar. India adopted a two-point policy. Firstly, it provided a 1-million USD package to assist in development and rehabilitation of Rohingya Muslims. Secondly, India, as part of its age-old tradition of tolerance in welcoming refugees allowed the Rohingya refugees to settle in India (based on the principle of non-refoulement and voluntary repatriation, explained later).

In 2015, the Rohingya crisis assumed a regional dimension for the first time. In the same year, the Rohingya refugees tried to enter into Malaysia and Thailand. They tried to reach these areas via the sea when their boats were turned around. At that time there were calls made to India to rescue the people in the boats. India did not respond to any such requests. There were various factors that went into this shift in Indian perception of Rohingya Muslims. Firstly, India was not interested in upsetting Myanmar by taking up the Rohingya Muslims issue at a time when Myanmar was trying to make a shift towards democracy. India rightly believed that if Myanmar is pushed too much on the Rohingya Muslims issue, it might be compelled to go close to China, which India could not afford strategically. Secondly, India has been deeply involved in Shwe gas field, Kaladan project and Sittwe port development and did not want to upset Myanmar at a time when it was involved with Myanmar at this developmental and strategic level. India followed a careful balance between geo-politics, geo-strategic and geo-economic concerns in the first phase. The origin of the second phase of India's Rohingya Muslims policy can be traced back to 2017. On 9th August 2017, in a response to a Parliamentary question, Indian Home Minister asserted that the government is planning to deport the Rohingya Muslims who are settled in different parts of the country, as they are 'illegal immigrants'. Even though the minister did clarify that the plan to deport the Rohingya Muslims is still being planned. In September 2017, there was a huge inflow of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar to Bangladesh. This heightened Indian concerns of the possibility of the outflow of the Rohingya Muslims from Bangladesh to India. India immediately responded by launching Operation Insaniyat. Under this operation, the government provided economic assistance to Bangladesh to provide relief to the Rohingya Muslims in the refugee camps in Myanmar. This is an important element of the Indian strategy in the second phase. The core logic is to de-incentivise the refugees to enter into India by incentivising Bangladesh. Thus, as we infer, that in the second phase, apart from geopolitical constraints, India adopted a policy with a mixture of humanitarian elements and non-interference in the internal affairs with adequate diplomatic capital invested in balancing Bangladesh and Myanmar. By the end of the second phase, India was able to achieve clarity regarding how to eventually approach the Rohingya Muslims problem and this led to the rise of the third phase. India developed clarity over three things. First, India stated that the situation could be normalised only when the displaced persons are returned to the Rakhine state. This policy stance meant that Rohingya Muslims needed to return to Myanmar not only from Bangladesh but also from India. This is where the catch lies. India calls the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar as 'displaced persons' but calls the Rohingya Muslims in India as 'illegal immigrants'. Second, India believes rightly that the only long-term solution to the problem of the Rohingya Muslims is the development of the Rakhine state for which India needs to use its own resources and also mobilise the resources from the international community. Third, India has asserted that it will maintain a healthy and a constructive engagement with both Myanmar and Bangladesh while at the same time will convince the international community to handle the situation of Rohingya Muslims with restraint, owing to the welfare of the Rohingya Muslims. The analysis of third phase proves that India's approach to the Rohingya Muslims problem was driven by an urge to find a resolution to the Rohingya Muslims crisis. This is a perfect case of quiet Indian diplomacy at work. The ulterior reason for India to resort to the third phase was to counter the proactive and assertive role that China began to play in the resolution of Rohingya Muslims crisis. China had announced a three-step strategy to solve the Rohingya Muslims crisis. China asserted that firstly their needs to be a ceasefire to ensure people do not run around and live in peace. Secondly, China asserted that there needs to intense consultations on the basis of equality. Thirdly, China asserted the need for the international community to develop the Rakhine state. Indian perception was that if it does not step in into the issue of Rohingya Muslims immediately, then it would end up in providing strategic space to China to decide on issues in Indian neighborhood. This would enable China to take geopolitical gains in India's own backyard. This is the

reason why India decided to step up its developmental engagement with the government of Myanmar and ended up in concluding agreements to undertake housing development, medicine support etc. for the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine area. As the countries in the West are busy in mitigating their own challenges, India has taken the Western vacuum to place itself in a comfortable position in developing its own strategy for the problem of Rohingya Muslims. There are two schools of thought that help us to analyse the conceptual prism of India's Rohingya policy. According to the first school, India has hesitation in designating any asylum seekers as refugees. Because of this thought in the strategic community of India, India creates disincentives for asylum seekers to stay permanently in India. According to the first school, the reason why India does not favour permanent settlement of refugees in India is because of an absence of a national policy for refugees. The second school of thought tries to explain the Indian approach to Rohingya Muslims by looking at the concept of implications. This school tries to explain the Rohingya Muslims problem through the implications Rohingya Muslims will have on India. As per this school, the government's approach of the Rohingya Muslims problem is explained through a security lens. This school asserts that the government in India is looking at the Rohingya Muslims problem as a problem of radicalisation, which can lead to a spillover on the Muslim population of India. As per the second school, this policy of the government is a shortsighted policy because it puts thousands of members of Indian diaspora in Myanmar under a serious risk while allowing other states to take lead in proposing solutions to Rohingya Muslims problem (Chinese three-step solution). The second school asserts that the Indian government's policy on Rohingya Muslims negates India's own past of being a democratic society with an open door for refugees.


INDIA, REFUGEE CONVENTION, NON-REFOULEMENT AND ROHINGYA ISSUE

In 1951, a Refugee Convention relating to the status of refugees was proposed. At that time, Nehru stated that India was committed to follow its principles without any legal obligation of ratifying it. The Convention defines refugees as person fleeing persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion. The refugees, under the Convention, get legal rights, which include the 'non-refoulement', which prevents the states from sending them back to the states from where the persecution originated. They also get secondary rights that range from work, property and education etc. India is not a signatory to 1957 UN Refugee Convention and nor to the 1967 Protocol, but the Indian government on case-to-case basis accepts asylum in India. If Indian government permits a seeker with asylum in India, the person in concern is provided with a Long-Term Visa (LTV). The LTV is renewed annually and allows a holder to work in private sector in India along with access to education and basic banking services. The UN has urged India to follow customary law while trying to deport Rohingya. This means that as in Myanmar, Rohingya Muslims are stateless, under the customary law; the principle of non-refoulement is applied where refugees cannot be returned forcibly to a place where there is a threat to their life or freedom. The Indian government has legal right to deport immigrants who may pose a security threat. Though selective targeting of Rohingya Muslims may be morally incorrect but places no legal limitations on the government. Three issues emerge in conclusion. Firstly, the way the government has handled the Rohingya Muslims problem has certainly raised questions on the democratic credentials in India. Secondly, India's initial reluctance to take a lead initially and reacting only after India saw the Chinese enter has raised questions on India's regional leadership question. Thirdly, the concentration of desperate people in Bangladesh and Myanmar only provide a fertile ground for breeding forms of radicalisation. One thing is clear. Instead of resorting to megaphone diplomacy to solve the Rohingya Muslims problem, India has preferred quiet diplomacy. As a future strategy, India should ensure that Rohingya Muslims are not deported back to Myanmar until it is safe for the Rohingya Muslims to reside in Myanmar. India can always prioritise national security but such prioritisation should not be imprudent and self-defeating. India should strive to establish cooperative agreements with Myanmar and Bangladesh to facilitate intelligence sharing that can prevent rise of radicalisation. A long-term strategy India should adopt is to try making Rohingya Muslims problem a core diplomatic agenda at various regional forums such as BIMSTEC and ASEAN. A 'regional diplomatic approach' can be a fruitful strategy in the long run. At the global level, India can play a role in convincing the West that sanctions on Myanmar will not work and eventually push Myanmar closer to China. Thus, the international community should constructively engage with Myanmar and help carve a developmental discourse. Such a strategy can help sharpen India's global credentials and help position India as a state with diplomatic capital for crisis management. In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court also stayed the deportation of seven Rohingya by the Indian government as they asserted that the Union Government in an affidavit had claimed that the Government of Myanmar accepted the refugees as citizens and the seven persons too orally agreed

for their deportation. In 2020, an African state Gambia, took Myanmar to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over the Rohingya crisis. The ICJ concluded that Rohingya face genocide by the Myanmar army. As a rising power which possess global aspirations coupled with a tradition-based history on dealing with refugees, India is duty bound to shape a narrative on Rohingya Muslims problem. Only then can India become a country, which Swami Vivekananda envisaged, a haven to the persecuted of the world, untainted by discrimination based on religion or nation.

INDIA AND MYANMAR BORDER COOPERATION

Myanmar and India share both land and maritime borders but since the 1990s, there has also been a growing proximity between China and Myanmar, who also share a land border. Myanmar continues to witness sea piracy and ethnic crises. Nagas have been living in the North East since time immemorial. After the decolonisation of Myanmar, new boundaries were created with India. This led to a division between India and Myanmar and affected the Nagas, who became ethnic minorities on both sides. To resolve the issue, the governments of both countries decided to establish a Free Movement Regime (FMR), which could allow Nagas greater interaction either side of the border. As per the FMR, the Nagas can travel 16 km across either side of the border without a visa. This FMR facilitated interaction between Konyaks, Khiamniungans and Yimchungar Nagas living in Eastern districts of Nagaland. The border crossing was possible only with a valid border pass, costing 20 rupees. India and Myanmar signed a Border Trade Agreement in 1994, which got operationalised in 1995. As per the agreement, the two sides will undertake border trade through designated check posts. Around 1% of the India–Myanmar trade happens through the border. The present duty is 5% for the 40 identified select items traded at the border.



INDIA–MYANMAR LAND BORDER CROSSING AGREEMENT 2018

In 2018, the two sides established a new border regime under which a citizen with a valid Indian or Myanmar passport and visa can now cross over to either side. There will no requirement of any special permit anymore. The two sides have identified Moreh in Manipur–Tamu in Myanmar (in Sagiang division) and Zokhawthar in Mizoram–Rhiikhawdar in Myanmar (in Chin state) as the crossing points. This will facilitate Buddhist tourists, medical tourists and students of Myanmar to travel to India with ease. There are many Manipuri people in Mandalay. Earlier they had to take a flight to Kolkata from Yangon. Now, the distance gets shortened and will facilitate people-to-people ties.


INDIA AND MYANMAR DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION

India, way back in 1950, had provided Myanmar with six Dakota aircrafts to aid in its fight against insurgency. The important dimension of the defence relationship is that India has been an important arms supplier to Myanmar. India has supplied T-55 tanks, transport planes and naval crafts to Myanmar, to name just a few. The broad contours of our defence engagement include border training, intelligence sharing and the training of Myanmar forces. In 1994, India and Myanmar signed a pact on Maintenance and Tranquility in Border Areas. Since then, India and Myanmar have been cooperating in the area of counter insurgency. Indian army chiefs regularly interact with their Myanmar counterparts. In 2006, both concluded a pact on intelligence sharing and training, where India envisages training of Myanmar's military to boost their military capabilities. Another driver of defence cooperation has been drug smuggling. Myanmar is a part of the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand and Laos) and has become an important transit country for illegal drug trafficking. In 2010, India and Myanmar established Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty on criminal matters, which have emerged as the core legal instrument to address issues related to drug smuggling and gun running. In 2012, both established Joint Working Group on Terrorism. In 2014, they signed a pact on border cooperation. India assists Myanmar in building Offshore Patrol Vehicles under Coordination Protocol (CORPAT). Recently, India also carried out a surgical strike on the Indian side of the border to shoot down insurgents operating in the region in 2016. Another key driver of defence cooperation is maritime security because India undertakes oil exploration in Myanmar. As Myanmar faces piracy and illegal fishing problems, India has

been providing training to Myanmar's forces and especially navy. At the maritime level, the two sides in 2016 concluded a Standard Operating Procedure for Joint Naval Portal. India also signed a Maritime Security Agreement with Myanmar in 2017. Under the agreement, India and Myanmar would be sharing data related to non-classified merchant ships with each other. India would also provide coastal surveillance system to Myanmar. In 2020, India handed over INS Sindhuvir, a Kilo-class submarine, which India purchased from Russia in 1980. This makes India counter China in Myanmar, which was trying to sell Ming-class submarines.

INDIA-MYANMAR COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

There has been steady gradual improvement in the trade ties between India and Myanmar. India imports beans, pulses and forest products from Myanmar while it exports steel and pharmaceutical products. Myanmar stands to be the second largest supplier of pulses to India. There is a rising cooperation in the field of IT and plantation products.



INDIA-MYANMAR HYDROCARBON PARTNERSHIP

At the level of hydrocarbons, India and Myanmar signed a pact in 2006 on cooperation in the petroleum sector. Since then India's ONGC Videsh Limited and GAIL have been present in exploration and development activities. India has acquired stakes in Shwe development and production area. Jubilant Energy and Reliance are also working in shallow water blocks in Myanmar. Both sides identified new areas of cooperation, which include construction of LPG terminals, railway cooperation and petroleum cooperation.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF KALADAN MULTI-MODAL TRANSIT TRANSPORT PROJECT ON INDIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS

The detailed project report was prepared in 2003 and a framework was agreed upon in 2008. The project was expected to be operational for shipment from 2020. It was conceived as an idea to have multi-modal transit transport for shipments from ports on India's east coast and North East through Myanmar. The project aimed to develop North East economy and integrate India's northeast to South East Asia. Through this, North East would be open to sea connectivity. It is a combination of rail, road and river transport. There are no land acquisition issues or environmental concerns, but security threats from insurgents and cost overrun are recurring issues. It would connect Kolkata to Sittwe by sea; from Sittwe to Paletwa by river transport and then a highway to Zorinpuri, Mizoram. The project will boost employment and helps lower the food prices in the region but the intrusion into the region will create a threat to local heritage.

CHINA FACTOR IN INDIA AND MYANMAR RELATIONS

China and Myanmar have deep relations, which are aptly called the "pauk-phaw" or fraternal ties. China is undertaking port construction in Myanmar. India felt that China would probably encircle India. In fact, from Myanmar point of view, the deepening of its relations with China compelled it to diversify and it became natural for Myanmar to look towards India to counter the dominating influence exerted by China. India certainly wants to limit Chinese assertion in Myanmar, as it constitutes Myanmar to be region of the Indian spear of influence. India asserts this because it supported democracy in Myanmar since the 1980s. However, to lay down a foundation for political reform, India, since the beginning of

21st century, had to support the Military Junta. Burmese scholars believe that the reason India became unsuccessful in challenging rising Chinese influence in Myanmar was its support to the Junta. The scholars also believe that when India began to support the Junta, it began to lose goodwill amongst the Burmese population. At present, India's influence is missing in the two camps of Myanmar—one camp that supports democracy and that which is supported by not only the ethnic minorities of Myanmar but also the USA, Japan and South Korea; while other camp is dominated by China and Tatmadaw or the Myanmar military. Though India has favoured the democracy camp, the views of the reformists hardly match with India. Drug trafficking across the borders is viewed by the reformists as a source of income but perceived as major threat by India. Since 2011, the coming of Thein Sein government has initiated a policy of global engagement. This has been beneficial for India, as Chinese influence in Myanmar will gradually diminish as Myanmar searches for new friends. The USA too has opened up to Myanmar, as it knows that a deeper engagement with Myanmar favours the USA in its attempt to keep the rise of China in check. The Chinese, on the other hand, began to support the United DWA State Army (UWSA). The UWSA has been getting arms and ammunition from China to fight the Myanmar government. The future depends on how Myanmar and the USA shall evolve and strengthen their relationship and whether the USA will provide military and defence supplies to Myanmar to counter China.

AREAS OF FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND MYANMAR

India has decided to support cooperation in identified areas. India will support Myanmar in livelihood creation, capacity building, construction of roads, tourism promotion, healthcare, education, telecom, renewable energy and fast moving consumer goods. In 2016, a motor vehicle agreement was concluded for Thailand–Myanmar–India roadways. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Highway shall be the next game changer. Not only Myanmar is the lynchpin for India's Act East Policy but also a gateway for a stable Indo-Pacific of the future.

Three Critical Gaps in India and Myanmar

Three areas need immediate intervention in India and Myanmar relations: security and connectivity at borders, connectivity with Indian northeast and expansion of bilateral border trade.